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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE IDEAL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY: ARTICULATING THE POSSIBILITY OF
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY WITHIN RELIGIOUS CONTEXTS

This dissertation seeks to explain a certain instability that characterizes many
contemporary religious communities. Why are people abandoning organized religion at an
unprecedented rate? And why do so many religious people behave in vicious ways, even as they
claim to preach a message of love? These phenomena are related, and they are both usually
explained on epistemological grounds. According to many of religion’s recent critics, religious
belief requires the suspension of rational thought, and those who abandon it have simply seen the
light of reason. Meanwhile, those who remain religious do so despite the testimony of their
reason, and the harms they commit against others are dismissed as a product of irrationality.
However, this explanation is insufficient. Real-world data show that people leave their religions
behind for a host of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with belief. These individuals
recount broken relationships, disagreements over social and political issues, and feeling
disconnected from their communities and their gods—despite still believing many of their
religions’ basic tenets. Furthermore, belief in a non-existent entity is not directly correlated with
the kinds of viciousness for which religion is often criticized. Many people believe objectively
false things, but do not weaponize those beliefs to harm others. Therefore, we should not criticize
religion in terms of its claims’ truth or falsehood, because these criteria do not successfully
explain the problems above.
Instead, we should recognize the decline of religion as an alienation of the individual
from her community. I argue that communities are strongest when their members recognize their
own interests as aligning with those of the group. This synthesis of interests enables community
members to trust and support one another, even in the face of difference. Meanwhile,
communities experience instability when their members understand their own interests as
alienated from those of the group. This perceived alienation is the product of a misunderstanding
of the relationship between the universal and the particular. I draw from the work of Friedrich
Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant to demonstrate two particular ways in which religious
communities can mischaracterize this relationship. In both cases, the result is a community where
individuals find themselves unable to form relations of thick trust with subjects beyond
themselves. In my final chapter, we see that Hegel suggests a distinct way of doing religion—
what he calls folk religion—that overcomes the same kinds of problems as those highlighted by
Nietzsche and Kant. Such a religion not only unites its adherents with their god, but also with one

another. The project therefore ends on an optimistic note: religion is not something that
necessarily must produce alienation and conflict. It is possible to create a religious community
that fosters meaningful relationships among its members.
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CHAPTER 1. DEFINING RELIGION IN TERMS OF THE SOCIAL
1.1

Introduction & Scope of Project
At the time of this writing, religion’s role in human life is shifting in a number of

ways. Within certain geographical regions and certain faith traditions, religion remains as
influential as ever1; however, there is a simultaneous move away from religious affiliation
taking place in many nations, particularly those in the West. This project is primarily
interested in this decline of religious affiliation within the United States specifically.
Throughout US history, its citizens have overwhelmingly considered themselves to
be Christians, with over 75% of Americans identifying with some denomination of the
religion as recently as 2010.2 However, this figure is rapidly changing, with American
Christian affiliation experiencing a 12% decline in the last decade. Of course, the potential
causes for this trend are numerous: shifting population demographics and increased
education levels are just two factors that can and do certainly contribute to this
phenomenon. However, this project arose from the suspicion that mere demographic causes
do not tell us the whole story of why American Christianity (and to some degree, American
religiosity in general) is on the decline.
I will argue that this phenomenon ought to be of major interest to the discipline of
philosophy; however, at this time, the field has not adequately engaged with the changing
historical moment. Within academic philosophy, much recent discussion of religion writ

1

For example, Islam is experiencing a spike in new affiliations, and southern Africa is projected to contain
40% of the globe’s Christians within the next thirty years. See Pew Research Center, April 5, 2015, “The
Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.”
2 Pew Research Center, October 17, 2019, “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace.”
Roughly half of Americans consider themselves to be Protestants of some sort, while approximately one
fifth identify as Catholic.
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large tends to be reductive, treating the phenomenon as an outdated practice that no rational
individual would ever defend. This trend is unfortunate, for it loses valuable opportunities
to understand our current evolutionary period in American history. Taking a good-faith
look at religion reveals realities about the phenomenon that are often overlooked in
contemporary scholarship. Therefore, this project will propose a distinct way of thinking
about religion, in an attempt to provide one novel explanation for at least part of the
Western trend away from its historical religious affiliations.3
“Religion” is one of those slippery terms that evades easy definition. There are few
clear criteria for what makes something a religion; elements such as ritualistic practices,
alleged deities, and the notion of an afterlife are common, but by no means universal.4
Given these difficulties, one way that religion is often defined is in terms of belief –
whether it be belief in a deity, or in a set of moral principles, or in some other metaphysical
phenomena. Because of this role of belief, religion is often treated as a primarily
epistemological phenomenon, through which the faithful seek to obtain some information
about reality, which then informs how they navigate the world. This is true for both
religion’s supporters and its critics. Fundamentalist Christians, for instance, declare that
they are saved from their sins through their belief in Jesus Christ, and emphasize that their
fellow churchgoers must hold onto their faith in times of doubt. Those who walk away
3

As a philosophical project, this dissertation will often consider the concept of “religion” broadly, rather
than merely limiting its theoretical scope to that of any single religion, i.e. American Christianity. This is
due, in large part, to the fact that Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche are seeking to provide accounts of religion as
a general concept, rather than to speak merely of any particular religious tradition. Therefore, while this
project takes its starting point in events concerning one historical religious tradition, it should not be
construed merely as a sociological examination of that one religion. We are interested in the theoretical
underpinnings of religious practice writ large, which (if my account is correct) ought not to be understood
merely within the context of any one religious tradition.
4 Stephen Asma proposes these elements as broadly definitive in Why We Need Religion (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2018), while noting that even these categories may struggle to capture the essence
of some religions.
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from the religion are often accused of simply not believing enough. Non-theistic religions
may not hold such clearly defined views about particular deities, but nonetheless maintain
traditional beliefs about other phenomena, which they take great care to pass down to new
generations of believers.
Meanwhile, most of religion’s recent academic critics attack the practice on the
grounds that it encourages unjustified or irrational beliefs. Among the most infamous of
these critics are New Atheist thinkers such as Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, who
decry religion as both metaphysically dubious and epistemologically unsound. For
instance, Dennett tentatively defines religion as a “social system whose participants avow
belief in a supernatural agent or agents whose approval is to be sought.” 5 Dennett’s mention
of religion’s social element acknowledges that it is not merely an individual intellectual
practice; however, he still primarily defines the phenomenon in terms of belief in the
supernatural. He goes so far as to say that new-age spiritual practices, which feature
traditional religious rites such as meditation or prayer but do not necessarily cultivate
beliefs in any particular deity, share similarities to religion but are “another species
altogether.”6 And again, he asserts that
[t]he core phenomenon of religion, I am proposing, invokes gods who are affective
agents in real time, and who play a central role in the way participants think about
what they ought to do.7

5

Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin Books,
2006), p. 7.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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In other words, religion’s primary function is to cultivate certain beliefs regarding one’s
purpose in life. Dennett’s task in this text is to analyze religious beliefs via scientific
inquiry, in order to determine whether religion is a practice that remains useful as history
moves forward. He suggests that, if his investigation produces a negative answer, then
continuing to cling to religious beliefs would constitute a type of harm.8 Richard Dawkins
takes a similar position: he contends that religion is an outright delusion (that is, an
irrational belief), and that those who embrace it are dogmatically committed to ideologies
that are obviously and demonstrably false. He spends the entirety of The God Delusion
refuting what he calls the God hypothesis, or the belief that the world is a product of
intelligent design. Dawkins’s view is that because religious beliefs about the nature of the
world are not supported by Occam’s Razor, we must contend with the likely reality that
they are false—and that in the face of this falsehood, we ought to reject religion altogether. 9
Accounts such as these often refer to particular, negative religious behaviors. For
instance, religion is often critiqued for cultivating various forms of violence and
extremism. This tendency can be seen within a number of contemporary American
evangelical Christian communities; for example, members of the infamous Westboro
Baptist Church are known for disrupting funerals with incendiary conduct. 10 Violent
behavior on the part of religious people is usually understood in terms of belief, just as
religion itself is. This explanation typically goes as follows: religious belief is

8

Ibid., p. 14.
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp. 147-150.
10 It may be argued that due to their extreme minority views and their clearly political motives, the
Westboro Baptist Church is primarily a political group masquerading as a religious group, rather than a
genuine body of religious believers. However, the group’s official stance is that its members affirm the
teachings of the Bible as truth. Given this (at least superficial) role of belief, both models for defining
religion that this project will consider (i.e. the epistemological model and the social model) would
determine that it is indeed a religion.
9
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epistemologically unjustified, and therefore inherently irrational; violence, bigotry, and the
like are also irrational; therefore, when a religious person commits some heinous action, it
is simply a case of an irrational person doing irrational things. On this view, those who
walk away from religion are those who have seen the light of reason and embraced
rationality over fantasy. Religious fanatics, meanwhile, are largely dismissed, as if they are
too intellectually far gone to even critique. However, this explanation is insufficient. There
are countless people who hold unjustified beliefs about various things, but do not
weaponize those beliefs to harm others. Unjustified or irrational belief, therefore, does not
adequately explain the cause of much religious violence, and criticizing religion in terms
of belief does not provide a tenable solution for how that violence can be mitigated.
We cannot deny that belief is a central tenet of much religious practice, for better
or worse. However, treating religion merely as an epistemological endeavor, or a way of
gathering information to inform certain beliefs about the nature of reality, fails to capture
other elements of the religious experience that are equally important. We can see this by
looking to the current trend towards secularization within the United States. If religion were
merely a matter of belief in the supernatural, then the testimony of religious “nones” (that
is, those who claim no particular religious affiliation) would communicate a lack of belief
as the driving cause of their disaffiliation. Lack of belief does show up in these
conversations, but it is far from the only thing that does. A recent poll shows that about
half of American religious “nones” cite disbelief as the primary reason for their attrition.
However, the other half claimed other reasons, such as a political dislike of organized

5

religion, or an experience of social conflict within their former congregations.11 And
another study, which specifically targeted the 18-22-year-old demographic, primarily
shows interpersonal and social issues as the driving force of young people abandoning their
childhood religions. Nearly a third of respondents stated that they felt disconnected from
their faith communities; only 10% claimed that they had stopped believing in God. 12 All
of this shows that people are driven away from religion by far more than a lack of faith in
the divine. More broadly, it also suggests that there is more to the religious experience than
simply cultivating these sorts of beliefs.
Those who consider religion to have outlived its usefulness take themselves to hold
a progressive intellectual position, to have in some sense evolved beyond the foolish views
of early human history. However, those who take the New Atheist position on why religion
is problematic ironically form their own commitment to an outdated philosophical view.
The view in question is the Enlightenment-era belief in the primacy of the rational, and the
relative unimportance of the practical. Dennett and Dawkins reject religious belief not
simply because it is empirically unjustifiable, but because they hold that that which is
empirically unjustifiable is irrational, and therefore problematic. The New Atheists hold
that we ought to reject religion because it makes no theoretical sense, without appreciating
the possibility that perhaps it intends to serve a different function altogether. Such a view
fails to recognize the reality that human life itself is first and foremost a practical endeavor,
rather than a theoretical one.

11

Pew Research Center, Aug. 23, 2016, “Choosing a New Church or House of Worship.”

12

Lifeway Research, 2017, “Church Dropouts: Reasons Young Adults Stay or Go between Ages 18-22.
Survey of 2,002 Young Adults who Attended a Protestant Church Regularly in High School.”
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My view is that, if we hope to understand religion’s increasing irrelevance, we
ought to widen the way in which we discuss religious belief. Following the tradition of
pragmatist thinkers such as William James, Stephen Asma points out that there are two
broad categories of belief: indicative beliefs, which concern that which is literally true, and
imperative beliefs, which can yield a practical benefit to the one who holds them even if
they cannot be demonstrably proven. 13 Those who take the position of the New Atheists
understand religion’s goal to be the cultivation of indicative beliefs regarding the nature of
reality, and dismiss religion because its claims cannot be verified. However, Asma argues
that religion primarily deals in imperative beliefs. I will argue that, given the experiences
of religious individuals as mentioned above, the primary function of religion is to bring
believers together within a community – and not to articulate literal truths about the divine.
We therefore ought not to analyze religion in terms of its rationality (or lack thereof), but
in terms of the community relationships that it fosters.
To put this another way, we can explain religion’s increasing irrelevance in terms
of the social, and not merely the epistemological. People are not only leaving their former
faiths behind because of changing beliefs about the divine—they are also leaving because
of social problems, as they feel alienated from increasingly extreme religious
communities.14 This alienation can lead individuals to abandon organized religion, even if
they still believe in a god or other religious ideologies. As many religious groups turn
increasingly inward (and in doing so, often become increasingly militant), more people are
finding no tenable place for themselves within those groups. The goal of this project, then,

13

Asma, Why We Need Religion, pp. 30-35.
To be clear, this is not to say that social factors are the only cause of religious attrition, or that (dis)belief
does not also play a major role in the current trend.
14
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is to articulate a theory of community that demonstrates what social factors are contributing
to the decline of religious affiliation. I will argue that many departures from religion are
the result of an unstable religious community structure, which takes the universal and the
particular to be inherently alienated from one another. This alienation contributes to the
breakdown of relationships among the religious group, as individuals take their own
interests to be necessarily opposed to those of their community. Those who remain in these
broken and alienated communities struggle to develop reciprocal relationships with others,
and this can ultimately lead members of such communities to commit violent and extremist
behavior against others. Taking this social view of religion, then, will provide us with a
new and useful framework with which to critique various religious phenomena. Due to the
nature of religious faith, arguing with a religious person merely in terms of indicative
beliefs is almost always fruitless; however, if we can demonstrate that a religious group is
committing some harm that is primarily social rather than epistemological in nature, then
we can critique religion without ever needing to wade into the issue of whether a god or
gods literally exist.
This chapter will provide us with the ideological framework upon which the rest of
this project will be built. Its structure will be as follows: first, I will define how I’m
understanding community by undertaking an interdisciplinary review of the concept.
Clarifying what defines a community in general is essential if we hope to understand any
particular form of community. We will see that a community is a social group grounded
upon relations of thick trust between its members. However, all communities are not
created equal; thick trust can exist to a greater or lesser degree within a group. The better
of a job that a community does of cultivating thick trust among its members, the more

8

durable that community will be in the long-term. However, many communities fail to
cultivate a significant degree of thick trust among their members, because those
communities sustain some form of alienation between the individual and the group.
Therefore, in addition to the distinction that the literature traditionally draws between
community and society, we shall see that we can also differentiate between multiple kinds
of community, based upon the degree to which a community successfully cultivates thick
trust among its members. The most durable form of community is what we shall call a
collaborative community, where thick trust develops through the synthesis of individual
and group interests—a synthesis that effectively overcomes alienation between the two.
With community thus defined, I will spend the next section defining what I take to
be two necessary conditions for the growth of thick trust among a group (or, to put it
differently, two necessary conditions for the birth of a durable community). The extent to
which these conditions are satisfied is what sets a community apart from a society, but also
what sets a collaborative community apart from other, less stable forms of community. I
take thick trust to be predicated upon two things in a relationship: a recognition of others’
moral autonomy, and a mutual respect for the rationality of the practical. Both of these
conditions work to overcome alienation between the individual and the group, and
therefore foster communal relationships. Communities can exist that satisfy one or both of
these conditions; however, in order for a community to be considered a collaborative
community, it must meet both of them.
With all of this established, the conclusion of this chapter will demonstrate some
ways in which religion functions as a community (as we have defined the term). I will
argue that we should understand religion as a primarily social endeavor, and not merely as
9

a way of forming beliefs that are literally true. To make this point, I will highlight several
ways in which religion serves a primarily social function in human life. Some benefits of
religious practice have little to do with indicative belief—they can be procured regardless
of whether the individual affirms the claims of a religious tradition. Other benefits do
involve belief, but in these cases, that belief works to provide some primarily social benefit
to the one who holds it. We should therefore not think of religion as merely a way of
forming indicative beliefs about the world, but of forming imperative beliefs that allow one
to participate in a community with others. Defining religion in terms of the social means
that we can use our framework for what grounds a durable community to analyze and
critique religious communities specifically.

1.2

What’s a Community?
If we are going to understand religion in terms of community relationships, we

should begin by defining what, exactly, we mean by the term “community.” Specifically,
what sets a group apart as a community, rather than a society or other type of human social
group? Ferdinand Tönnies was the first to draw a distinction between society and
community, or Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. The former is founded upon a mutual
commitment to a certain form of self-interest, where a group cooperates with one another
as needed in order to protect their own interests from others.15 The latter, on the other hand,
typically decries a strong commitment to radical self-interest.16 These communities often

15

See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), trans. and introd.
Charles P. Loomis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957).
16 Such an account of community understands the concept of self-interest within a primarily Hobbesian
framework. Hobbes treats the individual agent as a fundamentally egoistic entity, whose central concern is
always to promote her own interests as she sees fit. Hobbes, of course, treats the interests of the individual
and the group as if they are in continuous tension with one another – this tension encourages an
interpretation of Gesellschaft versus Gemeinschaft, which this project will ultimately reject.
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encourage shared allegiance to a central authority figure and mutual commitment to
definite social roles, all in the name of the group’s well-being. Generally speaking, in
contrast to a society, a community is not oriented merely towards the interests of its
individual members, but rather towards the interests of the group itself.
Taking up this distinction, economists Paul Adler and Charles Heckscher argue that
what primarily differentiates Gemeinschaft from Gesellschaft is the presence of thick trust
versus thin trust among members of the group. A community develops in the presence of
mutual thick trust, whereas a society is characterized by mere thin trust between its
members. Adler and Heckscher distinguish these kinds of trust in this way: when I have
thick trust in another person, I possess a high degree of confidence in my ability to predict
the behavior of that person. I specifically trust that the person in question will act with the
well-being of others and not merely herself in mind. 17 For example, if I have thick trust in
a coworker, I can trust that she will not steal money from my unwatched desk, even if she
could get away with doing so. Thin trust, on the other hand, assumes self-interest as a
primary motivator for others’ actions, and makes predictions based upon this assumption. 18
Thin trust would assume that a different coworker would only keep his hands off my
property if someone else were present to witness any potential thieving actions. In a
community, I can go about my daily life with confidence that those around me are looking
out for my well-being as carefully as their own; in a society, I can only assume I will be
safe as long as harming me comes with negative consequences to others.

Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, “Towards Collaborative Community,” in The Firm as a
Collaborative Community: Reconstructing Trust in the Knowledge Economy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p. 13.
18 Ibid., p. 13.
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Some version of the thin versus thick trust distinction is commonly employed and
widely accepted in social thought. 19 It is often claimed that thick trust is the thing that
makes a community a more durable form of social relation than a society. When one is
confident that she can predict the behavior of others, this confidence encourages her to
conduct herself in such a way that will benefit the group, as she trusts that others will do
the same. This trust, and the mutual respect that comes with it, reduce conflict and
encourage altruistic behavior within a group, and yield better long-term outcomes for group
relationships. (People generally get along better when they believe that others are not
working against them!) However, while they agree with this assessment, Adler and
Heckscher argue that we should take things a bit further. They claim we should not only
distinguish between society and community writ large, but also between different kinds of
community—some of which do a better job of fostering thick trust than others. Adler and
Heckscher contend that if our goal is developing a long-lasting community with high levels
of thick trust among its members, neither Gemeinschaft nor Gesellschaft as they are
traditionally understood adequately accomplish that goal. This is because both of these
social groups foster some degree of tension between the individual and the group, a tension
which ultimately stifles the growth of thick trust. 20 Another way to put this is that both of
these groups preserve an ideological dichotomy of the individual versus the collective, in
which the two entities are conceived of as being essentially distinct from one another, and
therefore as having distinct interests.
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20 Adler & Heckscher, “Towards Collaborative Community,” p. 20.
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Adler and Heckscher argue that this distinction hinders the task of communitybuilding, as it interferes with one’s ability to place trust in others. Thick trust requires that
I, as a reasonable person, am confident in my ability to assess how someone else, whom I
take to be another reasonable person, will conduct themselves in our shared environment.
Adler and Heckscher believe that such confidence is only consistently possible when the
individual understands her own interests and the interests of the group as being aligned
with each other.21 When the individual understands herself to be alienated from the group,
these interests may appear to diverge. One may see one’s community as an entity distinct
from oneself, with needs opposed to one’s personal needs. This can lead to the perception
that one must choose between conflicting interests. In the face of this perceived alienation,
the individual may eventually choose to act in a manner that seems to serve her own selfinterest, at the expense of the group’s well-being—and may be perfectly justified in calling
this a rational choice. 22 The potential for such behavior undermines others’ confidence in
the individual, and prevents them from developing a significant degree of thick trust in her.
Therefore, while communities produced by these relations may appear stable in the short
term, they are subject to continuous tension among their members.
The inherent alienation within Gesellschaft (as opposed to Gemeinschaft) is
relatively well-documented.23 When a society is founded primarily upon individual selfinterest, this type of social group treats each person as an island unto herself. The traditional

21Ibid.,

p. 20.
I say “seems to serve her own self-interest” here because this appearance may be false – in a healthy
social group, what benefits one will benefit others. However, this reality may be obscured to the individual
making the choice, and it is her perception of conflicting interests that matters here.
23 For instance, Marx famously draws upon this language in his account of economic alienation. See
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: Prometheus Books,
1988).
22

13

account is well-known: prior to establishing a society, individuals struggle to meet their
own needs within a state of nature. They eventually find that the most effective way to
protect their own interests from others is to enter into a social contract with them. However,
this social contract, and the society that arises from it, remains at its core a highly
individualistic endeavor. The purpose of the social contract is to sustain the interests of
each individual, not to unite them towards a common purpose beyond themselves. Such an
arrangement therefore preserves the idea that each individual can really only look out for
herself, and that the group is just another foreign subject against which she may eventually
need to defend her own interests. Adler and Heckscher argue that splitting the interests of
individuals in this way degrades any possibility of long-lasting community among those
individuals.24 Community requires trust in others—specifically, trust that they will behave
in a way that considers the interests of the whole group, rather than merely the individual.
But in a society, the interests of the group itself are subordinate to those of its individual
members, and the society only exists because the individuals happen to have found it
expedient. Because this group is held together only by a minimal social contract, that
contract could easily be cast aside whenever doing so suits the fancy of enough individuals.
This emphasis on individual interest leads to a social group that is characterized by human
alienation from one another, which precludes the possibility of long-term thick trust
between members of the group.
In contrast to this self-interested society, Gemeinschaft is often proposed as a less
alienated alternative. In such a community, members of the group understand themselves
not as isolated individuals, but as parts of a greater social whole. Self-interested behavior
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is decried in this type of group, because the community itself is prioritized as a distinct
entity. However, despite this apparent overcoming of social isolation, Adler and Heckscher
argue that the traditional model of Gemeinschaft also sustains structures of alienation, and
therefore fails to cultivate extensive thick trust among the group. Whereas Gesellschaft
prioritizes the interests of the individual over those of the group, Gemeinschaft reduces the
individual to her membership in the group. Gemeinschaft is characterized by a group
commitment to an existing status quo, to which individual members are expected to
conform. The group often organizes around a central authority figure or ideology, and
individual identity is defined by one’s relation to that central entity. For Adler and
Heckscher, such a community typically emphasizes adherence to a hierarchical system of
authority, along with a commitment to definite social roles; these emphases result in a low
tolerance for individuality, particularly among those who are reluctant to conform. 25 Within
Gemeinschaft, one is no longer treated as an individual, but as a part of the community first
and foremost. Importantly, the community is treated as an entity unto itself, something that
exists above and beyond its individual members – and the needs of which take precedence
over those of the individual. This leads to a prevailing perception of community needs
versus individual needs.
Adler and Heckscher believe that handling the individual in this way fails to create
conditions for thick trust among a group. To see how this is so, we can look to the social
criticisms of the Frankfurt School critical theorists. To borrow a term from Herbert
Marcuse, we can say that this type of community flattens out the individual, which results
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in her individuality effectively being lost within the group.26 Following Freudian social
theory, Marcuse argues that many social relations fundamentally repress individual human
drives and desires. In such a repressive context, individual freedom is lost to a rigid social
structure that provides a new identity at the cost of one’s old one. The group therefore
functions not as a union of unique and autonomous individuals, but as a homogeneous
collective, a collective to which the individual is sacrificed. Of course, in reality, no group
is actually homogeneous, and individual strengths and needs are not identical across the
group. Such a group fails to appreciate this reality, however. An expectation to downplay
one’s individuality, and to effectively put the needs of one’s community ahead of one’s
own, can foster resentment for that community among its members. Indeed, Sigmund Freud
argues that such resentment is common, and that it is the root of all sorts of problems in
human relationships.27 A frustrated and repressed individual may act out in a way that
satisfies her own desires, even if doing so puts the well-being of her community at risk.
This has negative consequences for the possibility of thick trust. In such a community,
where individual needs and desires are often subordinated to the interests of the group, it
is difficult to reasonably anticipate how others will behave. This community is always
prone to outbursts in which an individual seeks to satisfy some overwhelming repressed
desire, often at the expense of the group, which she takes to be an oppressive alien entity.
In such a situation, relations of thick trust are effectively precluded, for one cannot develop
reasonable confidence in her ability to predict the behavior of others.
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(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 57.
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In Gemeinschaft, the group is exalted at the expense of the individual; in
Gesellschaft, the individual is prioritized over the group. However, despite the apparently
opposite nature of these problems, they share a central root. Both of these social groups
preserve an ideological dichotomy of the individual versus the collective, which makes it
difficult for thick trust to develop among their members. In both of these relations, the
members of the group understand their own needs as being distinct from the needs of the
group—leading them to believe that they must choose between the two. Any task that they
undertake is treated as either work for the sake of the individual, or work for the sake of
the group, but never both. 28 As long as the interests of the individual and the group are
taken to be at odds with each other in this way, it is difficult to develop thick trust in other
members of the group, for there is always a risk that the individual will fall into some
destructive self-interested behavior.
In contrast to these, Adler and Heckscher argue that a community functions best
when its members recognize their interdependence with one another, while nonetheless
maintaining their status as unique, autonomous agents.29 In other words, they must
acknowledge their community as an essential and inseparable part of themselves, rather
than as something distinct from their lives as individuals, even as they recognize that they
cannot be reduced to their community. This type of community overcomes alienation
through an emphasis on cooperation, in a context where individual needs and strengths are
respected. It recognizes that working together towards a mutually beneficial end goal
produces the greatest results not only for the group itself, but also for individuals.30 Such a

Adler & Heckscher, “Towards Collaborative Community,” p. 20.
Ibid., p. 20.
30 Ibid., p. 21.
28
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community, which Adler and Heckscher call a collaborative community, does not require
the individual to neglect her own interests, or to reduce herself to an undefined part of a
collective. It instead requires her active and continuous participation in a social group, one
from which her individual existence is simultaneously distinct yet inseparable. Such a
community avoids the pitfalls of Gesellschaft, where individuals may feel that they must
choose between their own interests and those of the group—the interests are recognized to
be one and the same! However, unlike in Gemeinschaft, the individual members of a
collaborative community are not leveled within the group. There is no expectation to
submit oneself to hierarchical social norms that one may find disagreeable. This
community instead considers the unique strengths and unique needs of its individual
members, preserves their status as autonomous participants in a group effort, and works to
build a community in which all of its distinct members can flourish.
This concept of a collaborative community provides an alternative to the traditional
account of Gemeinschaft. In contrast to other versions of community, Adler and Heckscher
contend that it is a collaborative community which is the most stable form of human social
life in the long term. This is because only this type of community reliably generates thick
trust between its members—and thick trust is an essential element of durable social
relations. In both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Adler and Heckscher criticize what they
see as an alienation of the individual and the group from one other. Because individuals in
these groups understand their community as an entity distinct from themselves, those
individuals must perpetually choose between self-interest and the interest of the group.
Thick trust is essentially a confidence in other people that they will refrain from destructive
self-interested behavior. For Adler and Heckscher, neither Gemeinschaft nor Gesellschaft
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sufficiently discourage such destructive self-interest, for they always run the risk of the
individual elevating her own perceived interests above those of the group. In such a
context, thick trust in other people is difficult to establish, and a community is therefore
difficult to hold together. A collaborative community, however, effectively cultivates thick
trust because it reveals the interests of the individual and the group to be synthesized, in a
way that Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft do not. We can therefore think of collaborative
community as an attempt to move beyond the traditional distinction of Gemeinschaft
versus Gesellschaft—and with it, the prevalent Western tendency to sharply divide the
individual from the group. Within a collaborative community, radical notions of
individualism are recognized to be detrimental to the possibility of long-lasting social
relationships. However, this paradigm nonetheless simultaneously seeks to preserve the
interests of the individual (which cannot be reduced to those of the group) as a uniquely
important element of those same relationships. A person who understands her own wellbeing as being connected to that of the group is unlikely to behave in such a way as to
compromise the well-being of that group. And when an individual’s own needs are met,
there is far less chance that some dark repressed desire will manifest into violent or
destructive behavior at the expense of others. It is therefore much easier for members of a
collaborative community to place their trust in other individuals. This trust in one’s fellow
group members results in a community that is more stable overall, better equipped to meet
the needs of all its members, and therefore more likely to last in the long-term.

1.3

Creating Collaborative Community: Two Criteria for Thick Trust
As they consider community in its various forms, Adler and Heckscher employ

thick trust as their defining concept. However, one shortcoming of their account is that they
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do not explicitly articulate the conditions that are required for thick trust to develop
between members of a group. One may participate in hundreds of social groups and meet
thousands of people over the course of one’s lifetime, but only develop thick trust in a
fraction of them. What is it that sets those few meaningful relationships apart from the rest?
And why do some groups successfully set the stage for a collaborative community, while
others fall to instability and infighting despite efforts to foster community?
Human relationships do not occur in a vacuum; they take place within a particular
practical context. A community, like any other type of social relation, begins to form under
given conditions which can either promote or impede its development. Understanding what
conditions promote the growth of thick trust is critical if we wish to present collaborative
community as a social ideal towards which we ought to strive. These conditions can
provide us with a blueprint for how to best organize particular communities. Given our
discussion thus far, I believe that we can articulate two necessary conditions for the growth
of thick trust—conditions that are consistent with Adler and Heckscher’s account, even if
they are not explicitly stated therein. We can put these conditions as follows: 1. Members
of a group must take each other to be participating in their relationships as autonomous
moral agents; and 2. Members of a community must define rationality in terms of the
practical and not merely the theoretical. These are not necessarily the only conditions
required for thick trust (in this sense, they may not be sufficient conditions), but I contend
that if these conditions are not met, then thick trust cannot develop within a group. We
shall see that both of these conditions work to overcome some degree of alienation between
the individual and the group, and it is this overcoming that sets the stage for thick trust to
develop within relationships. A community can exist that only satisfies one of these
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conditions (I suspect that the traditional account of Gemeinschaft describes one such
community); however, in order to effectively overcome social alienation and therefore
achieve the greatest degree of stability, a collaborative community must satisfy both of
them.

1.3.1

First Criterion: Mutual Perception of Moral Autonomy
First, in order for thick trust to develop between two or more people, all involved

parties must take each other to be acting as autonomous moral agents. Properly treating the
concept of autonomy is itself a task worthy of an entire dissertation; for our purposes, a
brief overview should suffice. Autonomy can be widely defined as an individual’s capacity
for self-governance.31 It is often divided into the domains of moral autonomy and personal
autonomy, although the distinction between these two is sometimes contested. 32 Without
getting into this debate, I take Adler and Heckscher’s account to be primarily interested in
moral autonomy, so we will set the issue of personal autonomy (that is, autonomy regarding
matters without obvious moral weight) aside. Moral autonomy concerns whether an agent’s
moral actions can be understood as having the agent’s own will as their source. The concept
can be traced back to Kant, who takes an individual to be autonomous insofar as she is able
to hold herself accountable to the demands of the universal moral law. The stakes are high
with this issue, as moral responsibility implies moral agency; if we are to hold people
accountable for their actions, then we must in a sense be able to assign responsibility for
those actions to the people who commit them. 33
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See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988), pp. 3-20.
32 See Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 117-148.
33 Or, to put this in Kantian terms, necessity implies possibility.
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One of the most poignant questions regarding moral autonomy is this: under what
circumstances, if any, can an agent’s capacity for free moral choice be compromised? Most
theorists of autonomy agree that there are at least some moral choices which are clearly not
autonomous, and for which the individual therefore cannot be considered morally
responsible. For example, a person who has been kidnapped at gunpoint and forced to rob
a bank would not be considered morally culpable for the crime. However, such obvious
examples notwithstanding, drawing a line as to what does and does not compromise one’s
moral autonomy can be difficult. At one end of the spectrum are contemporary “thin” views
of autonomy, which seek to retain at least some degree of agency (and therefore of
responsibility) even for choices made under certain extenuating circumstances. 34 At the
other end is Kant, who claims that one’s autonomy can be compromised not only by
external entities, but also by one’s own non-rational desires and emotions.35 Kant’s view
on autonomy is almost universally derided at this point, as it is often accused of a
compartmental understanding of human nature which takes reason and emotion to be
inherently distinct.36 However, even if we accept that Kant’s criteria for autonomy are too
strict, we are still left with two opposing realities: moral responsibility requires the capacity
for free moral choice, and moral responsibility is (at least sometimes) overridden by factors
outside of the individual’s control.

One such account is provided by Uma Narayan, “Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural
Practices, and Other Women,” in A Mind of One’s Own, ed. Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (New York:
Routledge, 2002), pp. 418-432.
35 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (New York: Cambridge, 1996), 4:399 &
4:433.
36 One important criticism is given by John Stuart Mill, whose account of autonomy expands to include the
agent’s own desires as sufficient cause for autonomous moral action. See Mill, On Liberty (Kitchener,
Ontario: Batoche Books Limited, 2001), p. 53.
34
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What matters here is whether the action in question can be said to have the agent
itself as its cause, or whether it is caused by something external to her. Establishing the
agent as the originator of her moral choices has significant implications not only for the
possibility of morality itself (as if that were not enough!), but also for the possibility of
communal relationships. Trusting another person within a community requires that I take
that person to be capable of exercising moral self-governance. In our previous example, I
said that thick trust means I can trust that my coworker will not steal money from my
unwatched desk, even if she would face no punishment for doing so. This means that I trust
my coworker to hold herself to a particular moral standard, one which values the interests
of others alongside her own, even if there is no one else present to impose such a standard
upon her. However, in the absence of thick trust, I could not reasonably place such
confidence in another person. Thin trust (as opposed to thick) assumes that a Hobbesian
sort of radical self-interest is the primary motivator behind others’ actions, and only places
confidence in others’ social behavior when a Hobbesian type of social contract is in place.
Such a social contract exists to impose behavioral limitations upon individuals, and
assumes that in the absence of such limitations, individuals would default to their own
interests at others’ expense. Thin trust, therefore, takes individuals as unwilling and/or
unable to hold themselves to moral standards beyond those of radical self-interest. This
unwillingness and/or inability to exercise one’s moral autonomy undermines the possibility
of communal relationships among members of the group. Therefore, articulating the
conditions under which community is possible means articulating the conditions under
which moral self-governance is possible.
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What we see here, then, are two related dichotomies: that of heteronomous versus
autonomous decision-making, and that of self-interest versus group interest. As Adler and
Heckscher describe it, a society takes its members to be necessarily self-interested, and
heteronomously compels them to make choices that (prima facie) conflict with their selfinterested tendencies. Meanwhile, members of a community take one another to be in some
sense beyond motives of pure self-interest, and trust one another to make moral choices
without external coercion. We therefore see the exercise of individual moral autonomy in
community relationships, to a degree that we do not see in a society. But are these
dichotomies legitimate? It could be objected that I am inaccurately describing the social
contract as a heteronomous imposition, when it should actually be understood as an
autonomous expression of the group’s collective will. Hegel, for instance, makes such a
claim; he argues that the social contract is not a source of heteronomy at all, but rather an
amalgamation of the universalizable rational will of all its individual members. Hegel
claims that in a society, rules and requirements are freely given by all agents to themselves,
and that actions performed in compliance with such rules should be considered
autonomous, since they have the will of the agent as their source. 37 Importantly, such a
society proceeds from the understanding that individual and group interests are not
fundamentally distinct, but mutually constituted. In such a situation, then, it would be
strange to speak of social rules as heteronomous entities, since they have their beginning
with the individual and serve the individual’s interests.
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It’s worth saying that Adler and Heckscher’s account of collaborative community
largely agrees with Hegel regarding individual versus group interests; both accounts
conclude that what is good for the community is also what is ultimately good for the
individual, and that destructive self-interest interferes with the actualization of all involved
parties. In other words, both accounts would argue that the distinction between self-interest
and the interests of the group is a false dichotomy. However, there is a major disagreement
between these two accounts concerning whether the social contract should be considered
heteronomous to the agent. This disagreement raises critical considerations for the
possibility of communal relationships. To be autonomous is to be self-governing; therefore,
the primary thing at stake here is what ought to be considered a heteronomous influence
upon the agent’s free choice. Hegel’s account describes a society where the interests of the
individual and the collective have already been revealed to be synthesized. In other words,
members of the group do not perceive their own needs as being alienated from those of the
group. The rules and requirements of the group, therefore, do not appear as heteronomous
entities to the individual, because she understands them as working not only for the benefit
of others, but also for herself—and as being given by her own will. Presumably, such a
society would only set forth rules which aligned with the universalizable free will of all
rational agents, and those agents would comply with the understanding that they are freely
choosing to do what benefits everyone (and therefore also themselves). Under such
circumstances, it is quite reasonable to conclude that the social contract as Hegel would
understand the concept is not heteronomous to the agent. This synthesis of interests,
however, is not at all apparent in the society that Adler and Heckscher describe. Instead,
they depict a society where destructive self-interest reigns, even within the social contract;
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its mandates function to preserve the individual’s interests, and the society is prone to
instability because its members take their own interests to be opposed to those of the group.
In other words, Adler and Heckscher describe a Hobbesian society that retains a radically
self-interested understanding of human nature. 38 It is a social group characterized by rules
with which no one really wants to cooperate, rules which are only begrudgingly accepted
out of fear of punishment (or fear that one’s own interests will be threatened). The social
contract is therefore understood by members of such a society as a source of heteronomy,
because the mutual constitution of the individual and the group has not yet been revealed.
What matters, then, is not whether the social contract objectively is a heteronomous
force upon the will of the individual, but merely whether she understands it to be so. The
ultimate truth of the matter may very well be that one’s interests and those of the group
should not be distinguished from one another (everyone cited in this conversation would,
in fact, agree with this statement). However, if this truth is not recognized by the members
of the group, then those individuals are likely to experience some friction within their
relationships. If one takes her own interests to be fundamentally opposed to those of the
group, she will always see the requirements of the social contract as alien restrictions upon
her behavior. The problem of alienation, then, is deeply apparent here. What counts as the
“right” or moral course of action is directly informed by how one conceives of one’s own
relation to the social group in question. Begrudgingly abiding by the social contract betrays
a belief that one’s own interests and the interests of others, or of the group itself, are
opposed to one another. Meanwhile, developing thick trust in other people means
recognizing that one’s own interests and the interests of others are in some way intertwined.
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The project of community-building is, at its core, a project of overcoming alienation.
Recognizing others as autonomous moral agents is an action that works to overcome
alienation between the individual and the group, because it begins to recognize the interests
of these two to be mutually constituted. Societies treat the individual as a creature who
must be contained by a heteronomous system of checks and balances. Communities break
down this alienation by removing the need for an external check upon individual behavior.
Members of such communities trust one another to recognize that radical self-interest is an
illusion, and that what benefits the individual in the end is what also benefits her
community.
In short, we can say that societies and communities operate on two distinct views on
moral autonomy, one of which is grounded in structures of alienation while the other is
not. Societies begin with the view that self-interest and group interests are fundamentally
distinct from one another, and assume a lack of robust moral agency on the part of their
members. To compensate for this, the social contract is imposed as a set of apparently
heteronomous rules, in order to secure certain desired behaviors. This solution only further
cultivates alienation between the individual and the group. Meanwhile, communities begin
by taking individuals as capable of moral self-governance, and leave them to exercise this
capacity instead of imposing rules upon them. Social norms present not as alien entities to
which one is subject, but rather as a free choice made by the individual herself to pursue
the interests of the community (and therefore also her own interests). Building a
collaborative community requires that people recognize each other to be free moral
agents—and by extension, it requires an overcoming of alienation between the individual
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and the group that would pit their interests against each other. The standard Western
distinction of self-interest versus the interests of the group, therefore, must be reconsidered.

1.3.2

Second Criterion: The Primacy of the Practical
Discussions of autonomy are often connected to discussions of rationality. Perhaps

the most infamous such account is Kant’s, which claims that an autonomous action is
necessarily a rational one, and vice versa. 39 Kant is well-known for placing a divide
between human reason and human emotion; he sees the latter as obscuring the voice of
one’s reason, and as offering heteronomous motivations for behavior which can interfere
with one’s pursuit of the moral law. Kant’s view is representative of the Enlightenment
tradition at large, which elevates reason to a lofty position and presents rationality as a
standard towards which all ought to strive. This view understands reason and emotion as
being diametrically opposed to one another—if something is not rational, then it is
therefore irrational, a term that is not only descriptive but has come to carry all sorts of
negative connotations.40 In turn, this view privileges what is deemed rational at the expense
of what is not by declaring the rational to be ultimately desirable and, therefore, anything
not rational to be undesirable.
Kant and his intellectual descendants have been widely criticized for this
dichotomy, with good reason. When reason and emotion are polarized in this way, with
reason privileged, a good-faith understanding of the human condition becomes difficult to
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attain. We know now that human beings are not dualistic entities with a rational mind
trapped within an irrational body, caught up in an endless struggle between the two; even
our most apparently “rational” decisions are often heavily influenced by emotion, and to
speak of a purely rational “view from nowhere” is oxymoronic.41 Evolutionary studies
show that the neocortex, the part of the brain responsible for logical planning and
reasoning, is the most recently developed structure within the organ; our emotional
experience, regulated largely by the limbic system, functions independently of our reason,
and processes the brain’s initial reaction to a majority of stimuli. 42 This suggests that we
should certainly not think of ourselves primarily as creatures of reason; if anything, we are
creatures of emotion who have only recently come to dabble in rational thought. In practice,
the human being’s necessarily emotional nature reveals itself at every turn. Recent research
in psychology suggests that despite the evolution of the neocortex, the human decisionmaking process is still primarily of an emotional nature, not a rational one. When faced
with a choice, we tend to rationalize after the fact to justify an emotionally-driven response,
rather than to logically discern the proper course of action before acting.43 Additionally,
William James argues that an ardent commitment to rationality is itself an emotional
endeavor; one who maintains a skeptical attitude towards that which cannot be rationally
demonstrated does so in order to protect herself against the emotional experience of being
wrong—not to discern truth for its own sake.44 All of this can be summed up as follows:
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human experience is not merely (or even primarily) rational, and taking it to be so
drastically misunderstands the nature of the human being.
This is why rationality as it is understood in the Enlightenment tradition cannot
provide us with the thick trust required to ground a durable community. The concept of
thick trust does certainly have a rational element; if I hope to develop confidence in my
ability to predict the behavior of someone else, it helps if I can assume that she is
conducting herself as a reasonable individual, since by definition one cannot reasonably
predict erratic behavior. However, basing our predictions of other people’s choices merely
upon our own estimations of their rationality leads to a number of problems. First, if I tend
to analyze the potential actions of others purely in terms of what is rational, this analysis
will often yield an inaccurate result, because people (even objectively rational people) do
not base most of their decisions primarily upon the dictates of their reason. They instead
make decisions within a given practical context, and can be heavily influenced by their
non-rational emotional experiences and other compelling factors within that context.
Reason can and does play a role in this decision-making process, but it is not the only
influential factor, or even the primary one, as we have seen above. Second, even though
reason is often treated as a faculty that produces self-evident truths, it can often be difficult
to discern what is genuinely the “rational” course of action in a given context. “Reason” as
we tend to describe it is not as universalizable as one may think. What may be considered
rational to a person outside of a situation may be viewed as deeply irrational by someone
within it, and vice versa. For example, feminist theorist Uma Narayan writes about the
practice of veiling, in which some Indian women choose to wear cumbersome traditional
clothing even when they are not explicitly required to do so. Narayan points out that many
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Western feminists view the practice as irrational; if these poor Eastern “dupes of
patriarchy” could only be set free from the oppressive norms clouding the exercise of their
reason, they would surely choose to cast their veils aside and live as “enlightened” Western
women do.45 However, for Narayan, the choice to veil is often a considered and rational
response to the practical conditions of a woman’s life, one that is made after much careful
reasoning. For instance, a woman may choose to wear a veil in order to avoid unwanted
attention from men in public, or to maintain a good relationship with traditionally-minded
family members. Narayan argues that such women are not irrational dupes at all, but rather
that what is “rational” in one context is not necessarily universalizable. Therefore, choices
made in response to particular conditions should hardly be condemned as “irrational” by
those outside of that practical context, because they represent thoughtful and reasonable
responses to a set of circumstances. These realities demonstrate that individualistic views
of reason, which take one’s own reason as a universal standard while distancing themselves
from practical “irrational” elements of the human experience, will often fail to accurately
predict how others will behave.
Discussions of community, therefore, must occur in a context that broads the
definition of what is considered rational. Hegel’s famous claim that the real is rational and
the rational is real comes to mind here, demonstrating that rationality cannot be understood
outside of a given practical context. 46 Marx also recognized this reality; in his theses on
Feuerbach, he criticizes that intellectual tradition which attempts to sever the theoretical
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from lived human experience, noting that all social life is essentially practical.47 This means
simply that any attempt to understand human behavior must be made in reference to some
concrete practical circumstance, for individual decisions cannot be understood separate
from their contexts. We can take this even further, however, and discuss this issue
specifically in terms of trust. If the members of a community engage with each other as if
they were people of pure reason, elevating the exercise of the rational while dismissing the
practical,48 it will be quite difficult for those individuals to develop thick trust in one
another. To share thick trust with another person means to develop confidence in one’s
ability to predict another’s behavior; however, if one’s assessment of others takes place
purely in terms of what one personally takes to be rational, those predictions will often be
proven false. In other words, holding others to a standard of pure reason erodes the
possibility of trust between parties over time. If I expect others to behave how I would
consider “rationally,” I will be continuously proven wrong, and I will eventually come to
believe that I cannot trust anyone. Furthermore, my own criteria for what makes a choice
“rational” are informed by the practical conditions in which I find myself, and the
“rational” course of action may vary in dissimilar conditions. It is incredibly short-sighted
to assume that others, particularly those who live in oppressive or otherwise suboptimal
situations, should set their own situations aside and let some ideal of pure reason guide
their choices. Such an expectation dismisses the lived experiences of one’s fellow
community members. When an individual’s reasoned response to a situation is dismissed
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by others, this hinders the possibility of meaningful, trusting relationships between those
parties.
Instead, if I hope to understand how others will behave, I must recognize that the
human decision-making process (both my own and that of others) is always already
embedded within a practical context, and that evaluating actions in terms of pure reason
alone does not accurately account for this reality. This brings us to our second condition
for the growth of thick trust. We can put this as follows: Thick trust can only develop when
the members of a group define rationality in terms of the practical and not merely the
theoretical. This second condition works to overcome alienation between the individual
and the group by recognizing that the human experience cannot be universalized at the
expense of the particular. Privileging the rational takes reason as a universal standard, as
an equally accessible aspect of human experience. However, doing so often ignores the
practical elements of a person’s life, and it alienates individuals from others by encouraging
a simplistic view from nowhere that only focuses on one’s “rational” experiences. This
position undermines the possibility of meaningful relationships with other people by
ignoring what makes each community unique, and by distancing the individual from her
lived experience within that community.
Therefore, an essential part of building a durable community is recognizing that we
are simultaneously theoretical and practical beings, and that what is “rational” is not merely
theoretical. Communities are not groups of philosopher kings who remove themselves from
the practical and set aside their emotions to engage in rational discourse; they are groups
embedded within a particular context, which seek to find ways to navigate the
particularities of their own experiences. Communities do not merely seek to provide
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rational answers to the problems of life, but also to help their members learn to cope with
experiences that are often non-rational in nature. Living with others means learning to
navigate conditions that may make no rational sense (or at least make no sense outside of
a particular context). We can be fully aware that the things we feel (for example) are not
rational in the Enlightenment sense of the term, but that awareness on its own does not
eliminate those feelings or help us to address them. Solutions that are primarily rational in
nature, which do not account for this emotional element, come off as cold and
disconnected, and reflect a lack of genuine connection between parties. They betray a
rationalistic view which seeks to isolate itself from the human experience, rather than to
embrace it. Trusting other people means not only recognizing their rationality, but also
acknowledging that their choices are often influenced by practical factors, which may or
may not appear “rational” to others. Such a community does not treat these practical
realities as obstacles which one should strive to overcome; it instead recognizes them as
necessary elements of the human experience.
To sum up, this section has sought to define two necessary conditions for the growth
of thick trust among members of a group. These two conditions demonstrate that thick trust
has both rational and practical elements. In order for a community to flourish, its members
must participate as free agents whose rational responses to their practical situations are
respected as such. Accounting for these realities of the human experience allows organic,
meaningful relationships to develop between individuals, because those individuals can
feel confident in their predictions of other people’s behavior. Communities that satisfy both
of these conditions therefore enjoy a high degree of stability, as members of the group
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understand that group as a place where their needs will be consistently recognized and
satisfied.

1.4

Reimagining Religion as Community
The preceding pages have demonstrated what I take to be two necessary conditions

for the development of thick trust within a community. With all of this talk of community
writ large, however, we have said little about particular kinds of communities. At this point
we can now turn to the community that we are really interested in, i.e. the religious
community. To talk of religion in terms of community means to recognize that the practice
of religion has necessary social elements. We can point to such elements within all of the
major world faiths, albeit to varying degrees. 49 To be clear, it is not controversial to state
that religion is in some way a social phenomenon. Durkheim famously understood religious
practice as the unification of a social group around a central concept of the sacred, with the
purpose of creating a single moral community. 50And even religion’s most ardent critics
recognize some of its social aspects, even if they do not take those aspects alone to be
definitive of the practice. 51 However, in contemporary scholarship, religion is still usually
discussed primarily in terms of individual belief, and only secondarily in terms of those
beliefs’ social function. It is treated as a way of forming one’s personal ontology, which
then influences how one interacts with others. My view is that these two should be
reversed—we should think of religion primarily in terms of the social, and understand
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religious belief as serving a primarily social function. In other words, religion is not a
matter of individual beliefs that inform social behaviors, but rather of social behaviors that
inform individual beliefs. Differentiating between two different kinds of belief, indicative
and imperative, will provide us with a useful distinction to clarify this point. The goal of
this section, therefore, is to demonstrate that religious practice is not merely a matter of
seeking information about reality that is literally true. We should think of religion primarily
as a practice by which an individual seeks out the kinds of relationships that characterize a
community – and takes up beliefs that are instrumental to this end.
My view echoes that of Charles Taylor in A Secular Age, in which he claims that
religion is one avenue by which individuals seek a place for themselves within a group.
For Taylor (as a Hegelian), human history is a continuous series of attempts to enter into
relation with those beyond oneself. While religious affiliation is on the decline in many
places, there has also been a recent resurgence of religious belief in particular social circles,
perhaps most notably among the American far right. For Taylor, it is no coincidence that
such a group, which currently represents an ideological minority, would be drawn to
religion. He argues that this resurgence is not primarily a matter of belief in Christian tenets
for their own sake, but rather a desire for the kind of homogeneous group identity that
characterized earlier periods in American history. He writes that
part of what drove the Moral Majority and motivates the Christian right in the USA
is an aspiration to re-establish something of the fractured neo-Durkheimian
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understanding that used to define the nation, where being American would once
more have a connection with theism, with being “one nation under God.”52
Religious belief here, for Taylor, does not arise from an individual desire to know more
about God and one’s place in the universe. Religion (specifically Christianity) rather
represents a social institution that hearkens back to a historical moment in which the
believer would have felt connected to a wider social group. Uniting around a central
religious ideology allows those who feel alienated from their society to find a form of
community. The contents of these religious beliefs are not particularly important; for the
purposes of community-building, it does not really matter if a group believes in Jesus, or
Brahma, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster. What matters is rather that the members of the
group share a certain set of core values, or beliefs about their place in the world. For the
aforementioned Moral Majority, their particular group identity is defined in terms of their
shared beliefs regarding social issues and Christian moral standards. Sharing moral values
begins to set the stage for relations of thick trust between individuals, enabling the
development of a community.53

1.4.1. Religious Community with or without Belief
One interesting thing about organized religion is that it can work to instill these
values, and therefore provide a sense of community belonging, even if one has not fully
cultivated certain religious beliefs. To see an example of this, we can look to one of the
most common times for a person to take up religion: during childhood. Religion in early
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life begins as a social practice—for children from religious families, their earliest exposure
to such ideas almost always comes through education from a faithful family member. The
influence of such education cannot be overstated, as the strongest predictor of religiosity
in early life is religious affiliation of an adult caregiver. It should not be surprising that
young people tend to identify with the religions of their families. However, the influence
is long-lasting; in the United States, parental religious commitment is shown to be
positively correlated with children’s religious practice through late adolescence—if a
teenager’s parents are religious, it is likely that the teenager will claim the same religion
until at least their eighteenth birthday. 54 Of course, as a child grows up, they will begin to
form their own beliefs about the world, and for the child of a religious family, religious
beliefs factor into that worldview. Older children can decide for themselves whether they
personally find the faiths of their families compelling. However, at the young age at which
many children are first introduced to religious concepts, such beliefs can hardly be
considered robust or fully formed. A child does not participate in religious activities
because they have cultivated meaningful beliefs about complex religious ideologies; they
do so because they are placed into those activities by their parents. For such young
“believers,” therefore, religious practice is not primarily a matter of belief, but rather of
participating in the communities of their families. In light of this reality, it has been
suggested that we can think of religious identities as social artifacts, which are cultivated
through community religious practices. On this view, religious identity is formed socially,
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and then experienced individually as a product of that social development. 55 Children learn
about religious ideologies that hold significance to their family, just as they would learn
about other matters of cultural and historical importance. They learn that to be part of their
family unit, and of their wider social community, means to take up a certain attitude
towards a particular religion. This religious community provides them with support to
navigate the various experiences of their early lives, as well as presenting an additional
avenue by which to strengthen their communal ties with their existing family.
Participating in family religious traditions is therefore a crucial part of developing
and maintaining communal relationships. It is worth noting here that we can distinguish
between public religious practice, and private religious belief. Even if a child is too young
to have developed a robust personal stance on complex religious ideology, that child is still
encouraged to participate in the social aspects of religious practice. Studies suggest that
young people raised in a religious context tend to participate in religious rites primarily to
appease their families; it has been shown that young people are likely to engage in religious
practice (such as attending a worship service) at the same frequency as their parents, even
if they blatantly disagree with their parents about theological or ideological issues.56 This
suggests that, in early life, religion is primarily a social endeavor: as young people begin
to locate their own places within their communities, they participate in longstanding
religious practices in order to be accepted by others within those groups. The social benefits
of participating in these practices can be procured regardless of whether the young person
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actually forms a belief about the truth status of a religious claim. One can make friends and
find a support system at church even if God is not part of that support system.
To expand upon this point, it is significant that most religious young people who
abandon their faith, do so in their late teens or early 20’s.57 This period of life often
coincides with the introduction of new potential communities: college classmates, coworkers at one’s first major job, or newfound friends in a new city. It is often suggested
that young people who renounce their faith after moving away from home do so for
primarily intellectual reasons: a college education inspires them to question the dubious
claims of their old religion, and they come away as a newly enlightened atheist. Surely this
is the case in some circumstances. But we should also consider that this is the same moment
in a person’s life when their place within their existing community shifts, while they
simultaneously enter into new communities. Moving away from home for education or
vocation often means that one is unable to participate in one’s existing religious community
to the same extent as before. Identifying as a part of that community therefore becomes
less important, as the other members of that community become a less central presence in
the experiences of one’s life. One will necessarily find more value in those communities
where one lives and moves daily than in those which one has physically left behind.
Therefore, we should not simply assume that all young adults who walk away from their
childhood religion do so for intellectual reasons. We should consider the possibility that
such individuals simply no longer find social utility in their former childhood communities.
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1.4.2. The Social Function of Religious Belief
Up to this point I have spoken of religion as a primarily social endeavor, which
may or may not lead a person to develop beliefs in any particular religious tenets. In the
aforementioned examples, belief could play a role in the formation of community
relationships, but those relationships could also develop in the absence of robust belief, as
long as the religious community structure remained intact. However, it would be
intellectually dishonest to claim that religious belief is never important. In fact, many
religious people experience their beliefs as the most important element of their religious
practice. They build their entire lives upon these beliefs—beliefs that inform how they
choose to navigate the world on both an individual and social level. For these individuals
whose religious experience is necessarily a matter of belief, wouldn’t it make sense to
talk about that religious experience as a primarily epistemological phenomenon?
We should absolutely recognize the importance of belief in such cases; however,
we should be cautious as to how we think of these beliefs. When we speak of belief, we
must remember that there are different kinds of belief, which serve different functions in
the lives of those who hold them. A misunderstanding regarding the nature of religious
belief can yield inaccurate conclusions regarding religion’s proper place in human life.
William James claims that belief is never an end in itself; it is useful only insofar as it
fulfills some pragmatic end for the one who takes it up. James therefore conceives of
beliefs as “teleological instruments” that assist an individual with navigating something
that she is experiencing in her life. 58 Depending on the desired function, these
instruments can sometimes serve that function independently of whether they pick out
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literal truths about the world. Taking up this framework, Stephen Asma differentiates
between what he calls indicative and imperative beliefs, the former of which is
experienced cognitively and the latter of which is experienced emotionally. 59 Indicative
beliefs pick out literal facts about the nature of the world, while imperative beliefs
involve instinctive and emotional responses to stimuli rather than rational ones.
When religion is condemned, it is usually condemned on the grounds that it does
not cultivate literally accurate beliefs. In other words, religion is treated as an attempt to
develop indicative beliefs that ultimately fails. But Asma claims that this is the wrong
way to conceive of religious belief. He argues that it should instead be thought of as a
type of imperative belief, one which provides an emotional response to a problem instead
of a purely logical one.60 There are a number of aspects of the human experience that
reason alone simply cannot address. How can one make logical sense of death, or disease,
or the host of other problems in the world? Rationally reflecting on these problems may
make some logical sense of them, but it hardly makes them easier to accept. Asma
provides a poignant example from one of his own students, who had a sibling who was
brutally murdered. 61 In the wake of the tragedy, the slain boy’s mother (who was
formerly not religious) embraced Christianity because it promised that she would
someday see her son again. Asma’s student felt that her mother’s belief was dubious, but
she also recognized that it was primarily that belief which carried the grieving woman
through the days and years following the murder. Because she believed that there was a
chance she would see her son again, the mother was not overwhelmed by her grief; she
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was able to continue serving as a parental figure for her surviving children. In this case, a
dubious epistemological position offered concrete practical, social benefits. We have here
a belief that is clearly not rational (in the Enlightenment sense of the term), but
nonetheless carries value despite its lack of demonstrable literal truth—namely, the value
of empowering a grieving individual to continue living her life to the fullest extent
possible.
The account that Asma provides is by no means unusual. It is common for
individuals to flirt with religion during difficult periods of life, regardless of their former
history with it. Many who experience the illness or death of a loved one turn to religion
as a source of comfort, even if they have no significant religious affiliation prior to the
event. During the initial spring 2020 wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, internet searches
for the word “prayer” reached an all-time high.62 Willingness to “try out” religion in
circumstances such as these (or at least to investigate it) suggests that these individuals
are searching for something to help them navigate a particularly taxing situation, and they
are curious as to whether religion can provide some sort of assistance to that end. In these
instances, the literal truth value of any particular religious claims is not necessarily
relevant for the task at hand. These individuals are experiencing a practical need, one
which is primarily emotional in nature. Logical assurances and answers to one’s
questions can provide some sense of relief, but they are by no means guaranteed to do so.
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Asma argues that religious belief, which deals in primarily non-rational phenomena, can
be preferable to reason alone for navigating such non-rational circumstances.63
For the present project, it is important to note that we should understand these
benefits of imperative religious belief in primarily social terms. At its core, religious
belief provides a feeling of connection to something beyond oneself. This “something”
can be an existing body of religious believers, a deity, or both. Theistic religious practice
typically entails more than merely believing in a god or gods; it involves a continuous
effort on the part of the believer to engage with both the divine and the religious
community. Religion often represents a sort of relationship between the particular
believer and whatever she takes to represent the universal. 64 This is not confined to any
particular faith; religious theorist Karen Armstrong notes that this quest for connection, to
understand one’s relationship to the universal, can be seen in all manner of historical
religious practices, regardless of their temporal or geographical location. 65 This suggests
that even individualistic religious behaviors such as prayer and meditation can still be
thought of as types of social practice. On a more human level, a religion can provide its
followers with a social support network, one which can help them to navigate the nonrational experiences of their lives. Whether it is through an existing religious community
through or a perceived connection with the universal, religion can inform the belief that
one need not endure the trials of life alone.
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At this point Marx’s declaration that religion is the opium of the masses may
come to mind. Perhaps religious beliefs can provide some sort of comfort through life’s
difficulties, but if those beliefs are ultimately untrue, then what good is that comfort,
really? How can we as rational individuals allow people like the mother of Asma’s
student to live their lives based on fictions? At its core, this is the New Atheist position:
that an inconvenient truth is preferable to a pleasant lie. Our aforementioned critics
believe that religious claims ought to be tried in the court of reason, and if they are found
wanting, they ought to be cast aside, regardless of whatever other benefits they provide.
To this sort of objection, I would respond that even if we were to cast aside religion, we
cannot cast aside the kinds of experiences that lead a person to become religious.
Practical problems are something that we as human beings cannot escape. We have
already seen that, when it comes to certain matters of human life, reason on its own may
struggle to provide adequate solutions to certain problems. Human beings are
fundamentally emotional creatures, with emotional needs that reason may struggle to
accommodate. Those rationalistic suggestions that we decry religion in the name of
reason do little to suggest how, exactly, one ought to handle those problems for which
reason has no answer. What good is it to be a man of reason, if reason is all that one has?
To sum up this section, I have sought to demonstrate that we should think of
religion in terms of its social function. Religion is not merely a matter of forming literal
beliefs, but of seeking connections with others. These connections can be fostered with or
without belief – but we should understand religious beliefs as being primarily imperative
rather than indicative in nature. With all of this demonstrated, we can now begin to apply
our framework of what constitutes a durable community to religious communities.
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1.5

Can Religion Function as a Collaborative Community?
My primary task in this chapter has been to show that many criticisms of religion

fundamentally misunderstand the practice. Highlighting the social aspects of religion
grants us a new understanding of the lived experiences of many religious people, and can
help us to make some sense of the complex global trend away from organized religion. I
have thus far condemned criticisms of religion when they occur primarily on
epistemological grounds, as I take them to begin in the wrong place. It is worth saying,
however, that even when these criticisms fail, they still often represent a worthy task: that
of highlighting the historical problems that have been associated with religious practice. It
is undeniable that religion has been the source of all sorts of social ills, and that much
suffering has been caused in the name of various faiths. To be abundantly clear, this project
is not a defense of religion itself against any critics of the practice, and nowhere am I
seeking to minimize the atrocities committed in the name of religion through the course of
history. Rather, my position is that attributing religion’s grievances to mere inaccurate
metaphysics, or to epistemological negligence, fails to do justice to the victims of religious
violence. The kinds of religious harms that we see most often—whether physical or
emotional in nature—are not merely the product of false beliefs about some aspect of
reality. Instead, a religion perpetrates harm when its teachings lead to the breakdown of
relationships, which are fundamental to the flourishing of the human being. Presenting
falsehoods as facts may be a kind of epistemic injustice, but such injustice on its own is
surely less egregious than that physical and social violence inspired by bigotry and
extremism. It is one thing to simply present falsehoods as facts; it is another to weaponize
those falsehoods in order to alienate believers from meaningful relationships with other
people. If we understand religion as a social phenomenon, then we should recognize that
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at least some of its failures are of a social nature. Understanding religion in this way
provides us with a framework within which we can not only envision what ideal religious
practice could look like, but also critique particular religions when they fall short of that
ideal.
Such a critique will be the task of the next two chapters. We saw in this chapter that
there are varying degrees of community, some of which are far more stable and durable in
the long-term than others. My interest is not merely to define religion as a community in
the traditional sense, but to consider whether religious practice can ground a particular kind
of community: what we have been describing as a collaborative community. In other
words, can religion be practiced in such a way that it overcomes alienation between the
individual and the group? We have seen that a collaborative community develops when
two necessary conditions for the growth of thick trust are satisfied. I will spend the rest of
this project considering what it would take for religious communities specifically to satisfy
both of those necessary conditions. However, in order to reach a positive conclusion, we
will first work through some common failures of religious communities. Towards that end,
Chapters Two and Three will demonstrate two ways of doing religion that fail to meet each
of our necessary conditions respectively. We will first look at religious systems that fail to
preserve the moral autonomy of the believer, and how this failure precludes the possibility
of a durable community among the religious group.
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CHAPTER 2. NIETZSCHE’S ACCOUNT OF ALIENATION IN THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
2.1

Introduction
The previous chapter provided us with a framework for understanding the nature of

community—specifically, for defining what makes community relationships durable. We
have seen that, in order for a community to initially develop, members of a group must
form relations of thick trust with others in that group. I argued that the growth of thick trust
is predicated upon the satisfaction of two necessary conditions which work to overcome
some form of alienation between the individual and the group. Since these conditions can
be satisfied to a greater or lesser extent in practice, we saw that we can differentiate
between traditional, alienating versions of community (which present barriers to the growth
of thick trust) and a novel version called a collaborative community (which surmounts
these barriers).66 Noting the social function of religious practice in human life, I also argued
that we ought to think of religion in terms of the social—contradicting a more common
way of understanding the practice, which takes it as an attempt at instilling indicative
beliefs regarding the nature of reality. I argued that this epistemological model of religion
does not adequately explain the recent global trend away from the practice. My position is
that we should not understand this trend merely as the product of an intellectual break with
religious ideology. We should also understand it as the product of broken communal
relationships, as individuals experience alienation from unstable faith communities.
Understanding how this alienation occurs in religious communities (and whether it
can be overcome) is the goal of the rest of this project. Thus far, we have largely spoken
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of religion in the abstract, without referring to how particular tenets or practices can impact
the possibility of community relationships. However, we cannot remain at such an abstract
level of discussion. Our aim is to articulate the possibility of a collaborative community
that is specifically religious; therefore, we must now examine specifically religious
structures, in order to see how they can foster or hinder the growth of community
relationships. Towards this end, an exhaustive account of all historical religions is neither
possible nor necessary—we are interested in categories of religious practices, rather than
every single possible way of doing religion. I will therefore be limiting the scope of our
discussion to two philosophical accounts of religion that I take to be uniquely interested
not only in the well-being of the individual religious practitioner, but also in the well-being
of the religious group as a whole. In other words, we shall examine the work of two
philosophers who understand religion as a form of community. These accounts will
illuminate some ways in which particular religious structures can impact community
relationships—ways that will align with the conditions for community laid out in the
previous chapter.
The first of these accounts, which will be the subject of this chapter, is provided by
Friedrich Nietzsche. At the outset, including Nietzsche in a discussion of religious
community may appear to be a strange choice, for at least two reasons.67 First, much of his
work on religion is infamously negative, with his declaration of the death of God securing
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him a reputation as one of history’s most devout atheists. Using Nietzsche to motivate a
positive account of religion’s function in human life may therefore seem to contradict
Nietzsche’s own views. And second, Nietzsche is often read as a radical individualist,
whose primary philosophical commitment is the progress of the overman against the
mediocrity of the herd. 68 It is extraordinarily uncommon to see discussions of community
in Nietzsche’s thought, since much of his work seems to speak to the level of the individual.
My view, however, is that Nietzsche is typically misunderstood on both of these counts.
He is not broadly opposed to religion qua religion, but rather to a particular form of
religious teaching that splinters the concepts of the human and the divine. And his concern
lies not merely with the well-being of the individual, but also with the community of which
that individual is a part. Given both of these realities, I hope to show that Nietzsche’s
philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the problem of religious alienation, both of
the human from the divine and of the individual from the group. By looking to both his
negative and positive accounts of the phenomenon, we can determine how particular
religious practices can create social conditions that impact the growth of durable
community relationships among individuals.
This chapter will be structured as follows: first, I will work through three distinct
periods in Nietzsche’s religious thought, tracking the issue of religious alienation across
these moments. We will begin with The Birth of Tragedy, in which Nietzsche provides a
positive account of religion’s social function in the life of the Greeks. We will see that the
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early Nietzsche takes such a religion to empower its followers to overcome nihilism by
deifying the distinctly human. Afterwards, we will turn to Beyond Good and Evil and the
Genealogy of Morals, to compare Nietzsche’s most well-known polemics against JudeoChristianity with his views on the religion of the Greeks. In these texts, Nietzsche criticizes
Judeo-Christianity for its alienating properties. Finally, we will work through some
passages in The Antichrist, to demonstrate that even the texts most commonly associated
with Nietzsche’s “atheism” present a challenge for those who take him to hold this position.
Despite the wide scope of his thought on the subject, I will argue that Nietzsche’s
overarching view on religion remains consistent across these three moments. His work
demonstrates a recurring fixation on the concepts of humanity and divinity, specifically on
the nature of the relationship between the two. Nietzsche sees these concepts as necessarily
connected, and strives to present them as unified rather than distinct. He views religion as
a tool with which individuals can cultivate useful beliefs regarding how they should
conduct themselves in the world. Religion cultivates these beliefs through its representation
of the divine/human relationship; although, of course, different religions can represent this
relationship in wildly different ways. With this concern in focus, we can see that
Nietzsche’s praise for the Greek religion in The Birth of Tragedy and his criticisms of
Judeo-Christianity in his later works provide a single, consistent account. Religions that
represent the human and the divine as unified earn Nietzsche’s approval, while those that
alienate the two concepts become the subject of his polemics. We should therefore not
understand Nietzsche as an opponent of religion writ large, but rather as an opponent of
any ideology (religious or otherwise) that would alienate these two concepts.
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With Nietzsche’s views on religion thus articulated, I will then argue that we can
use his account to motivate a positive theory of religious community. While Nietzsche is
often read as a radical egoist, we will see that this is a misrepresentation of his ideological
commitments. In fact, his work demonstrates an understanding that the well-being of the
individual and of the group are mutually constituted. Nietzsche’s desire for the fulfillment
of human potential, therefore, is not merely an individualistic concern for the overman’s
own interests, but also for the progress of the group in which that individual lives and
participates. I will argue that using Nietzsche to articulate a theory of community is
therefore consistent, due to the distinctly communitarian commitments within his work.
Finally, with all of this laid out, I will conclude by demonstrating how Nietzsche
takes various religious ideologies to impact the possibility of communal relationships. We
have seen that the alienation of the human and the divine is a central concept in his religious
thought; I will argue that we can track a second, related type of alienation in his work on
the subject as well. Religious ideologies that alienate the human from the divine also
alienate the individual from her community, by blocking the growth of thick trust among
members of the group. Recall from Chapter One that thick trust develops when individuals
take one another to be participating in a relationship as autonomous moral agents—to trust
someone, I must have confidence that they are the author of their own moral choices, and
are making such choices free from any sort of external coercion. Nietzsche’s recurring
interest in the relationship of the human and the divine stems from his commitment to the
human ability to define for oneself how one ought to live one’s life; no external god or
other authority figure can determine this for the individual. However, by presenting the
divine as something that is fundamentally distinct from the human being, religions such as
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those within the Judeo-Christian tradition undermine the believer’s ability to exercise her
own capacity for conducting moral judgments. Followers of this tradition look outside of
themselves for some objective meaning and purpose for their lives, and in doing so, they
fail to exercise their capacity for individual agency. This creates conditions of thin trust,
where individual behavior can only be trusted when the authority figure in question remains
in place. The Judeo-Christian religious tradition (indeed, any religion that alienates the
human from the divine) therefore creates conditions where people cannot place a
meaningful degree of thick trust in one another.69
In sum, by tracking these two related forms of religious alienation, Nietzsche is not
merely seeking to critique Judeo-Christian ideology. He also aims to show how religious
belief can provide a foundation for human social relationships. We therefore ought to
understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion as laying out what he takes to be required
for the growth of a durable religious community in which all of its members can flourish.

2.2

Is God Dead? Nietzsche’s Work on Religion
Nietzsche’s infamous declaration of the death of God has earned him recognition

as one of western philosophy’s most devout atheists. The ideological impact of this claim
cannot be overstated; some have gone so far as to argue that Nietzsche’s atheism is a
fundamental part of his wider philosophical project, and that his rejection of the Christian
God cannot be separated from the rest of his thought.70 However, it is ironic that history
often remembers Nietzsche as an opponent of religion, when almost all of his major works
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are filled with discussions of the divine. Beginning with The Birth of Tragedy and
continuing all the way through his posthumously published work, themes of the
human/divine relationship run quite obviously through Nietzsche’s thought. These themes
are far more complex than the simple statement that “God is dead” reveals, and it is
intellectually dishonest to understand Nietzsche merely as a devout atheist.
Walter Kaufmann points out that by saying God is dead, Nietzsche implies that he
once took God to be alive and well. We should of course be cautious to note that the “God”
Nietzsche describes is not a deity that he believes to literally exist, but rather a manmade
concept that has historically been useful for the purpose of human progress. Kauffman
emphasizes this point, and argues that we should not understand Nietzsche to be dealing in
literal matters of metaphysical or theological truth, but rather in matters of human culture,
which he takes religious beliefs to impact. 71 Kaufmann’s view is that we should read
Nietzsche as an agnostic rather than an atheist; several recent accounts have gone even
farther in their appreciation of Nietzsche’s (eternally?) recurring concern with the divine.
Some have even declared him to be “god-obsessed” in his continuous search to identify the
role that religious belief plays in human life. 72 Regardless of the extent to which one takes
him to be sympathetic to the practice, however, we should be clear that Nietzsche never
aims to be a theorist of religion for its own sake. We do not see him taking a stance as to
whether religious claims should be considered literally true; indeed, he is largely
uninterested in examining any specific theological matters. Instead, Nietzsche is primarily
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concerned with the evolutionary progress of the human species, and with the fulfillment of
our highest potential qua human beings. It is this concern with the concrete world,
according to Lawrence Hatab, that motivates Nietzsche’s infamous polemic against JudeoChristianity; therein he does not seek to offer a critique of religion qua religion at all, but
rather a critique of particular religious notions that attempt to transcend the lived
experience of humanity. 73 Nietzsche therefore takes a similar view on religion to that
provided in Chapter 1 of this project. He sees religion as a practice that represents abstract
truths, and influences particular imperative beliefs about how one should conduct
oneself—beliefs that can be helpful or harmful, even if they do not constitute literal
metaphysical truth. In other words, what matters most for Nietzsche is not whether one is
religious, but how the religious beliefs that one holds can lead one to understand one’s own
abilities and responsibilities.
A careful reading of his work on religion confirms this interpretation. Specifically,
Nietzsche is concerned with how religious beliefs lead the faithful to understand the
relationship between the divine and the human. Nietzsche’s view is that, when a religion
unifies these two concepts, the believer is empowered to overcome nihilism by embracing
her own capacity to define purpose and value. Meanwhile, religions that represent the
divine as something fundamentally distinct from the human being discourage this process,
and lead to the stagnation of human potential. Nietzsche is therefore not interested in
whether religious myths themselves constitute literal truth, but whether they represent
more abstract truths accurately. For him, religious beliefs that depict the powerful (i.e. the
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divine) nature of humanity are useful tools for informing how the human being should
conduct herself in the world. 74
To show this, the following section will work through what I take to be three key
moments in Nietzsche’s religious thought. 75 My goal is to show that Nietzsche’s views on
religion are ideologically consistent across his body of work, even if the content of his
writing on the subject varies widely. We will begin with The Birth of Tragedy, where
Nietzsche praises the Greek religion and culture, and goes so far as to claim that this
religion serves a function that is essential for the well-being of the Greek people. Second,
we will review his critique of Judeo-Christianity in Beyond Good and Evil and the
Genealogy of Morals, where a sharp contrast appears between his appraisal of that tradition
and his former comments on Greek religion. Finally, we will observe the evolution of his
thought in The Antichrist; this text is often taken as definitive evidence of Nietzsche’s
atheism, but I will show that it presents a much more nuanced account of religion and the
divine. As I conduct this review, I will argue that we ought to draw two conclusions: 1.
That Nietzsche is not opposed to religious belief in general, but merely to particular kinds
of religious beliefs that splinter the concepts of divinity and humanity; and 2. That
Nietzsche sees instrumental value in religions that represent these concepts as unified
rather than distinct. We should therefore think of Nietzsche’s overarching goal as being, as
William Lloyd Newell describes it, a retrieval of the divinity in man. 76 Nietzsche does not
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seek to eradicate the divine as a concept, but rather to demonstrate that we ought to define
the divine in terms of the distinctly human.

2.2.1

The Role of Religion in The Birth of Tragedy
Nietzsche’s first major treatment of religion is in The Birth of Tragedy. Prima facie,

it appears that Nietzsche is speaking of art more than religion in this text; however, he tends
to move fluidly between discussions of the two, as he takes them to serve a similar purpose
and employ similar methods. Indeed, for him there is little distinction between the tragedy
as an art form and as a religious experience. 77 His utilization of religious language in the
figures of Apollo and Dionysus demonstrates that for Nietzsche, art has a definite religious
quality, and vice versa. We should therefore understand his comments on Greek art to also
apply to the Greek religion. 78 In this text, Nietzsche’s primary task is to articulate how a
group of people can most effectively cope with the harsh realities of human existence.
Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer by claiming that life necessarily produces suffering, and
that each fleeting moment of individual happiness will inevitably be swallowed by the
ultimacy of one’s death.79 In a break with Schopenhauer’s infamous pessimism, however,
Nietzsche takes a more optimistic approach; his task is to define a way in which human
beings can overcome nihilism by creating their own meaning in a meaningless world. Since
life must go on even in the face of impending death, the individual who chooses to continue
living must determine the best way to process life’s negative elements.
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Nietzsche takes Apollonian and Dionysian art as two distinct attempts at coping
with the depressing reality of existence. However, neither attempt can be successful on its
own. Apollonian art reframes human experience in such a way as to draw one’s attention
to qualities of strength over qualities of weakness. Such art does not merely depict real life,
but also glorifies it. For example, Apollonian art may represent a violent military battle as
a praiseworthy act of heroism and valor, rather than as a moment of great tragedy. 80
Nietzsche understands the Apollonian as an individualizing force that draws boundaries
between particular beings—it depicts a given person or group in as much of a glorified
state as possible. 81 However, this boundary-drawing is also the primary shortcoming of
Apollonian art: it presents the glorious tragedies of life and death as things that only happen
to others, which always remain external to the individual observing the representation. One
may find temporary solace in a piece of art that depicts death as an act of heroism, but it is
never one’s own death that is captured by that art. By drawing such a definite boundary
between individual human experiences, such art therefore ultimately fails at the task of
providing comfort in the face of one’s own inevitable mortality.
In contrast to the clearly delineated Apollonian, Dionysian art (which Nietzsche
typically identifies with music) is formless; whereas the Apollonian particularized life and
death, the Dionysian transcends this particularity. In allowing the individual to overcome
her own finitude, Dionysian art also raises her to a level of consciousness that transcends
her individual sense of mortality. 82 However, the Dionysian on its own is not also without
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its shortcomings. A pure Dionysian state entails a frantic abandonment of all particularity,
what Nietzsche calls a “shattering of the individual,” and a destruction of all Apollonian
boundaries and structure.83 Nietzsche likens the pure Dionysian impulse to a state of
barbarism, one which he takes to be incompatible with civilized life. It amounts to an
abandonment of one’s particular existence, which for Nietzsche is an unsustainable way of
thinking—our goal should be to cope with reality, not to leave it behind. For this reason,
while the Dionysian may provide us with some temporary solace in the face of a painful
world, we cannot live our lives in the continuous grip of a pure Dionysian frenzy. 84
Therefore, neither the Apollonian nor the Dionysian on its own sufficiently
manages the negativity of the human experience. The Apollonian is too mired in its own
particularity, while the Dionysian is too detached from concrete existence. It is for this
reason that Nietzsche praises the Greek tragedy: he considers it the first art form to
successfully unify the Apollonian and Dionysian in a way that satisfies the emotional needs
of the audience. The tragedy provides a space in which the members of the audience can
experience Dionysian transcendence for themselves, through identifying with particular
Apollonian stories and characters. The tragedy’s modified Dionysian element, safely
confined by the Apollonian, allows the members of the audience to satisfy their need to
transcend rigid individuality in a way that keeps them grounded in the present world, and
therefore poses no risk to society. 85 Meanwhile, the tragedy’s format encourages the viewer
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to see herself represented in the characters on stage, breaking down the barrier between
individuals that ordinarily characterizes the Apollonian. In this way, the two forces
dialectically work to overcome one another’s shortcomings. This allows the audience to
experience Dionysian transcendence, and all of the coping power that comes with it, in a
way that is compatible with the existence of civil life.
Nietzsche explicitly writes that the Greek religion and the tragedy serve the same
function for those who engage with them. 86 In the Greek pantheon, the gods are depicted
in glorified anthropomorphic terms; far from the abstract concept of an Aristotelian Prime
Mover, the Greek gods feature distinctly human qualities and conduct themselves in
distinctly human fashion. They participate in relationships (both with other deities and with
humans), experience a wide range of emotions, and frequently make mistakes. None of
their imperfections detract from their divinity, however; in fact, the Greek gods are a prime
example of Apollonian representation, as the fullness of their conduct is meant to be
understood in terms of their divine glory. They are worthy of praise precisely because of
their anthropomorphic traits—they represent power and strength to the utmost degree even
in their imperfections, and they function as ideals that human beings can seek to emulate. 87
At this point we can begin to see the central idea that I will argue drives all of Nietzsche’s
work on religion: the belief that we should understand the human and the divine as two
unified concepts. We will return to this shortly. For now, we can note that by presenting
gods that are simultaneously anthropomorphic and divine, and divine because of their
anthropomorphic qualities, the Greek religion effectively synthesizes the Apollonian and
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the Dionysian. This works to check the progress of nihilism among the Greek people, by
encouraging them to recognize their own inherent divine capabilities.
At this point, it should be apparent that Nietzsche takes a primarily teleological
view of religious belief: he understands such beliefs to fulfill some practical purpose in the
lives of those who hold them, to provide them with some needed benefit. It is important to
note that he does not link this benefit to the literal truth value of any particular religious
claims. In fact, Nietzsche believes that both art and religion provide their benefits through
the use of mythological imagery (as opposed to rational facts). Art and religion provide
methods for one to temporarily transcend the negativity of the world, through a brief
engagement with fictional accounts. Nietzsche in fact notes that religion fails to serve its
purpose when it begins to make attempts at objectively and rationally describing reality,
instead of focusing on the mythological. 88 He criticizes this Socratic point of view, which
confines everything to the world of the rational; he argues that such an approach fails to
achieve the benefits provided by myth, and ultimately ends in the death of art. 89 Therefore,
Nietzsche aligns with the position of Chapter 1 of this project: we ought to understand
religion as a primarily social phenomenon, and to speak of religious belief in terms of the
imperative rather than the indicative. Nietzsche would agree that taking a purely
epistemological model of religion, which measures its value in terms of its ability to
communicate literal metaphysical truths, misunderstands the role of religion in the lives of
those who embrace it. We should keep this orientation in mind as we move into Nietzsche’s
criticisms of Judeo-Christianity; we will see that he condemns that tradition not because he
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takes its historical claims to be literally false, but because it fails to achieve the nihilismdefying purpose that he outlines for religious belief.

2.2.2

The Slave Revolt: Beyond Good & Evil and Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche appears to drastically change his tune on religion when he begins to write

on Judeo-Christianity. Whereas the Birth of Tragedy presented an account that was largely
amenable to religious practice, Nietzsche’s middle period takes a far more critical position
on the subject. In particular, his numerous references to the false ideas conveyed in JudeoChristianity have led many to misinterpret his views during this period. Contrary to popular
interpretations, I will show that the falsehoods Nietzsche criticizes in Judeo-Christianity
do not concern whether these religions accurately describe any particular deity; rather,
Nietzsche takes these religions to inaccurately represent the relationship of the human and
the divine as abstract concepts. This inaccurate representation can lead the religious
individual to cultivate beliefs that fail to fulfill their desired social function.
The Judeo-Christian tradition becomes the target of an extended polemic in Beyond
Good and Evil. Therein, Nietzsche describes the Christian faith as the sacrifice of all one’s
freedom and pride—and as a result of this, he condemns it as self-mutilation and
subjection.90 Nietzsche holds that, by encouraging qualities such as submissiveness and
humility, Judeo-Christianity has preserved lowly traits in humankind that should have been
allowed to fade into our species’ past—and certainly should not have been presented as
ideals for future generations to emulate. 91 We begin to see Nietzsche developing his
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account of master and slave morality in this text; we will wait to examine this matter until
his more developed version in the Genealogy of Morals. However, it’s worth pointing out
that despite serving as the foundation of Nietzsche’s war with the Christian God, Beyond
Good and Evil also provides some nuance regarding Nietzsche’s views on religion writ
large. We can see clear evidence in this text that the real target of Nietzsche’s polemic is
not religion per se, but rather a particular way of doing religion—one which the Nietzsche
of the Birth would also condemn. Despite having just criticized Judeo-Christianity at
length, he goes on to write that some form of religion can have a multiplicity of uses for
the philosopher who rises above the mindset of the herd:
The philosopher…will use religion for his disciplining and educating work, just as
he will use the contemporary political and economic conditions. The selecting and
disciplining influence—destructive, as well as creative and fashioning—which can
be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, according to the sort of
people placed under its spell and protection. For those who are strong and
independent, destined and trained to command…religion is an additional means for
overcoming resistance in the exercise of authority.92
For Nietzsche, the philosopher represents the overman, the one who rejects the widespread
slave morality and chooses to undertake higher pursuits. It is through the actions of such
individuals that humanity can progress as a species. To see Nietzsche suggesting that such
a person can use religion to accomplish their purpose is important, as it stands in stark
contrast to the view that religion is simply an outdated practice which the philosopher
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should abandon. We see here an emphasis not on religion itself, but on the way that the
individual practitioner utilizes the beliefs that she cultivates through religious engagement.
And a few lines down, Nietzsche even has some positive words for Christianity:
Religion, together with the religious significance of life, sheds sunshine over such
perpetually harassed men, and makes even their own aspect endurable to
them…There is perhaps nothing so admirable in Christianity and Buddhism as their
art of teaching even the lowest to elevate themselves by piety to a seemingly higher
order of things, and thereby to retain their satisfaction with the actual world in
which they find it difficult enough to live. 93
This seems to echo Nietzsche’s view in the Birth: religious belief can help its followers to
cope with an unpleasant existence. At this point he seems to believe that this can be the
case even for Christianity, although he will shift to a fully negative view of this tradition
over time. The key idea here is that, in some cases, religious belief can encourage an
acceptance of one’s practical situation, rather than a renunciation of it in favor of an
idealized afterlife. Such a belief can empower the one who holds it to navigate situations
in her life that would otherwise be overwhelming. This denotes a practical benefit to
religious belief, one which has little to do with the truth value of any particular religious
claims.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche provides a more developed account of
master and slave morality. Nietzsche understands human history as a continuous struggle
between some version of a noble master class and a lowly slave class, which feature
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opposite characteristics. 94 A system of master morality defines as “good” those traits that
the master class possesses: strength, beauty, power, and the like. 95 These traits are
presented as ideals towards which all of humanity, including the slave class, ought to strive.
However, recognizing that it does not possess these noble qualities, the slave class develops
resentment, and it attempts to undermine master morality by enacting a slave revolt. 96 As
a product of this revolt, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition makes a surreptitious
attempt to undermine the superior master morality. In these faiths, mankind is not
encouraged to cultivate the power and strength exhibited by the master class. Instead,
certain “wretched” qualities of the slave class are exalted. These religions declare that the
good are those who are kind and meek, those who turn the other cheek and forgive their
offenders even when they show no remorse. Meanwhile, the qualities of the master class
are condemned by these religions, and given a status not only as “bad” but as morally evil.
This ideology employs uniquely religious imagery in order to give additional credibility to
its claims97 —and given the proliferation of Judeo-Christian morality in Western society,
it has been wildly successful in doing so, even among those who do not practice these
religions themselves. Nietzsche’s position, of course, is that a new moral revolt is needed
to liberate the human race from these inferior religious notions.
To understand how this connects to the human/divine relationship, we can contrast
Nietzsche’s account here with that in The Birth of Tragedy. We saw in the Birth that the
Greek gods represented the same ideals as those that would later be described in terms of
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master morality. Those gods were worthy of worship not simply because they were divine
(in the sense that they were elevated beyond humanity), but because they exemplified those
qualities that also promote the flourishing of the human being. The Greek religion did not
encourage the individual to look beyond the distinctly human for examples of how she
ought to conduct herself—she should seek to cultivate those same human qualities that
were represented to the utmost in the behavior of the gods. However, while the Greek
religion thereby depicted the human and the divine as two essentially unified concepts,
Nietzsche sees Judeo-Christianity as splintering the two. By rejecting master morality,
Judeo-Christianity also rejects those qualities that promote the flourishing of the human
being. It proposes a God who requires his followers to debase and humiliate themselves,
and to reject their own will to power as something morally evil. What benefits the human
being, therefore, is fundamentally opposed to the will of the divine (as these religions
conceive of it). Those who would seek to do the will of God, then, must choose between
their own best interests as humans and the commands of a deity that is and must remain
necessarily distinct from the human experience.
Nietzsche describes the Christian worldview as objectively false—not because he
rejects the possibility of a historical Jesus, but because he takes the tradition itself to
cultivate false beliefs regarding how human happiness can be achieved. In the Birth,
Nietzsche likewise understood religion’s role to be one of helping people to cultivate
beliefs, which in turn would help them to continue functioning in a world void of objective
meaning. This teleological understanding of religious belief remains evident in the
Genealogy. The two forms of religion produce opposite outcomes, however; the Greek
religion empowers its followers to reject nihilism by embracing their own lived experience
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qua human beings, while Judeo-Christianity claims that without a god that exists beyond
the human world, life has no meaning. The latter religions define truth in terms of a god
that must remain fundamentally distinct from those who worship him—humans are proud
and cruel and evil, while God is humble and kind and good. For Nietzsche, therefore, those
who choose to embrace the Judeo-Christian slave morality are embracing falsehoods
regarding what promotes the flourishing of the human being. He believes that these
individuals are essentially lying to themselves, rather than accepting the reality that master
morality best represents that which leads to human happiness. 98 By defining the will of
God as something necessarily opposed to the ideals of master morality, slave morality
cultivates inaccurate beliefs, at both the individual and societal level, regarding how human
beings ought to live their lives. Therefore, while the Greek religion served a positive
function in the lives of those who followed it, Nietzsche sees Judeo-Christianity as a
negative practice which has the potential to stifle the progress of the human being.
With all of this in mind, we can see that Nietzsche’s view of religion remains
consistent from The Birth of Tragedy through his most well-known religious criticisms.
Nietzsche sees religious practice as a way of cultivating beliefs regarding the relationship
of the human and the divine. Religions that present these concepts as unified (i.e. religions
that promote divine traits as those that also lead to the flourishing of the human being)
serve a useful function in the lives of the faithful, because they empower them to navigate
a complex and often difficult world. Religion meanwhile becomes problematic when it
alienates the human and the divine, and thereby encourages false beliefs regarding how
human beings ought to conduct themselves. It is my view that Nietzsche maintains this
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position throughout his remaining work. To show this, I will now briefly turn to some of
his comments in The Antichrist. This text is often taken to provide definitive evidence of
Nietzsche’s radical atheism, but I will show that his goal therein is not to attack religion
writ large. Rather, he remains adamant that problems with religion stem primarily from
ideologies that cultivate improper beliefs regarding the human/divine relationship.

2.2.3

Religion & Divinity in The Antichrist
Nietzsche’s posthumously published comments on the Judeo-Christian faith are

consistent with his previous remarks on the subject. In his later life, Nietzsche continues to
hold that these religions are grounded upon a false understanding of reality, and that
because of this, they are hostile to those qualities that promote the flourishing of the human
being. In the Antichrist, he writes early on that we should define morality as a set of
conditions that benefit the life and growth of a group of people.99 Of course, he still holds
that it is specifically master morality—what he takes to be the true morality—which
accurately describes how one can best secure these benefits for oneself. Meanwhile, the
Christian faith “had its roots in hatred for the natural, for reality” 100; in the Christian God
Nietzsche sees “a declaration of war against life, nature, and the will to life.”101 By
embracing a Christian understanding of morality, the religious individual assumes
erroneous beliefs about what will best serve her own interests—and in doing so, denies the
reality of what it means to be human. In Nietzsche’s view, this religion institutes a moral
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system that does nothing to promote the well-being of those who follow it. To the contrary,
it actively works against its adherents’ best interests by keeping them in a state of
mediocrity.
However, it is particularly interesting how, despite Nietzsche’s repeated polemics
against religion in this text, The Antichrist does not imply a radical atheism. Moments also
appear where we can glimpse a concept of a god towards which Nietzsche feels more
favorable, and a practical use for religious belief of which he approves. He accuses
Christianity not of manufacturing a deity outright, but of “falsifying” the concepts of God
and morality—in the sense that this tradition inaccurately represents those matters, not that
it makes them up entirely.102 In the same passage he criticizes priests whom he takes to
“abuse” the name of God, which suggests that he understands a way of utilizing religious
imagery that would not be abusive. Referring to himself and other such free spirits, he later
writes that “what differentiates us is not that we find no God—but that we do not feel that
what has been revered as God is ‘godlike.’” 103 And even more clearly, he writes that the
God created by the New Testament Christians is “a negation of God.” Here we have
undeniable evidence that for Nietzsche, divinity is not a concept that we ought to reject
altogether. Rather, it is a quality that is diametrically opposed to how Judeo-Christianity
understands the concept. This suggests that for Nietzsche, the notion of the divine is not
something that humanity ought to abandon outright, but rather one that should be
understood in terms of a particular set of qualities—those that align with the most noble
traits in humanity, rather than those that require a rejection of them.
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In this text we can once again recognize Nietzsche’s view that religion is a
representational tool, which can be utilized to cultivate beliefs that fulfill some desired
function. He writes that Christianity has been progressively watered down by the various
historical peoples who have taken it up. In other words, Christianity itself does not pull
beliefs out of thin air; rather, it has been used to justify beliefs about humanity that an
inferior group of people already held, prior to the religion’s organization.104 Belief in the
principles of this religion produces a psychology of the faithful which solidifies a profound
mental sickness, of both the individual and the society that embrace it. Nietzsche repeatedly
describes Christianity as a religion of pity, the ideologies of which ultimately lead to
nihilism. 105 With the language of nihilism reappearing, one cannot help but be reminded
of his task in The Birth of Tragedy. In that text, Nietzsche’s goal was to articulate a way in
which a group of people could avoid falling victim to a radical pessimism regarding the
meaninglessness of existence. To do this means to embrace those ideals that he later
identifies with his system of master morality. Meanwhile, the Nietzsche of The Antichrist
identifies Christians as people who, by rejecting the will to power through the exercise of
Christian morality, have willfully also rejected their own ability to define what makes a
meaningful life. Such a religious orientation does not merely impact the individual; it
institutes ideals that harm the entire human species by stifling its evolutionary potential.
Nietzsche’s comments in The Antichrist demonstrate that while God may be dead,
the divine is alive and well. Nietzsche is opposed to Christian ideologies not because they
are false in a literal, metaphysical sense, but because they institute erroneous beliefs
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regarding what benefits the human being. We should not understand the divine in terms of
an alien god that demands us to renounce those qualities that promote our best interests as
humans. Rather, the divine is a quality that always already belongs to us. Religion becomes
problematic when it robs us of this notion of the divine and implies that we should hold
something beyond us in higher esteem than we do ourselves.

2.2.4

Nietzsche’s Religious Writings: A Consistent Account of the Human/Divine

Relationship
Now that we have examined multiple moments from Nietzsche’s accounts of
religion, it should be clear that the theme of the human/divine relationship runs consistently
through his work. The Birth of Tragedy claimed that the Greek religion was successful due
to its mythical representation of anthropomorphic gods. The Greek pantheon united the
concepts of humanity and divinity, and allowed believers to see themselves in the gods
whom they worshipped. These gods were considered praiseworthy because of their
distinctly humanlike qualities, which were deified in Apollonian fashion. Meanwhile, in
Judeo-Christianity, the concepts of the human and the divine are alienated from one
another. Those qualities that promote the flourishing of the human being—strength, power,
and the like—are not only discouraged in these religions, but declared to be antagonistic to
the will of God. The deity of these religions is distinguished from the religious practitioner,
because the person of God is depicted in a way that reinforces the inferior slave morality,
which Nietzsche takes to contribute to the mediocrity of humanity. It is because of this that
Nietzsche’s posthumously published work takes Christianity to be opposed to life itself:
for him, it is a religion of falsehood, which presents notions that will hold humanity back
as things that will carry us forward. Nietzsche’s early commitment to what he comes to
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define as the qualities of master morality therefore remains visible throughout his
remaining work. Nietzsche is not criticizing Judeo-Christianity because its followers
continue to believe in a literal, metaphysical God that has long been dead. He instead
criticizes this tradition because it follows what he takes to be an outdated way of thinking
about God, a form of thinking which refuses to recognize that the all-too-human qualities
in oneself are the ones that are actually worthy of praise. Nietzsche is therefore providing
a consistent account of various religions as sources of teleological beliefs, which can either
help or harm the ones who hold them in the long run.

2.3

Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion as a Theory of Community
We have identified a central type of alienation in Nietzsche’s work on religion: the

alienation of the human from the divine. On its own, this account is not particularly novel;
a number of Nietzsche scholars have defended a similar interpretation of his views.
However, I am not merely interested in conducting a conceptual analysis of Nietzsche’s
theory of the divine. This is a project in social philosophy, which is centrally concerned
with the possibility of a collaborative religious community—i.e. a religious community
that overcomes alienation of the individual from the group. We have seen the central
problem with much religious practice as Nietzsche defines it: religions go wrong when they
alienate the believer from that which she worships. This form of alienation is distinct from
the kind of communal alienation discussed in Chapter 1 of this project. However, I take
these forms of alienation to be necessarily connected, and I suspect that Nietzsche does so
as well. In other words, my position is that Nietzsche criticizes religious ideologies that
alienate the human from the divine because he takes such alienation to impact human social
life, in which he holds a fundamental interest. To make this point, however, it is first
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important to establish that Nietzsche does, in fact, hold such an interest in the social. We
must establish this because it is a minority position; most accounts of Nietzsche’s work
take him to be an egoist, an individualist, or some combination of the two. 106 We can
demonstrate, however, that Nietzsche is not merely interested in the flourishing of the
individual. Neither is he suggesting that particular groups ought to be elevated over others
due to some innate superiority on their part. Rather, he is interested in securing those
conditions that promote the evolution of the human race writ large. He understands
religious belief as a tool that can either accomplish or hinder this goal, not merely at the
individual level, but also within social groups. Therefore, in order to justify why I have
chosen to use Nietzsche to motivate a theory of collaborative religious community, this
section will argue against an individualistic reading of his work. I will demonstrate that an
interest in human social life can be followed through all of the comments on religion that
we have previously analyzed.

2.3.1

Religious Community in The Birth of Tragedy
The Birth of Tragedy is Nietzsche’s most obviously communitarian work. In this

text, Schopenhauer’s influence on the young Nietzsche is prominently visible. Nietzsche
at this point shares Schopenhauer’s view that religion has two primary function. As already
shown, its first function is to help its followers to cope with their own pessimism. However,
it also functions to provides a group of people with a central community ethos. 107 For
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Schopenhauer (as for Nietzsche), in order to promote social stability, a group of people
requires a single conception of morality around which it can unify. Religion is, of course,
not the only way in which such a system of morality can be instituted among a group, but
it is historically a common (and highly effective) way of doing so. Regardless of how it is
provided, this shared understanding of morality is essential for community life; Nietzsche
understands community as a common enterprise united around a shared conception of the
good life. We can think of religion’s role, then, as drawing a group of people into relation
with one another by instituting a particular set of moral principles, which members of the
group then take up as personal beliefs. Without such shared principles, Nietzsche believes
that a community is subject to degradation. After all, how can a social group be considered
a community if its members disagree on life’s most fundamental issues?
Religion is uniquely able to institute these shared moral principles through its
utilization of mythological thinking. Julian Young argues that Nietzsche’s communitarian
sympathies in the Birth can be traced back to his own intellectual roots in the Volkish
tradition.108 This intellectual movement, represented not only in Nietzsche but also in
Schelling, Fichte, and others, arose in response to the alienated rationalism of the
Enlightenment. When reason was elevated as the defining human faculty, ideas that had
historically been accepted—including the existence of God—were seriously called into
question for the first time, on the grounds that their literal truth could not be demonstrated.
Of course, Nietzsche sees the metaphorical death of God as a grand opportunity for the
progress of humanity; however, Young argues that Nietzsche believes such progress can
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only occur in a communitarian context, one which extreme rationalism undermines. 109
Nietzsche’s criticism of Socratic thinking in the Birth supports Young’s interpretation. For
Nietzsche, attempts to understand the world in terms of pure rationality cultivate a nihilistic
worldview which blocks the possibility of flourishing within human life. Such attempts
stifle the spirit of artistic myth and strip life of its Dionysian element. Nietzsche himself
claims that such a Socratic mode of thinking ought to be abandoned—Young sees this
prescription as a direct product of the Volkish influence on Nietzsche’s thinking. Young
follows Thomas Rohkrämer in arguing that the primary ideological thread in such thinking
is the belief in a necessary return to a type of communal faith, which can unify a social
group around a central set of beliefs. 110 To be clear, this is not a faith in any particular deity
(and for Nietzsche, certainly not in the Judeo-Christian God). Rather, it is a return to the
mythological style of thinking of the pre-Socratic Greeks, which recognized that much of
human life cannot be explained in terms of the purely rational.111
Therefore, the Nietzsche of the Birth calls for a communal turn away from
excessively rationalistic thinking, and a return to the spirit of myth exemplified in the Greek
tragedy. In doing so, a social group can cultivate a set of shared moral values, around which
the group can organize – and which can provide the foundation for durable community
relationships.
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2.3.2

The Social Orientation of Nietzschean Master & Slave Morality
The Birth is often treated as an anomaly. It is commonly accepted that Nietzsche

simply changes his tune after this text, rejecting his previous position regarding religion’s
positive social potential, and that the rest of his work is a continuous progression towards
an ever-greater degree of both atheism and individualism. However, we can see that
Nietzsche in his middle period retains both his interest in human social life generally
speaking, and his view on religion as a source of community morality. His religious
criticisms in Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy can be understood in light of his
position in the Birth; in the later texts, he is simply describing the absence of the positive
community ethos which he had previously discussed. His disdain for Judeo-Christianity is
not simply that these religions produce individuals whose lives are steeped in mediocrity.
Rather, his primary position is that the Judeo-Christian slave morality has instituted
erroneous beliefs at the group level, beliefs which prevent the possibility of groups
flourishing. Therefore, we can understand his account of master and slave morality as
issuing from a commitment to the possibility of healthy social life, and not merely to the
well-being of particular individuals.
First, we can see in the Genealogy that Nietzsche does not advocate for a radical
individualism; he writes about the benefits of belonging to a community. From Nietzsche:
Man lives in a community, man enjoys the advantages of a community (and what
advantages! We occasionally underestimate them nowadays), man lives protected,
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spared, in peace and trust, secure from certain injuries and enmities, to which the
man outside the community, the “peaceless” man is exposed[.]112
Nietzsche unfortunately does not go into greater detail regarding what specific advantages
he recognizes for community life. Here he mainly seems to echo the classic account of the
social contract, as he goes on to describe the process by which a community holds
accountable those who would seek to impose their own individualism against its sociallyheld ideals. We can infer from his account of master and slave morality that, if one belongs
to a community, then perhaps one enjoys a level of social security that reduces the
likelihood of group conflicts. This could, in theory, position one in such a way as to free
up her time and energy for more important pursuits. Despite his commitment to the primacy
of one’s own will to power, nowhere does Nietzsche seem to suggest that the ubermensch
will be more successful in undertaking his task if he does so alone. Therefore, while he
does not provide an extensive account here of his views on community, it should be clear
that Nietzsche is not advocating for a life of radical individualism in this text.
To understand Nietzsche’s views on community more clearly, we must first
understand his views on morality. Indeed, Nietzsche’s account of morality not only can be
understood in terms of the social—I argue that it must be understood in these terms. We
saw in the Birth that Nietzsche takes a central conception of morality to be essential to the
unity of a social group. It is a shared system of morality that not only brings a group
together, but also informs them of how to best direct their own conduct. For the Greeks,
their shared morality was largely akin to what Nietzsche would later call master morality:
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the gods were considered worthy of worship due to their qualities of exceptional beauty
and strength. Nietzsche saw this conception of morality as a useful community ethos for
the Greek people, because it presented moral ideals that he took to benefit those who
followed them. This ethos, of course, directly contradicts the new slave morality that would
be instituted in Judeo-Christianity. We have seen that Nietzsche takes the Judeo-Christian
morality to be fundamentally opposed to the human, in the sense that it requires its
adherents to conduct themselves in ways that directly violate their own interests qua human
beings. The whole point of a system of morality, for Nietzsche, is to define how a group of
human beings ought to live, in order to fulfill their highest potential. His criticism of these
religions, therefore, should be understood as a criticism of a faulty community ethos—one
which misunderstands what it means to be a flourishing human being. By imposing the
inferior slave morality upon a historical moment, Judeo-Christianity has oriented
generations of people towards erroneous beliefs regarding the best way to live a human
life. These religions do not merely institute these beliefs at the individual level, but broadly,
in such a way as to compromise the progress of the entire human race. The entire point of
religion is to institute, at the community level, an ideology regarding what constitutes a
group’s best interests, and Judeo-Christianity directly violates that purpose.
We can go a bit farther on this point: in the Genealogy, Nietzsche makes it clear
that he understands moral beliefs to be primarily of a social (rather than an individual)
nature. In other words, the beliefs that one holds regarding what is “good” and “bad/evil”
are typically the product of one’s position within a given social context—and not the
product of some prior individual experience with a given deity. Both the master and slave
class first define goodness not in terms of any religious ideology or human authority figure,
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but rather in terms of their own pre-existing personal qualities. Of course, as the qualities
of these two groups are opposed to one another, this leads to conflict when the groups
encounter each other. Nietzsche writes that “the idea of political superiority always
resolves itself into the idea of psychological superiority” 113; what he means here is that
resentment (as a personal psychological experience) develops in response to conflicts at
the group level. Slave morality itself is a set of beliefs that a group cultivates in response
to occupying an inferior position in society. The key point here is that for Nietzsche, moral
beliefs are not merely a foundation for community relationships—those beliefs themselves
are also socially constituted. This highlights the primacy of the social in Nietzsche’s
account, and calls into question those who would take him to be a radical individualist.
We should understand Nietzsche, therefore, as being committed to sociallydisseminated ideologies that promote the well-being of the human qua human. Importantly,
Nietzsche’s interest in human social life is not confined to an interest in any particular
group of people. As with so many other issues, Nietzsche often allows himself to be
misconstrued on this point; in both Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy, he
contributes to this interpretation with his repeated fixation on the European race
specifically.114 These comments, of course, are often used to justify Nietzsche’s later
connection to Nazism, by suggesting that Nietzsche takes the European race to be innately
superior to other groups of people. However, Nietzsche here is not taking a genetically
reductive position regarding some inborn superiority of any particular group. Beyond Good
and Evil demonstrates that for Nietzsche, human life is primarily an expression of the will
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to power, as both individuals and groups seek to impose their own wills upon others. 115
Nietzsche’s view of morality is that it is not an inherent quality of the individual, but rather
of actions—an action is objectively moral if it promotes the well-being of the human being.
Nietzsche does not differentiate what constitutes human well-being for different races or
nationalities. He likewise does not primarily differentiate between groups in terms of
inborn qualities, but rather in terms of how historically successful those groups have been
at imposing their own will to power upon others. His comments on the European race
should therefore not be understood as meaning that there is a biological superiority to a
given group of people; rather, that group has simply demonstrated great success in
exercising its will to power.

2.3.3

Nietzsche’s Social Views in The Antichrist
In the Antichrist, Nietzsche maintains the same position regarding religion,

morality, and community as that outlined above. He reaffirms early in this text that we
should understand morality as the conditions that benefit the life and growth of a group of
people. His disdain for the Christian faith is that it promotes as objective truth a set of ideas
that stifle the evolutionary progress of humanity. In describing Christianity as a profound
sickness, Nietzsche’s view is that this sickness is not confined to those individuals who
practice that religion—it extends to the entire society that embraces its moral ideologies.
Given all of this, one would be amiss to understand Nietzsche merely as a radical
individualist, whose concern lies with the solitary ubermensch in contrast to the needs of
the herd. One would be similarly mistaken to take Nietzsche as only being interested in
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particular social groups whom he believes to be genetically superior. Nietzsche’s religious
philosophy seeks to articulate an account of morality that can secure the flourishing of the
human race, not merely of a few individuals. Morality itself is a necessarily communitarian
enterprise, for moral concepts are themselves socially constituted, and what is moral must
be understood in terms of what benefits a group of people. Beliefs cultivated through
religious commitments do not only impact the individual who holds them, but also the
social groups in which that individual participates. With all of this articulated, we can
conclude that Nietzsche’s philosophy belongs in a positive account of religious community
such as this one. Nietzsche’s goal is to determine how we can cultivate the kinds of moral
beliefs that will allow us – all of us – to reach our greatest human potential.

2.4

Social Alienation in Nietzsche’s Religious Writings: Religious Moral Autonomy

& The Possibility of Thick Trust
With the alienation of the human and the divine demonstrated throughout
Nietzsche’s religious writings, and with the social orientation of Nietzsche’s philosophy
defended, I will now bring his views into conversation with the positions established in
Chapter 1 of this project. We have already shown that Nietzsche is fundamentally
concerned with the alienation of the human from the divine; given this, I believe that we
can also track a second, related type of alienation in his work. For Nietzsche, JudeoChristianity does not stop at alienating the human and the divine; it goes farther by
alienating the individual from her community. It does so by interfering with our first
necessary condition for the growth of thick trust: that of perceived moral autonomy among
members of the group. In this section, I will briefly revisit this condition for the growth of
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thick trust, and then argue that Judeo-Christianity as depicted by Nietzsche creates a social
environment in which this condition cannot be satisfied.
Recall that our first condition was as follows: in order for thick trust to develop
within a group, all parties must take each other to be participating in their relationships as
autonomous moral agents. In other words, when it comes to moral decision-making,
individuals must understand each other to be acting freely, without an external entity
coercing them to make a particular choice. They must in this sense take each other to
possess moral autonomy.116 Thick trust requires that individuals be able to hold themselves
accountable to a standardized expectation of conduct, even when they could feasibly get
away with violating that expectation.
It is clear from our previous discussion that Nietzsche sees moral autonomy to be
an essential element of religious belief and practice. His view that religion exists to provide
a central community ethos, i.e. a shared concept of morality, demonstrates an important
connection between the moral and the religious. However, different religions can shape
their adherents’ views on morality in a wide variety of ways, which can in turn yield a
variety of results for the possibility of thick trust.
Nietzsche’s praise for the Greek religion in the Birth should be read in light of how
that religion encourages the moral autonomy of its followers. The Greek religion does not
treat morality as something that is unknowable by the human being; followers of that
religion understand themselves to be already divine, and are thus empowered to play a role
in crafting their own community ethos. In doing so, members of such a religious
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community come to serve as their own standard for morality – they can determine for
themselves what will promote their flourishing qua human beings, and mutually choose to
pursue it. The possibility of moral autonomy is secured in such a religion because there is
no alien deity who defines for the agent how she ought to live her life. In other words, there
is no external standard for morality in such a religion, apart from the human being herself;
members of the group serve as their own autonomous authority regarding what is moral.
In a context where the individual serves as her own moral authority, others can reasonably
place their trust in that individual. Such an individual does not perform moral conduct out
of fear of punishment, but rather out of a personal commitment to her own autonomous
moral code.
Meanwhile, Nietzsche’s primary criticism of religions such as Judeo-Christianity
concerns those religions’ negation of their followers’ moral autonomy. To be morally
autonomous simply means to have the ability to set one’s own standards for moral conduct.
However, by presenting the divine and the human as two fundamentally opposed concepts,
and situating moral authority with the divine exclusively, a religion claims that it is an alien
god (and not the human believer) who ultimately determines what is moral. In JudeoChristianity, it is God alone who has access to the universal laws of right and wrong –
human beings must direct their conduct in light of God’s commandments, not in light of
their own personal moral values. Within this context, the believer has little input regarding
the types of actions that she ought to perform. We should recall that, for Nietzsche, those
who pursue the slave morality of Judeo-Christianity are pursuing an ideology which is
inherently heteronomous to the agent, and which is opposed to the flourishing of the human
race qua human beings. Because these religiously-imposed moral standards are
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heteronomous, they are insufficient for grounding relationships of thick trust. In order to
inspire thick trust in others, one’s moral conduct must originate with the individual herself;
it cannot be imposed upon her by an external entity. If morality entails merely following
rules imposed by an authority figure, then members of a group cannot trust one another to
follow those rules in the absence of the figure in question. Morality then becomes a matter
of simply avoiding punishment, not of determining for oneself how one ought to live. We
saw in Chapter One that such a self-interested approach alienates the individual from other
members of the group, and precludes the possibility of meaningful trust relationships.
Religions like Judeo-Christianity (as Nietzsche describes the tradition) therefore
cannot provide us with what we need to establish a collaborative religious community.
These faiths call into question the individual’s ability to determine what is moral; they
instead locate morality with a god that remains fundamentally distinct from those who
worship him. Additionally, in such religions, the commands of God often require the
faithful to perform actions that directly violate their best interests qua human beings. As
this way of doing religion alienates the human from the divine, it undermines the
individual’s capacity for moral autonomy—and in doing so, prevents her from cultivating
durable community relationships.

2.5

Conclusion
This chapter has focused largely on alienation between the religious individual and

that which she worships. For Nietzsche, to be human means to be capable of moral selfdirection; the individual human being must decide for herself what is meaningful, and
towards what end she will direct her life. He believes that humanity has a responsibility to
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strive towards our fullest potential qua human beings—a potential to embrace our own will
to power and exercise to the utmost our all-too-human qualities of power and strength.
Religions like Judeo-Christianity posit an alien deity as an exclusive source of meaning
and truth, and present a moral ideology that is fundamentally opposed to that which
objectively benefits the human being. This promotes the stagnation of human potential, as
believers look beyond themselves for answers regarding how to live their lives. Such
religious practice not only alienates humanity from the divine; it also alienates believers
from one another by undermining the possibility of genuine community relationships.
A succinct way of describing this problem is to define it in terms of religious
heteronomy. Of course, this chapter is certainly not the first place where such a problem
has been taken up. One of the more well-known treatments of this problem is in Kant’s
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Of course, from a historical perspective,
Kant’s work cannot engage with Nietzsche’s; however, Kant’s task is to address some of
the same concerns about religion that Nietzsche would also later articulate. In the Religion,
Kant seeks to rationalize religious practice by emphasizing the moral autonomy of the
believer—that is, by designating the individual believer as one who can access and interpret
religious truth. By doing so, Kant attempts to turn religion into a universalizable practice
in which the rational subject is able to determine what is morally right simply through the
exercise of her own reason. Prima facie, Kant’s solution appears palatable, for it
emphasizes the believer’s autonomy and therefore seems to avoid the sorts of problems
that we see highlighted in Nietzsche’s account. It also, at least at first glance, meets our
first criterion for the growth of thick trust. However, for our purposes, Kant’s view of
religion remains inadequate for the task of establishing a collaborative community; this is
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because, while religion in Nietzsche often fails to satisfy our first condition for thick trust,
religion in Kant fails to satisfy our second. The following chapter will consider Kant’s
Religion at length and conclude that, while such a religion has the potential to solve the
problem of religious heteronomy, it also creates new ones, and therefore cannot set the
stage for a collaborative community.

86

CHAPTER 3. THE PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF KANT’S RATIONAL RELIGION
3.1

Introduction
The previous chapter was primarily concerned with the subject of religious moral

autonomy. Nietzsche believes that a religion can cultivate the moral autonomy of the
believer by emphasizing the inherent divinity of the human being – that is, by situating
moral authority with the religious individual. Many historical religions have failed to
accomplish this, however, instead depicting the divine and the human as necessarily
distinct from one another. In doing so, these religions place moral authority in the hands of
an entity beyond the human agent, a practice which undermines the possibility of thick
trust in communal relationships. One can conclude, then, that a collaborative religious
community must be one in which the moral autonomy of the believer is prioritized.
For Nietzsche, religious moral autonomy is possible; he takes the Greek religion as
an exemplar of autonomous religious practice. Nietzsche claims this religion represents the
divine in a way that deifies and therefore empowers the human being, breaking down the
barrier that other religions (such as Judeo-Christianity) would impose between the two. If
Nietzsche were correct, then perhaps we could look to the Greek religion as a standard for
a collaborative religious community. However, upon closer examination, we can see that
this religion does not successfully overcome divine/human alienation in the way that
Nietzsche claims it does. While the Greek religion represents the divine in largely
anthropomorphic terms, the Greek gods still maintain qualities that are beyond those of
even the most powerful human being. Zeus may take on the appearance of a man, but men
can never become Zeus. Therefore, the practice of this religion still sustains a degree of
alienation between the human and the divine, because while the believer can identify with

the gods concerning their shared human traits, she can never truly know what it is like to
be a god. The gods remain separate from the believer, not merely because they are distinct
individuals, but also because they are a distinct type of entity. The mythological device, by
virtue of being representational, therefore ultimately perpetuates the problem that it
attempts to overcome. This calls into question whether such a religion can genuinely
cultivate the moral autonomy of the human being.
There is another issue with Nietzsche’s account of religion as well. Despite his
(already!) lengthy criticisms of it, Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil that
Christianity, even with all of its alienating tendencies, can still have a certain teleological
value for those who do not become mired in its questionable theological claims. 117 This
suggests that the ideological content of a religious tradition is less important than the
individual who interprets that content. In other words, it seems that what a person takes
away from a religion is primarily determined by the person rather than the religion itself.
If religion’s goal were simply to function at the individual level, i.e. to develop the
individual’s moral conscience and worldview, then perhaps Nietzsche’s choice to center
the believer (rather than the content of the representation) would make sense. But we also
saw that for Nietzsche, religion’s main function is to provide a central community ethos
around which a group of people can unify. If this is the case, then the way Nietzsche
describes Christianity in Beyond Good and Evil seems to conflict with that function. How
can a religion unite a community around a given set of principles, if the members of that
community can all interpret the claims of that religion differently? If religion is merely a
matter of individual interpretation, then any religion can mean anything at all, and religious
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principles come to mean little more than the most arbitrary personal opinion. While this
may encourage the believer to look to herself for the answers to life’s biggest questions, it
does little to create a social context in which people can reasonably predict the behavior of
others. In other words, the possibility of thick trust within this sort of religious context
seems questionable.
There is therefore a gap between what Nietzsche wants out of religious practice,
and what he describes it as actually being able to give us. What is needed here is a way of
doing religion that secures the moral autonomy of the believer more effectively than the
Greek religion does. We need a model of religion that does not point the believer towards
anthropomorphic gods (and in doing so, solidifies structures of alienation), but rather to
her own autonomous judgments of what constitutes moral conduct. Furthermore, if a
religion is to ground relationships of thick trust, it seems that there needs to be some
objective foundation for the religion’s belief system. The ideology in question ought to be
based upon universally agreeable principles, rather than vague tenets which can be
interpreted differently by different sorts of people.
Because of this, for the purpose of fostering social relationships, I take Kant’s
account in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason to be preferable to Nietzsche’s
model of religion. Kant takes great care to center the believer’s autonomy in his account,
as his entire practical philosophy is grounded upon the possibility of individual autonomy.
Additionally, Kant does not make religion a matter of subjective interpretation—he
believes that all historical religions are grounded upon universal truths which are accessible
to, and verifiable by, every rational agent. In my view, Kant’s rational religion preserves
the autonomy of the believer in a way that supports the development of communal life,
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while also successfully overcoming the alienation between divine and human that is a
necessary element of religious representation. Such a religion therefore does a better job
than Nietzsche’s of satisfying our first condition for the growth of thick trust. 118
However, while it is necessary, the mutual perception of moral autonomy alone is
not sufficient to establish thick trust among members of a community. We saw in Chapter
1 that reason alone cannot ground community relationships, and that post-Enlightenment
accounts which privilege reason often discount the reality that human experience is not
purely rational. It is because of this that I articulated a second necessary condition for the
growth of thick trust: members of a community must define rationality in terms of the
practical, and not merely the theoretical. And unfortunately, while Kant’s account of
rational religion does an excellent job of satisfying our first condition, it fails to satisfy the
second. Kant attempts to surmount the problems of representational religion altogether by
treating religious imagery as a set of ideological training wheels, as a tool which can be
cast aside once one no longer needs it. He holds that the historical elements of religious
practice are not of particular import, because he is primarily interested in the ideological
similarities of religions rather than their cultural and temporal differences. Kant’s proposal
is that in the kingdom of ends, historical religion will fade away altogether, leaving behind
pure rational religion.119 However, this approach mistakenly treats religion as if it were
merely an epistemological endeavor, one which would strive to cultivate indicative beliefs
regarding the nature of the moral law. Kant therefore ends up making the same sort of error
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as the critics we saw in Chapter 1 of this project, who judged religion by its metaphysical
accuracy rather than its practical utility. Because of this, for the purpose of creating a
collaborative community, Kant’s rational religion solves one type of problem but creates
another.
So, this chapter will show that Kant’s model of religion brings us closer to a
collaborative religious community than Nietzsche’s does, but still ultimately falls short of
it. Our order of events will be as follows: first, I will demonstrate what Kant takes religion’s
purpose to be, according to his account in the Religion. We will see that, like Nietzsche,
Kant initially claims that religion serves a teleological function in human social life. Kant’s
view is that historical religious imagery represents universal moral truths in a way that is
amenable to practical reason, and serves to cultivate beliefs regarding the possibility of
moral conduct. We will see that for Kant, the topics of religion and autonomy are
necessarily intertwined, as the purpose of religious practice is to illuminate the believer’s
capacity for moral autonomy. I will argue that, by distinguishing between rational and
historical religion, Kant preserves the autonomy of the believer while overcoming the
religious alienation between the divine and the human that Nietzsche criticizes—and does
so in a way that is more effective than any solution Nietzsche provides. In doing so, Kant’s
account satisfies our first condition for thick trust more effectively than Nietzsche’s does.
However, while Kant’s ultimate move away from representational religious
practice works to preserve the believer’s autonomy, it also creates a new problem—one
which prevents his model of religion from grounding a collaborative community. Many
Kant scholars have contended that by privileging rational religion, Kant strips away
everything that is uniquely religious about religion; I will echo this point, although I will
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suggest that the problem is not so much the loss of the religious as the loss of the practical,
generally speaking. I will argue that Kant mistakenly treats religion as a source of
indicative beliefs regarding the moral law, when he instead ought to treat the practice as a
source of imperative beliefs that can have social utility regardless of their literal truth value.
By holding religion to Enlightenment standards of rationality, Kant betrays a limited
definition of the rational, and in doing so underestimates the primacy of the practical in
human social life. Therefore, this chapter will conclude that Kantian rational religion on its
own is not sufficient to ground a durable community, because it fails to satisfy our second
necessary condition for thick trust.

3.2

Kant on the Function of Religion
Kant’s work on religion is extensive, and to understand it properly requires some

familiarity with his practical philosophy. While this is not a dissertation primarily on Kant,
we should begin with a cursory review of his work on the subject, so that we can understand
the role that he takes religion to play in human life. We will see that, in short, Kant believes
that the function of historical religion is to represent the universal moral law in a way that
is amenable to practical reason, with the goal of illuminating the individual’s pre-existing
capacity for moral autonomy. For Kant, this awareness of one’s own capacity for goodness
is a necessary condition for the foundation of the ethical community.

3.2.1

Rational vs. Historical Religion: Kant on Religious Objectivity
Kant and Nietzsche agree on at least one point: both believe that historical religious

practice is primarily a representational endeavor. Like Nietzsche, Kant believes that no
single religion’s historical claims should be understood as literal truth. Kant’s view is that
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religions tell stories in order to help practical reason to grasp abstract concepts, which may
be difficult to understand on a purely theoretical level. 120 While these stories may be
objectively dubious, this is not a problem, for their purpose is mythical rather than literal.
It does not matter whether Jehovah or Zeus actually exists (for example), but merely what
those concepts represent to those who engage with them. Both Nietzsche and Kant would
say that stories of all-powerful gods can help human beings come to some understanding
of divinity as a concept. However, one way that we can differentiate between Kant and
Nietzsche’s accounts is by noting their different views on religious objectivity. I argued in
this chapter’s introduction that Nietzsche makes religion a matter of pure subjective
interpretation, where there is no ultimate truth to be found within religious ideology—
religion can mean anything at all, depending upon the person interpreting its
representations. For Nietzsche, the function of religion (at least, its ideal function) is to
illuminate for the individual her own capacity to decide what constitutes a meaningful life.
However, Nietzsche holds that this meaning is entirely up to the individual to determine;
there is no objective standard for value beyond the will of the subject. 121 In contrast, while
Kant likewise acknowledges the great variety in historical religious representations, he
believes that there are certain objective truths to be found across all religions, and that
particular religions should be understood as an attempt to represent these universal truths.
Kant’s view is that historical religions themselves ought to be judged according to how
accurately they align with this objective standard. 122 Religion for Kant, then, is not about

120 See Religion, 6:109; & Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans.
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creating value in a meaningless world, but rather about using religious representations to
locate pre-existing values. Nietzsche treats religion as something purely subjective, while
Kant sees it as having both subjective and objective elements.
Kant’s position is best demonstrated by his distinction between historical religion
and rational religion. The former is what one likely thinks of when hearing the term
“religion”; historical religion refers to any particular religious tradition that is practiced in
a given place and time. Such a religion is defined both by its theological commitments, and
by its traditions and rites in which believers participate—it therefore has both theoretical
and practical features. Meanwhile, Kantian rational religion is purely theoretical, and is a
bit more abstract. For Kant, a rational religion is a “religion” the content of which is
informed solely by the testimony of human reason. It is an intellectual exercise, but not
necessarily a practical one. To be a rational religion, it must be universalizable in the sense
that its claims to truth are not dependent upon historical events or particular tenets of
theology. It is necessary that these claims can be discerned by any rational agent at any
point in time.123 Specifically, the content of rational religious belief is informed solely by
the moral law, and the primary goal of rational religious practice is promoting
universalizable moral statutes. There is indeed no difference for Kant between the tenets
of rational religion and the dictates of the categorical imperative. 124
Importantly, this distinction between rational and historical religion is not a
dichotomy—historical religion can (and for Kant, ought to) be grounded in rational
religion. One can think of rational religion as an idea or concept, for which historical
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religion provides a practical representation. Because Kant largely equates rational religion
and the moral law, he contends that rational religious principles on their own may be
difficult for practical reason to grasp. Kant writes that human beings have a “peculiar need
for something the senses can hold onto”125; the historical elements within a particular
religion, such as its traditional imagery and rites, can serve as representational vehicles for
universal truths which may otherwise remain obscure. For instance, Kant claims that the
Biblical story of mankind’s fall from grace represents the evil that occurs when a human
being sets conditional incentives as her supreme maxim instead of the moral law. 126
However, as mentioned at the outset of this section, one must bear in mind that universal
truth cannot be limited to the form of mere particularities. Truth can be represented in any
number of religions, not just one. Kant’s claim that morality has no need of religion means
that universal truths represented by religious practice would hold true even in the absence
of all historical religions, and that no single tradition has a monopoly on truth. 127 In other
words, the moral necessarily precedes the religious. Kant’s claim also means that, while
historical religions serve an important representational purpose, they can never represent
rational truths with one hundred percent accuracy. He writes that “the distinguishing mark
of the true church is its universality”128; for Kant, the historical elements of any particular
religion make it necessarily non-universalizable, because historical facts cannot be
discerned through reason alone. Kant is primarily interested in universal moral truths, not
in the imperfect vehicles through which they are conveyed to the believer. He therefore
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takes rational religion to be of primary value, with historical religion serving a lesser
supportive function.129

3.2.2

The Teleological Function of Belief
We can see from the above discussion that Kant takes religion and morality to be

necessarily connected—not because any particular religion can exclusively determine what
is moral, but because rational religion and the moral law are one and the same. Historical
religion, meanwhile, serves to establish beliefs regarding the moral law and one’s
relationship to it. These beliefs impact the way in which the individual navigates her life,
and influence her continued pursuance of the moral law. We can therefore see that, like
Nietzsche, Kant takes one of religion’s most important functions to be the cultivation of
beliefs, which serve a teleological function in the lives of those who hold them.
The function of religious belief in Kant’s system is to inspire and encourage a
commitment to moral conduct over the course of one’s life. For Kant, necessity implies
possibility; we are only obligated to do that which we are able to do. Possibility here refers
not only to the overarching metaphysical possibility of something, but also to the agent’s
perception of its possibility. This means that, when it comes to the task of fulfilling our
duty to the moral law, two things are required: we must actually be capable of setting the
moral law as our supreme maxim, but we also must believe that we possess this capability.
It is only after one comes to believe that moral conduct is possible that she can begin to

129 We shall see shortly that this creates a tension between rational and historical religion, one which
presents problems for the possibility of a collaborative religious community.

96

pursue it. Religion for Kant is therefore primarily a matter of cultivating beliefs—not in
any particular faith’s gods or tenets, but in the possibility of goodness itself.
There are two ways in which religion can establish beliefs regarding the possibility
of becoming moral. First, Kant argues in the second Critique that moral conduct is only
possible if the subject believes that virtue and happiness will ultimately be aligned. From
the categorical imperative, we have a duty to promote the highest good, which would be
made manifest in a world where performing virtuous conduct necessarily leads to
happiness.130 Kant’s commitment that necessity implies possibility leads him to conclude
that such an ideal world must indeed be possible. However, despite being the two elements
of the highest good, virtue and happiness often oppose one another. Kant writes in the
second Critique:
[M]axims of virtue and those of one’s own happiness are quite heterogenous with
respect to their supreme practical principle; and, even though they belong to one
highest good, so as to make it possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they
greatly restrict and infringe upon each other in the same subject. 131
In other words, we can see in the world around us that behaving virtuously does not always
lead to happiness. Nature is not so structured as to necessarily promote the highest good
on its own. A person who attempts to follow the moral law thus has no initial guarantee
that she will ever achieve the highest good.132 Therefore, in order to secure the possibility
of Kant’s ideal world, we must postulate the existence of an all-powerful being which can
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ultimately unite duty and happiness, by ensuring that happiness necessarily follows from
doing one’s duty.133 For all purposes, this being would be God. Postulating the existence
of God allows one to believe in the possibility of the highest good, which in turn allows
the subject to direct her maxims towards that good.
So, religion can establish a belief in the possibility of a sort of ultimate happy
ending, in which one’s duty aligns with the highest good. This belief empowers the agent
to fulfill her own moral obligations. Religion can establish a second sort of belief as well:
the belief that the individual herself remains capable of continuous moral improvement,
even in the face of her own moral shortcomings. One of Kant’s central claims in the
Religion is that every human being possesses propensities to both good and evil; while we
all have an inextirpable moral predisposition, the concurrent evil within us can obscure our
insight into the possibility of our own goodness.134 Because of these simultaneous
propensities, while we all have the capacity to become virtuous, we may occasionally find
ourselves blinded to that capacity in the face of repeated moral failures. These failures can,
over time, dishearten even the most resilient individual. Such a person may come to believe
that she is fundamentally incapable of doing good, and therefore cease any further attempts
at moral conduct. This leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the propensity for evil
“determines” the ultimate nature of one’s choices.135 For the purpose of morality, what is
needed is for the agent to attain self-consciousness of her own propensity for good—that
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is, she must come to recognize and believe in her own ability to give the moral law to
herself and to act in accordance with it, despite temptations she may face to do otherwise.
While Kant believes that all rational agents are theoretically capable of coming to
this self-recognition solely through the power of their reason, the task can nonetheless be
made more manageable through the use of practical representations. It is at this point that
rational religion, with its synthesis of universal truths and phenomenal content, can be
useful. Although such particular representations can only do an imperfect job of
representing universal truth (since they are always merely particular), they can nonetheless
enable practical reason to cognize that truth in a way that it may otherwise struggle to do.
By looking to religious myths that defend the individual’s inextirpable capacity for
goodness, one can cultivate a belief in her own goodness—a belief that can encourage her
to continue the task of striving towards virtue, even as she does so imperfectly. In Book II
of the Religion, Kant discusses a representation of, or prototype for, virtue. He takes virtue
to be best represented in the person of Jesus Christ, and he believes that Christ can serve a
pivotal function in the moral transformation (or “salvation”) of the human being. However,
for Kant, the role that Christ plays in human salvation is not what is described in the
traditional Christian story. Kant does not treat Christ’s death as an event that institutes a
literal metaphysical reorientation of guilt from one party to another. Rather, he presents it
as a hopeful allegory which suggests that even the most corrupted will can be transformed
through continuous effort.136 As the prototype of virtue, Christ is the perfect embodiment
of a person oriented towards the moral law. He is fully human, with a corporeal form that
is subject to the same struggles and temptations that afflict every other human. In the face
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of every temptation, however, he never strays; he allows the moral law alone to guide
everything that he does. Christ’s embodiment in human form demonstrates to the individual
that while it may at times be extraordinarily difficult, it is possible after all for a human to
become virtuous.137 By recognizing this capacity for virtue in Christ, and by extension in
oneself as a similarly constituted being, Kant claims that one places a practical “faith” in
Christ. Through this practical faith, the believer becomes conscious of her own moral
disposition. In other words, she comes to believe that she too can be virtuous, if she just
follows Christ’s example. She can then seek to emulate Christ in the face of her own
temptations, and if she does so, she is justified in hoping herself to be a person who is
pleasing unto God—a person who is virtuous.138 In this sense, then, the believer’s faith in
Christ “saves” her, not in the sense that it gives her admission into a literal afterlife, but in
the sense that it provides her with a belief which inspires her to continue fulfilling her duty
to the moral law.

3.2.3

Religion’s Role in the Ethical Community
We can see from our discussion thus far that for Kant, belief plays a pivotal role in

the possibility of moral conduct. This emphasis on the power of belief is something that
we also saw in Nietzsche’s work on religion. A further similarity between Kant and
Nietzsche is that neither of them takes belief to function merely at the individual level; they
both claim that beliefs provide a central ideological structure around which a community
can organize. For Kant, shared moral beliefs are the foundation of the ideal ethical
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community. Kant holds that human life is necessarily social; the highest human good (that
is, the unification of duty and happiness) cannot be realized by an individual will, and
rational agents must come together in an ethical community or kingdom of ends in order
to achieve it. This is largely due to the prevalence of temptation—Kant holds that one’s
own efforts at moral conduct always run the risk of failure if one is not surrounded by
likeminded others who are also committed to the moral law above all else. 139 In other
words, centralized beliefs are essential for both individual and group moral progress. And
just as religion could cultivate a belief in the possibility of individual morality, Kant
believes it can also provide representations useful in the life of a community.
Kant holds that individuals who wish to come together in an ethical community
must have a single unifying principle that unites them in their efforts. This unifying
principle, rationally speaking, must be the moral law. Such a community must be founded
upon laws that are universalizable for every member of the group, and each individual
ought to be considered a law-giving agent—law-giving not merely for herself, but for every
other member (insofar as the laws she gives are rationally universalizable). 140 However,
treating each member of the group as an individual lawgiver for others is impractical,
because it is impossible for one to know the hearts of other people. Therefore, Kant believes
that the ethical community requires a practical representation of a centralized ethical
lawgiver, who knows the hearts of the people and makes laws that align with the will of
the group.141 Only a supreme noumenal being, a god, can serve as this lawgiver. 142 The
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important thing to keep in mind here is that, for the ethical community, the supreme
lawgiver is merely an image—such a community is not dogmatically united under the
banner of any particular religion or god, but rather under the common goal of pursuing the
moral law. The religious imagery of a god who posits that law can be of use, but that use
remains necessarily representational. By establishing an ethical community oriented
towards the will of some represented deity, moral agents can better discern universalizable
moral truths and direct their wills towards actions that will benefit the community overall.
Historical religion’s function in human social life therefore always remains a
representational one. Indeed, Kant is adamant that no particular historical religion can
ground the ethical community, since the claims of such a religion would not be
universalizable.143 What matters here is not that the members of the community share a
belief in a single historical faith, but rather that they believe in the possibility of their own
moral progress. Rational religion’s emphasis on universalizable truths (rather than
historical facts) necessarily points one towards the recognition of the moral law—and
towards those truths that hold for all rational agents, not merely for oneself.
It should be clear from our discussion so far that, just as Nietzsche does, Kant
affirms that religion is a matter of cultivating useful beliefs. Those beliefs do not concern
whether any particular god literally exists, but rather how one ought to conduct oneself in
the world. Kant and Nietzsche’s primary disagreement does not concern the social function
of religious belief, but rather what they take certain religious beliefs to produce in those
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who take them up. Such beliefs have real consequences for the possibility of communal
relationships. We will see in the following section that both Kant and Nietzsche hope to
secure the moral autonomy of the individual through religious practice, but that their
accounts vary widely on what exactly constitutes such autonomy.

3.3

Autonomy in Religious Practice: Kant & Nietzsche’s Conflicting Accounts

3.3.1

Kantian vs. Nietzschean Autonomy
We have already seen that, for Nietzsche, religion’s ideal function should be to

represent the reality that what is human is also necessarily divine, with the goal of
demonstrating the individual’s capacity for moral autonomy. Kant also sees religion as
being necessarily bound up with the autonomy of the believer. For Kant, insofar as
historical religion illuminates the moral law, it also illuminates the individual’s relationship
to that law; in other words, historical religion can demonstrate the individual’s capacity for
moral self-governance. For Kant, to be autonomous means to recognize the universal law
within oneself, and to embrace one’s capacity to hold oneself accountable to that law.
While all human beings have the ability to do this, we do not start off with this orientation
towards the moral law. Our attempts at goodness often begin heteronomously, with us
identifying “goodness” as the improvement of particular actions or mores. 144 These
attempts are misguided, and will ultimately always be thwarted by the human propensity
for evil. Kant speaks extensively in the Religion about what he calls a revolution in the
disposition of the human being, which he takes to be required before an agent can begin
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pursuing genuinely moral conduct. 145 Anyone who seeks to become morally good must
undergo an internal transformation that enables her to attain virtue. What Kant means by
this dispositional revolution is a recognition of one’s status as an autonomous subject—
and through its representational imagery, religious practice can illuminate this status to
practical reason. Religious practice for Kant, then, is a process by which the individual
rises to consciousness of her status as a law-giving subject.
One of the primary differences between Kant and Nietzsche is that the two have
radically different definitions of autonomy. Kant takes the universal law to be an objective
truth, but to also be a subjective phenomenon that is produced by the autonomous will of
each rational agent. Nietzsche, however, disagrees with this assessment, and considers
Kant’s account of morality to be riddled with heteronomy. In what is clearly a reference to
Kantian ideas, Nietzsche writes in The Antichrist that
a virtue must be our discovery, our most personal self-defense and necessity: in
every other sense it is merely a danger. What our life does not call for harms it: a
virtue, which is merely a feeling of respect for the concept of “virtue,” as Kant
would have it, is harmful. “Virtue,” “duty,” “good-in-itself,” good in the character
of impersonality and universality – chimeras in which the decline, the final
exhaustion of life, the Koenigsbergian Chinadom is expressed.146
For Nietzsche, one cannot universally define what constitutes goodness—it is the
responsibility of each individual to make such a determination for herself. Nietzsche
therefore rejects the German idealist commitment to reason as a universal moral standard.
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Indeed, he believes that despite their emphasis on the human subject, the German idealists
elevate reason to the status of a heteronomous authority. Nietzsche would therefore claim
that Kant’s view of reason precludes the possibility of individual moral autonomy, because
it holds the agent accountable to something external to herself.
A lengthy discussion of Kantian versus Nietzschean autonomy is beyond the scope
of this project. However, it’s worth noting that Kant does not see the moral law as
constraining the freedom of the agent; in contrast, he claims that human beings are most
free when they choose to limit their actions to those that align with the moral law. 147 This
freedom in limitation is possible because Kant sees the moral law as something that is not
external to us, but rather an essential element of our own reason. No one and nothing else
can impose the moral law upon us; it is a product of our own spontaneous rational
activity.148 To give the moral law to oneself, which is to limit one’s maxim-making on a
voluntary basis, is to set oneself free of those maxims that are heteronomously given. In
other words, Kant equates autonomy and freedom.149 Acting in accordance with the
autonomously given moral law also ensures the highest degree of human well-being. To
be free is not simply to obey whatever potentially self-destructive inclination that happens
to cross one’s mind (a state that Kant calls negative freedom in the second Critique), but
to choose to live in accordance with the moral law as given to oneself, thereby fulfilling
one’s highest potential as a rational agent. Thus, Kant says that it is by choosing to rein in
her will that the individual becomes a free, autonomous subject.
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While our task here is not to wade into the minutiae of Kant and Nietzsche’s
disagreement on this subject, the way in which we define autonomy is still quite important.
This project has established a degree of moral autonomy as a necessary condition for the
growth of thick trust within a group; therefore, determining what exactly constitutes such
autonomy is necessary to articulate the possibility of a collaborative community. I have
already argued that Nietzschean autonomy can satisfy this condition, but what about
Kantian autonomy? Does the objectivity that Kant posits in the moral law undermine the
individual’s ability to serve as her own moral standard? And how does it affect her ability
to form relationships of thick trust with others? In the following section, I will explore
these questions. We will see that as far as the religious community is concerned, Kantian
rational religion not only satisfies our first condition for thick trust—it can do so more
effectively than any type of religious practice that Nietzsche proposes.

3.3.2

Moral Autonomy in the Religious Community: The Initial Adequacy of Both

Kant & Nietzsche’s Accounts
I have stated our first condition for the growth of thick trust as follows: in order to
establish thick trust, members of a group must take each other to be participating in their
relationships as autonomous moral agents. Insofar as individuals believe each other to be
able to hold themselves accountable to a given set of moral principles, those individuals
can trust one another, even in the absence of coercive authority figures. It is intentional that
I have used the language of taking one another to be autonomous as opposed to something
like “members of a group must participate in their relationships as autonomous moral
agents.” This choice of language was made in light of a position that itself sounds quite
Kantian: trust is built upon practical appearances, rather than upon unknowable
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metaphysical realities. Autonomy is a slippery concept that is quite difficult to discuss in a
definitive manner; in practical social relationships, however, it hardly matters whether
individuals hold strong theoretical positions regarding the nature of autonomy. It may be
the case that none of us are truly autonomous in a literal sense, but in a social context, it
still appears that we have the freedom to make choices. It is this social perception of moral
freedom that enables thick trust among individuals.150 This is true even if it is difficult to
nail down a theoretical definition of what exactly constitutes autonomy.
On this rather thin definition of autonomy, both Kant and Nietzsche’s accounts
initially provide us with what we need for thick trust to develop within a religious group.
It is less important whether a religious practice objectively provides one with the highest
possible degree of metaphysical freedom, and more important whether those around the
believer simply understand her to be acting with moral autonomy. We have already seen
that, for Nietzsche, the most useful religious practice is that which centers the individual;
an entity beyond the subject cannot dictate what is moral for that subject. This means that,
in the kinds of religious practice that Nietzsche praises, the believer serves as the ultimate
standard regarding the morality of her conduct. This primacy of the believer’s judgment
allows others to understand her to serve as her own moral authority—in other words, to be
acting with moral autonomy. Kant’s account also centers the autonomy of the believer
(albeit with a different definition of autonomy than Nietzsche’s). When one is practicing a
religion rationally, one must examine the claims of that religion in light of one’s own
reason. Since Kant takes the moral law to be something within oneself, which the agent’s
reason actually produces, he considers rational religious practice to be inherently
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autonomous.151 Such practice cannot entail blindly following the commands of a god or
religious leader; it requires one to be an active participant in one’s own faith, and to
critically assess religious “truths” in light of the testimony of one’s own reason. This is a
continuous and active process; Kant repeatedly condemns those religions that encourage
their followers to be mere passive recipients of religious teachings. 152 Therefore, in the
eyes of her community, the individual who practices religion in a rational fashion is
thoughtfully examining religious claims, and autonomously choosing to accept or reject
them only after reflecting upon them. This is a level of subjective reflection that I argue
crosses the autonomy threshold required for thick trust, because it entails that a person
holds herself accountable to a self-imposed moral standard instead of merely accepting the
commands of an objective entity.
So, concerning the perceived autonomy of oneself and others, Nietzsche and Kant
both describe religion in a way that is theoretically able to satisfy our first condition for
thick trust. However, while both accounts present this possibility, I believe that Kant’s has
the ability to be more effective at doing so. While both Kant and Nietzsche seek to establish
the moral self-direction of the human being, I suggested earlier in this chapter that
Nietzsche’s model of religion has two problems: it preserves a degree of alienation between
the human and the divine, and it lacks the objectivity necessary to provide a central
community ethos. Both of these problems undermine the possibility of a collaborative
religious community. Meanwhile, Kant’s move away from historical religion and towards
the rational demonstrates an attempt to transcend the need for religious representation
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altogether. In pure rational religion, the believer enjoys a greater degree of perceived moral
authority—and therefore, can better satisfy our first condition for thick trust.

3.3.3

The Communal Shortcomings of the Greek Religion
Nietzsche is not the militant atheist that history often remembers him to be. He

began his career with a defense of certain religious practices, and spent the rest of his
productive life considering the various roles – both positive and negative – that religion
can play in human social life. He holds that religious faith can be socially useful insofar as
it cultivates certain beliefs concerning one’s moral and existential responsibilities. For the
purposes of establishing a durable community, however, there are at least two problems
with how Nietzsche speaks of religion. First, the central belief that the Greek religion
attempts to cultivate – that the human being is inherently divine, and can serve as the master
of her own destiny – is limited by the form of religious representation. This limitation
undermines the possibility of moral autonomy for the religious individual, both
metaphysically and practically. Second, Nietzsche’s attempt to situate morality primarily
with the will of the individual prevents the development of the kinds of centralized
principles necessary for relationships of thick trust. Therefore, while it is theoretically
possible to generate relationships of thick trust in Nietzsche’s ideal religion (i.e. the Greek
religion), it will be quite difficult for that religion to foster the kind of community
relationships that this project is seeking.
Nietzsche’s praise for the Greek religion in the Birth is largely due to the fact that
this religion’s deities are exceptionally anthropomorphic. Unlike the Judeo-Christian god,
which is an abstract entity that is a fundamentally different sort of thing than those who
worship him, the Greek gods have a number of humanlike qualities. For Nietzsche, as this
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religion deifies what appears human, it bridges the divide that other faiths (such as JudeoChristianity) place between the believer and that which she worships. One is not required
to reject one’s own humanity in order to emulate the gods—instead, one can directly
identify with them based on shared qualities, and can embrace one’s own humanity as a
result. I have argued that Nietzsche hopes for such religious practice to overcome the
alienation he perceives between most religions’ accounts of divinity and humanity.
However, while the Greek religion certainly does close the human/divine gap more
effectively than those religions which worship more abstract gods, it does not fully
eliminate that gap. Zeus (for example) does have a number of humanlike qualities—but at
his core, Zeus is still not human. He remains both a distinct entity (in the sense that he is
Zeus, and no one else) and a distinct type of entity (in the sense that he is essentially a god,
and not a human). While those who worship Zeus can identify with his anthropomorphic
traits, and even seek to emulate those traits which they share, a division remains between
them, since those individuals can never truly know what it is like to be a god. (Heracles
understood this problem all too well!) The issue here is that, while the representations of
the Greek gods are far more accessible to the human being than, for instance, those of
Judaism, they are still just that—representations. As Hegel frequently notes,
representations are inherently alienating, since they preserve a distinction between subject
and object.153 This presents a problem, because Nietzsche seeks to ground moral autonomy
upon the inherent divinity of the human being. Nietzsche holds that we are able to serve as
the masters of our own destinies because there is no moral authority higher than that of the
human subject. However, Nietzsche’s proposal for religion – that is, that religion should
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represent the divine in anthropomorphic terms in order to establish a belief in one’s own
moral authority– does not actually demonstrate that the individual has such authority. Since
even the anthropomorphized Greek gods are still represented as entities that remain
fundamentally separate from the human being, it is possible that their divinity is not a
product of their anthropomorphic traits, but rather some non-human element of their
constitution—something which those who worship them could never attain. Therefore, a
degree of alienation between the human and the divine remains in the Greek religion, with
negative consequences for the possibility of moral autonomy.
This is the case regardless of whether one is seeking to establish the overarching
metaphysical possibility of autonomy, or merely the social perception of it. Regarding the
latter: in a religious community that presents anthropomorphic gods as standards for human
beings to emulate, it is no secret to believers that a gap remains between themselves and
their gods. Thick trust requires that members of the group understand each other as holding
themselves accountable to given moral standards. However, there is nothing about
worshiping an anthropomorphic god that suggests one is exercising this level of moral
autonomy. Due to the alienation problem described above, it is unclear whether one enjoys
the same existential authority as a god, and the reality can be that one is simply following
the commandments of a god, instead of critically assessing those commands for herself.
All of this can make it difficult for others to feel like they can trust one as a moral agent. It
is still very possible that the religious individual is acting upon heteronomous moral
motivations. Therefore, while I have argued that we only need the social perception of
moral autonomy to establish thick trust (rather than actual metaphysical autonomy), it is
questionable whether the Greek religion gives us even this.
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A second problem for the religious community arises with how Nietzsche
understands moral objectivity. I have already pointed out that in Beyond Good and Evil,
Nietzsche describes religion as something that reflects the kinds of people who take it up.
On this view, there is no objective truth to be found within religion—religion is whatever
the individual takes it to be. Nietzsche sees no problem with this; in fact, he is eager to
place moral value in the hands of the human subject, and to escape any sort of objective
system for defining such value. 154 However, while this may establish a sort of radical moral
autonomy for the individual, one must ask how thick trust can develop in the face of such
subjectivity. Community relationships require confidence in one’s own ability to predict
the behavior of others. Nietzsche’s ideal religion goes so far in its attempt to establish the
individual as her own source of moral authority, that it actually hinders the possibility of
thick trust between members of a group. For Nietzsche, the individual should be the final
word on all of her decisions—no outside entities can determine what constitutes a
meaningful life. However, in a context where each person subjectively determines her own
values, we are presented with a situation in which individuals can struggle to reasonably
anticipate one another’s behavior. Without some source of moral objectivity, the
community can fall into chaos, in which people make wildly different decisions, all of
which can be equally justified. Because of this, while Nietzsche’s account of autonomy
does technically meet our first criterion for thick trust (that is, it secures the perception of
the individual as the final moral authority on her decisions), the radical subjectivity that he
posits in that account undermines the possibility of durable communal relationships.
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Our takeaway from all of this should be that, while Nietzsche describes religion in
a way that can establish the moral autonomy of the believer, his account does so in such a
way as to make relationships of thick trust difficult to attain. For this reason, I take
Nietzsche’s account to be unreliable for the purpose of establishing a collaborative
religious community. In contrast, the following section will show how Kant’s account
avoids the aforementioned problems, and thereby brings us closer to the sort of religious
community that we seek.

3.3.4

The Superiority of Kant’s Model
Nietzsche’s fatal error is that he goes too far in his attempts to secure the moral

authority of the human being. Community relationships do not merely require that one is
the master of her own decisions; they also require a type of stability, in which others can
develop confidence in their assessments of one’s future behavior. We must therefore
navigate a tension between the religious subject and objective communal principles. My
position is that Kant is successful in navigating this tension. By moving beyond the use of
religious representations, and by locating both subjective and objective elements within
religion, Kant provides us with a way of doing religion that better satisfies our first
condition for thick trust.
While Nietzsche certainly does not propose that every human being ought to be
religious, his early work defends the use of religion as a representational practice. His
declaration that God is dead does not demand a radical, literal commitment to atheism on
the part of the human race, but rather a move away from alienating religious ideologies.
However, any sort of representational imagery carries with it the possibility of alienation.
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On the other hand, Kant’s distinction between rational and historical religion seeks to
ultimately move beyond the form of religious representation altogether. Kant holds that it
is rational religion, not historical religion, which is of primary importance; the latter is a
temporary concession to practical reason in order to establish the former. However, Kant’s
hope is that in the kingdom of ends, the need for historical religion will fade away
altogether, leaving pure rational religion behind:
It is therefore a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same time, the
moral predisposition in us […] that in the end religion will gradually be freed of all
empirical grounds of determination, of all the statutes that rest on history and unite
human beings provisionally for the promotion of the good through the intermediary
of an ecclesiastical faith. Thus at last the pure faith of religion will rule over all, “so
that God may be all in all.”155
Kant takes historical religion to always include elements of untruth, since particular
religious tenets cannot be universalized. Because of this, he argues that such particular
elements of religion do not have a final place within the ethical community. For Kant, as
religious individuals move away from historical religion and towards rational religion, they
also move to a more accurate understanding of the moral law (and by extension, of their
own autonomy in relation to it). Such individuals no longer look to gods as representations
of divinity—they instead look to the universal law, which is necessarily a product of their
own reason. This move beyond the representational emphasizes the believer as subject, and
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in doing so, bridges the human/divine gap more effectively than any religious solution that
Nietzsche provides.
Second, while Nietzsche goes too far in his attempt to secure the moral autonomy
of the human subject, Kant balances subjectivity with the degree of objectivity required for
durable communal relationships. Kant demands that those who practice rationallygrounded faiths must examine religious claims in light of their own reason. They are not
to accept the word of a god or authority figure at face value; their reason must testify as to
the validity of those claims, and they must be willing to reject them if they violate the moral
law. It is critical to keep in mind here that, for Kant, the moral law is something that each
individual gives to herself freely—he holds that we are most free (in other words, most
autonomous) when we hold ourselves accountable to it. While Nietzsche would disagree
on this point, I take Kant’s emphasis on the testimony of the individual’s own reason to
give us a sufficient degree of autonomy as to satisfy our first condition for thick trust in the
context of social relationships. Those who practice rational religion retain the perception
of moral autonomy, while also making decisions in light of universally accessible
principles—principles which are objective enough to justify predictions about how others
will conduct themselves. Because of this balance between the subjective and objective, I
take Kant’s rational religion to satisfy our condition of perceived moral autonomy more
effectively than any religion proposed by Nietzsche does.
Trust is a matter of degrees—it can exist to a greater or lesser extent in a given
context. While both Nietzsche and Kant describe religions that can theoretically secure the
moral autonomy of the believer and therefore establish thick trust within a community, I
suspect that there is a differing degree of trust created in these two accounts. Nietzsche’s
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use of religious representation sustains a form of alienation between the divine and the
human—the very phenomenon that he hopes to overcome in religious practice. Kant’s use
of rational religion, which moves beyond the representational form, surmounts this
alienation. However, while Kant’s account does a better job of satisfying our first condition
for thick trust, this does not mean that Kantian rational religion provides us with everything
needed to establish a collaborative religious community. The following section will show
that Kant’s distinction between rational and historical religion ultimately devalues the
latter, in a way that compromises his ability to meet our second criterion for thick trust.

3.4

Kant’s Underestimation of Historical Religion
Kant sees a certain tension between rational and historical religion. He believes that

elements of pure rational religion can be found to varying degrees in a number of historical
faiths, insofar as those faiths represent some aspects of the moral law; however, historical
faiths can never be considered fully rational, as religious traditions also depend upon the
contingent contexts in which they function. 156 Because of its limitation to reason alone, a
rational religion cannot require, for example, that all believers place their faith in a messiah
who lived during a particular historical moment, because the particularity of this messiah
would prevent a vast majority of rational beings from obtaining essential religious
knowledge. Rational religion instead treats religious traditions and practices as symbolic
activities that represent universal truths to practical reason. Those traditions and practices
themselves, while useful as representations, are not valuable for their own sake, but are
subservient to reason. Any historical faith must be judged by the criteria of rationality, with
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the moral law (and not religious doctrine) being the ultimate governing authority. And any
religious practices which would obscure the moral law, or represent it inaccurately, ought
to be cast aside altogether.
We have seen that Kant’s distinction between rational and historical religion allows
him to subvert the issue of representation that plagued Nietzsche’s account. However, once
its representational elements have been stripped away, nothing particularly “religious”
remains in Kant’s rational religion. Among Kant scholars, this is one of the most frequent
sticking points regarding the Religion. It is often argued that Kant reduces religion to
morality, as he believes that rational religion is founded entirely upon the universal truths
of the moral law.157 If rational religion merely symbolizes the moral law, and the moral
law is freely accessible to all rational agents, then religion is simply not necessary for the
task of becoming moral. One could respond that while religion in particular is not required
for morality, some practical representation of the moral law is—after all, human beings do
have that peculiar need for something the senses can hold onto. However, despite his own
admission to this point, we saw above that Kant believes human beings will ultimately
transcend the need for historical religion. 158 While the Kant of the second Critique
emphasizes the role of practical reason in human life, by the time of the Religion, it seems
that he is less committed to the ultimate importance of the practical. For Kant, historical
religion (even in the most rational form possible) is a necessary concession that allows
imperfect phenomenal beings to initially cognize the moral law—a concession that, given
the opportunity, ought to be set aside. It is pure rational religion, with its universalizable
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moral truths, that ought to govern the ethical community, without all of a historical faith’s
empirical trappings. Kant therefore treats historical religion like a set of ideological training
wheels, which can be set aside once one’s relationship to the moral law has been adequately
understood. Kant’s vision for the ideal ethical community is one grounded upon universal
moral principles, and historical religion’s eventual place in that community is not a secure
one.
Kant’s relationship with historical religion is therefore contentious. In his view, the
Religion represents an attempt to save Christianity from the Enlightenment attitudes of his
day, which rejected religious belief altogether as mere superstition. 159 He clearly sees
benefit in religion insofar as it can illuminate universal truths to the believer—so, he hopes
to defend religion’s place in his current historical moment, against those who would say it
should be immediately cast aside. However, while Kant succeeds in demonstrating that we
can interpret certain religious claims in accordance with the categorical imperative, he
nonetheless fails to clearly demonstrate what we ought to do with historical religion
moving forward. Kant acknowledges that despite its benefits, historical religion also carries
risks: it can be misinterpreted, or even manipulated to serve purposes that do not align with
the moral law.160 Religion can represent truths to practical reason and can be useful insofar
as it does so, but this representational work can be just as easily accomplished through
secular imagery, which does not run as great a risk of being misinterpreted or manipulated.
If our goal is illuminating the moral autonomy of the individual, then, it seems
unnecessarily risky to do so through avenues that can easily slip into heteronomy, as
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historical religious practice can. While Kant himself expresses this very concern, a number
of accounts have argued that he does not provide an adequate defense of religion qua
religion.161
I believe that we can defend historical religious practice in terms of its teleological
social function; however, doing so highlights a failure in Kant’s assessment of religion.
Kant acknowledges that historical religion cannot have a monopoly on truth. He likewise
acknowledges that morality precedes historical religion, and that the former has no need of
the latter. In this way, he recognizes that historical religion is a representational endeavor,
and that religious stories should not typically be taken as literal facts. To use the language
that we have utilized throughout this project, it seems that Kant in one sense recognizes
historical religion to be a poor source of indicative beliefs, since its claims cannot be
demonstrably verified and are often downright dubious. However, I argue that by
presenting historical religion as a method through which one cognizes universal truths,
Kant still holds religion to an indicative standard, and in doing so, makes the same sort of
error as the New Atheist critics discussed in Chapter 1 of this project. Recall that those
critics condemned religious practice on the grounds that it encourages metaphysical beliefs
which are literally inaccurate. For Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins, our goal as
rational human beings should be to seek out what is true, and to reject any ideologies which
lead us away from the truth. While Kant acknowledges that historical religious practices
are representational rather than literal in nature, he also judges religion in terms of its ability
to communicate universal truths. Kant believes that historical religion is valuable insofar
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as it cultivates accurate beliefs regarding the moral law and one’s relationship to it. Those
religious practices that inaccurately represent universal truths become the target of his
criticism, and he suggests that only those historical religions that are rationally grounded
can be of genuine use for the human being. 162 And since all historical religious practice –
even that which is rationally grounded – still retains a degree of untruth by virtue of being
representational, Kant envisions an ethical community where historical religion has no role
to play. In this way, Kant devalues historical religious practice, in favor of rational
“religious” truths.163 Kant’s error is ultimately the same as that of the New Atheists: he
judges religion in terms of whether it cultivates indicative beliefs, and rejects it altogether
in those cases where it fails to do so (which, in Kant’s view, is actually all cases).
This position is erroneous because it misrepresents the role that religion plays in
human social life. I have argued throughout this project that the function of religion is to
cultivate imperative beliefs, which can be useful for navigating a given practical context.
Beliefs can often serve this purpose regardless of whether they are literally “accurate.” For
example, the belief in an afterlife where one will be reunited with deceased loved ones can
help a grieving individual to continue fulfilling her social obligations without being
overwhelmed by her loss.164 Kant initially recognizes this—he describes historical religion
as a concession to practical reason, which enables the believer to cognize otherwise obscure
moral truths. However, by ultimately rejecting those “untrue” historical religious practices,
Kant fails to appreciate the reality that religion is a necessarily practical endeavor. As we
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saw in Chapter 1, religious communities provide their practitioners with a host of benefits
which are primarily social in nature, many of which can be attained even in the absence of
religious belief. Kant’s attempt to rationalize religion strips away those practical benefits,
and leaves us with a “religion” the religiosity of which is highly questionable.
Because of all this, Kant’s rational religion fails to meet our second necessary
condition for the growth of thick trust: members of a community must define rationality in
terms of the practical and not merely the theoretical. Kant does not see significant value in
historical religious practices beyond their ability to accurately represent universal truths.
He speaks as if we must ultimately choose between the rational and the practical, as if the
two are necessarily at odds with one another. However, in the life of a community, rituals
and practices can be extremely important for the purposes of establishing trust, even if
those rituals seem to serve no rational function. By observing others’ commitment to their
personal faith, members of a community can develop confidence in their ability to predict
one another’s behavior—in other words, to place thick trust in one another. Kant’s proposal
for religion would strip away these practices, leaving a purely theoretical “religion” that
seeks out the moral law, but devalues the practical elements of human life. Kant’s
dichotomy between the rational and the practical reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of human life—especially human social life, where the line between these
two is often blurred.
In some ways, Kant’s rational religion brings us closer to the possibility of a
collaborative religious community than Nietzsche’s religion does. Rational religion
provides its followers with beliefs regarding their own autonomy, while also establishing
sufficiently objective standards to allow people to reasonably anticipate others’ behavior.
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This satisfies our first condition for the growth of thick trust, in a way that Nietzsche’s
account of Greek religion does not. However, because Kant ultimately separates rational
and historical religion, he alienates religious belief from the realm in which it primarily
ought to function. We cannot separate belief from the practical contexts in which it is
exercised. I argue that there is no point of “rational” religion without the historical practices
that carry its tenets, and religious practice can provide social benefits even in the absence
of rational grounding. Kant’s defense of religion, therefore, does not provide us with the
conditions necessary to establish a collaborative religious community. Such a community
cannot be merely theoretical, but must also be practical—not merely as a transitional phase,
but necessarily so.

3.5

Conclusion
Kant and Nietzsche agree on a fundamental point: preserving the individual’s moral

autonomy should be the goal of religious practice. Despite their differences on what exactly
constitutes such autonomy, both provide us with accounts that theoretically secure the
possibility of communal relationships in a religious context. However, both accounts also
present problems. Nietzsche’s attempt to center the believer as the sole source of moral
authority moves towards a radically subjective definition of autonomy; this raises the
question of just how much members of a group can reasonably trust one another.
Meanwhile, while Kant balances the believer’s autonomy with a community’s need for
objective values, he also devalues those practical elements that make religion such a
powerful force in human life. We are therefore left with a difficult question: how can
religious practice satisfy both of our conditions for thick trust, when thus far attempts to
meet one condition have violated the other? The closing chapter of this project will attempt
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to answer this question. My view is that Hegel succeeded where both Kant and Nietzsche
failed: he provides an account of how religion can ground a durable community, while
respecting both the moral autonomy of the believer and the inherent rationality of the
practical.
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CHAPTER 4. HEGEL & THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
4.1

Introduction
Up to this point, we have reviewed the work of Nietzsche and Kant, both of whom

discuss at length the social aspects of religion. In light of their work on the subject, I have
argued that both support my view that religion should be understood as a social
phenomenon (i.e. as a form of community oriented around commonly-held imperative
beliefs), and not merely as an epistemological one (i.e. as a source of indicative beliefs).
Our task in this project goes beyond this, however; we are not merely interested in defining
religion in terms of the social, but also determining whether a certain type of social relation
can develop within a religious context. That type of relation is a collaborative community,
i.e. a community that features a high degree of thick trust among its members. And while
Kant and Nietzsche both recognize religion as a social phenomenon, they do not describe
any religion that satisfies the conditions necessary to establish this type of community.
Rather, both present religion as something that is inherently alienating – a practice which
not only separates the individual from that which she worships, but also separates
individuals from one another. We have seen throughout this project that such alienation
stifles the growth of mutual thick trust, and therefore prevents stable communities from
developing.
Kant attempts to overcome this sort of alienation by placing moral authority in the
hands of the religious subject (rather than linking it to the commandments of some deity or
religious authority figure). While it satisfies our first condition for the growth of thick
trust, however, Kant’s solution creates a new problem for the religious community: it
devalues concrete religious practices, and leaves behind a rational “religion” that is hardly

recognizable as such. Kant recognizes that religion can be a source of socially-useful
beliefs, but he ultimately makes the mistake of assessing those beliefs in terms of their
literal truth value. While his motivations are quite different from those of the New Atheists
(Kant actually takes himself to be defending religion), Kant’s solution is therefore not
unlike theirs: he recognizes that religion has been historically useful, but claims that
historical practices should eventually be transcended and replaced with a higher form of
knowledge – one which is not distorted by the contingent.
Kant rightly understands religious practice as a way of cultivating beliefs, some of
which can be useful in one’s daily life. However, his primary failure in the Religion is that
he does not distinguish between different types of belief. We’ve been referring to two broad
categories of belief in this project: indicative and imperative. While indicative beliefs ought
to be judged in terms of their literal truth value, imperative beliefs can be socially useful
even if they cannot be demonstrably proven. Kant takes religion to be useful for cultivating
indicative beliefs regarding the moral law and what it requires of us – for him, its goal is
to teach us the truth about some aspect of reality. Because of this, he argues that anything
which is not universalizable in religion must eventually be transcended, since the moral
law does not change with context. I’ve argued that we should rather understand religion as
a source of imperative beliefs, which can provide social benefits to the one who holds them
even if their truth status is questionable. Unlike Kant’s model, this view does not require
us to rationalize religion, but rather to ask if it successfully cultivates beliefs which fulfill
their desired social function. That function, I have argued, is the foundation of a
collaborative community oriented towards the well-being of all its members.
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My view is that Hegel successfully articulates the possibility of such a community
where Kant fails (and Nietzsche would later fail). Hegel is fundamentally interested in both
religion and human social life, and from his earliest work recognizes a necessary
connection between the two. His early discussion of folk religion, while heavily influenced
by a Kantian understanding of the phenomenon, also begins to recognize the role of
practical, non-rational beliefs in the lives of individuals. However, like Kant, Hegel
initially understands religious beliefs to be primarily indicative in nature, and this leads
him to an early view that religion is a representative practice which should eventually be
transcended. It is not until his mature work in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
that Hegel finally recognizes the value of imperative religious beliefs, even if those beliefs
do not constitute literal truth. Hegel’s ultimate position on historical religion is that the
practice is a particular response to the given conditions of one’s life. Given this, a religion
should be judged not by its ability to communicate literal truths, but rather by its ability to
satisfy the practical social needs of those who practice it. In other words, we should
evaluate any particular religion in terms of the community relationships that it fosters.
This chapter will be structured as follows: I will begin with a discussion of Hegel’s
early theological writings, where he outlines his vision for folk religion and defines the role
that such a religion could play in human life. I will argue that Hegel’s account in this text
reflects an early, underdeveloped appreciation for imperative beliefs, but ultimately retains
a Kantian commitment to religious beliefs as primarily indicative. I will then turn to the
seventh chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Hegel further embraces a view
that religious belief is indicative in nature. This view leads him, as it led Kant, to claim that
historical religion ought to be understood as an incomplete source of knowledge, one which
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ought to eventually be set aside in pursuit of the rational. We will then contrast these
accounts with his views in the 1827 Lectures.165 Therein, Hegel is far more amenable to
religious experience as a source of knowledge; he no longer claims that religious practices
should be rationally transcended, but rather deems them sufficient for the needs of those
who find them practically useful. I will argue that Hegel has shifted to a new understanding
of religion in this text, one which treats religious belief as primarily imperative in nature.
With Hegel’s position thus mapped out, this chapter will conclude by bringing his
work into conversation with the rest of this project. I will argue that Hegel provides us with
a blueprint for a religious community which satisfies both of our conditions for thick trust.
Such a religion preserves the moral autonomy of the individual who practices it, by
situating moral authority with her as a rational agent. However, it also recognizes that many
elements of human life are non-rational, and that theoretical solutions alone fail in these
areas. I will argue that Hegel describes a way of doing religion which synthesizes the
interests of the individual and the group, overcoming the alienation that is inherent in
traditional forms of community – and it does this without stripping religious practice of
everything that makes it uniquely religious. In doing so, Hegel articulates the possibility of
a collaborative religious community.
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4.2

Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion

4.2.1

Berne Period
In the late 18th century, the young Hegel briefly attended seminary in Berne, which

led him to compose a number of essays on the philosophy of religion. These early writings
lack the systematic scope that is characteristic of Hegel’s more well-known work, but they
provide important insights into the sorts of problems that he found compelling. (They are
also far more readable!) For example, in the Tübingen Essay, we see Hegel musing upon
the unstable social conditions of his historical moment, and considering whether some form
of religion could unite the otherwise fragmentary German nation-state. In this essay, Hegel
is less interested in religion qua religion; it is a desire for social unity, and not religion for
its own sake, that is the primary concern of this essay.166 He claims that his tenuous social
context is at least partially due to a breakdown of religious belief among the German
people. This is a breakdown characterized not by outright apostasy, but rather a fall into
certain ways of doing religion that Hegel deems problematic. In other words, the German
people have not rejected religion altogether, but have begun practicing it in a way that does
not serve the social needs of the group. While Hegel is not using the language of
subjectivity and relationality at this point in his thought, we can clearly see the beginning
of these ideas in his religious criticisms. He is starting to suspect that allegiance to a certain
type of religion is blocking believers’ capacity for relating to each other as practicallyoriented rational subjects.167 He sees in the German people a newfound individualism, in
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which each person understands her own interests to be alienated from those of the group. 168
However, while such a criticism could easily lead one to reject religious practice altogether,
Hegel proposes a different solution. He suggests that what is needed is a different way of
doing religion: a folk religion, which overcomes this social alienation by drawing the
believer into meaningful relationships with others in a community. His task in these early
essays is to articulate a way of doing religion that accomplishes this purpose.
Importantly, Hegel’s folk religion is not affiliated with any single religious
tradition; he does not think that the German people will be united simply by converting to
some particular faith. Rather, we can think of folk religion as a religious orientation
towards one’s social context. It is a way of taking up rational, socially-disseminated
religious beliefs and using those beliefs to navigate one’s particular social moment. Folk
religion is a primary example of what Hegel calls subjective religion; in contrast to an
objective religion, which focuses primarily on providing historical facts and instilling
systematic belief, a subjective religion seeks to engage the affective interest of the
practitioner.169 Hegel places a much greater value upon subjective religion than upon the
objective form of the practice:
Everything depends on subjective religion; this is what has inherent and true worth.
Let the theologians squabble all they like over what belongs to objective religion,
over its dogmas and their precise determination: the fact is that every religion is
based on a few fundamental principles which, although set forth in the different
religions in varying degrees of purity, however modified or adulterated, are
168
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nonetheless the basis of all the faith and hope that religion is capable of offering
us.170
What matters in a subjective religion is not the religion’s unique conception of God or
immortality (for example), but how those concepts influence the lives and behaviors of the
people who take them up. In other words, different people within a community may choose
to practice subjective folk religion differently, and no singular tradition can be defined as
“the” folk religion; however, folk religious practice must be something that is equally
accessible to all. A folk religion is therefore an abstract yet inclusive religious orientation
that can be taken up by an entire population, regardless of their particular theological
commitments.
Rather than linking it to any particular faith, Hegel outlines three broad principles
for folk religion: 1. It must be a practice based in universal reason, 2. It must engage not
merely with reason, but also with the imagination and the heart of those who practice it,
and 3. It must be concerned with the practical needs of life. 171 These three criteria
demonstrate an early understanding on Hegel’s part of different types of religious belief,
and the different functions that such beliefs can perform in human life. We’ll examine each
of them in turn.
At this point Hegel has not yet formulated his now-famous criticisms of Kant, and
regarding religion in particular, the young Hegel remains committed to certain Kantian
views. This is clear from his first principle of folk religious practice, which states that folk
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religion must be grounded upon universal reason. In several of his early essays, Hegel
launches a polemic against the Christian church. His criticisms are based not upon
theological grounds, but upon rational ones. Hegel argues that Christianity is a religion
which drives a wedge between its practitioners and their community – and that this is in
large part due to the religion’s gross irrationality. Many of Christianity’s theological tenets
run contrary to reason, and the religion’s claims to truth rely on either dubious historical
“events” or an outright appeal to miracles. 172 In other words, Christianity often requires a
suspension of rational disbelief on the part of the faithful, and an acceptance that events
took place which no reasonable person would believe actually occurred.
As Kant did, Hegel takes issue with this way of doing religion. He echoes Kant’s
claims in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, arguing that the principles of a
folk religion must be universally accessible to all rational agents. Indeed, this first principle
of folk religion is largely synonymous with Kant’s idea of rational religion. Reason itself
should testify as to the accuracy of folk religious principles. Just as Kant criticized those
statutory religions that had no rational basis for their claims, so Hegel condemns religious
practices that stand in contrast to the dictates of reason. This is largely due to a mutual
commitment on Kant and Hegel’s part to believers’ autonomy; both are critical of religious
practices in which only a select few officials mete out religious knowledge to the faithful
masses.173 Such religious practice is exclusive, as it is inaccessible to the general public.
As Kant does, Hegel notes a practical need for such a rational religion as well, as it is not
realistic to expect a group of people to suspend disbelief and embrace blatantly irrational

172

Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” pp. 78-80.
Kant discusses this issue in terms of statutory religious practice in Religion within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason, 6:108.
173

131

claims indefinitely.174 Folk religion, therefore, cannot require that its practitioners ignore
the testimony of their reason, or base their beliefs solely upon particular historical events
that cannot be verified.
However, while Hegel is clearly influenced by Kant’s concept of rational religion,
he highlights an important point that Kant fails to recognize: religion, even if it is rationally
grounded, cannot be purely theoretical. We have seen that Kant’s ultimate vision involves
a kingdom of ends where rational agents no longer need historical religion as a practical
illustration of the moral law, where the need for such a religion ultimately passes away.
The young Hegel does not share Kant’s confidence on this point. For Hegel, the historical
situatedness of the human being is something with which we can never dispense. He
actually draws from Kant’s moral philosophy to point out that the human constitution is
such that we often require practical as well as theoretical motivations for behavior. The
young Hegel chalks this up to the human imagination and heart, which he takes to drive
the majority of decisions that one makes. While humans are rational agents, we are also
creatures led by a whole host of motivations and concerns which stretch beyond the merely
theoretical. Kant appreciated this reality in terms of human moral motivations, but he failed
to consistently carry this view into his work on religion, leading him to imagine an ideal
religious community led by pure reason. Hegel meanwhile recognizes the concrete
situation of actual religious communities—groups of people for whom theoretical
motivations on their own may seem alien and irrelevant. We see the beginnings here of
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how Hegel will ultimately engage with all of Kant’s philosophy: Hegel is seeking to resolve
the alienation that the Kantian dichotomy of ideal and real creates.
Through all of this, Hegel demonstrates why folk religion cannot be merely
theoretical: in a practical context, theoretical knowledge on its own is not enough. In order
to remain compelling to human beings, a religion must also engage the imagination and
the heart.175 One of the primary purposes that Hegel imagines for folk religion is that such
religious practice should inspire believers to behave in such a way that benefits their entire
community (and therefore also themselves). Such behavior corresponds to that sort of
universalizable action that Kant’s categorical imperative prescribes. But as Hegel makes
clear, it is typically not enough to tell a person what her rational duty is, and then expect
her to follow it out of a sense of duty alone. Hegel writes that “it is altogether unlikely that
humankind, or even a single individual, will ever in this world be able to dispense entirely
with non-moral promptings.”176 In other words, while an ideal community motivated
purely by reason may sound appealing, it is just that: an ideal. For real-world purposes,
folk religion must be engaging, inspirational, and motivating— it must be “blended into
the fabric of human feelings, bonded with what moves us to act.”177 In this way, such a
religion can influence human behavior to a greater extent than a merely rational religion
ever could.
Finally, Hegel’s third requirement is that folk religion must be concerned with the
practical needs of life. In some ways, this requirement echoes the one above, as it reminds
us that religion cannot be a merely theoretical endeavor. But there are unique points
175

Ibid., p. 49.
Ibid., p. 53.
177 Ibid., p. 36.
176

133

captured by this third condition as well. One of Kant and Hegel’s shared criticisms of
certain religions is that the traditions in question require people to set the concerns of their
daily lives aside, and to devote themselves entirely to their faith. For example, we can
imagine a monk or nun, who renounces ordinary human life in order to dedicate all of their
time and energy to their religious activities. For Hegel, it is not realistic to expect this sort
of all-consuming religious commitment from the majority of individuals, since most people
cannot reasonably renounce their practical obligations.178 Therefore, if folk religion is to
be something widely practiced, it must fit into the lives of ordinary people. Another way
that we can put this is to say that folk religion cannot be something that alienates the
believer from her own lived experience. 179 Many religions devalue the earthly lives of the
faithful, pointing them to instead invest their energies in a world beyond their present one.
Hegel sees this religious tendency as alienating the individual not only from her current
situation, but also from others in her life. Instead, folk religion should provide believers
with the intellectual and emotional tools necessary to navigate their daily lives. It ought to
speak to the concrete issues with which a people concern themselves, and it should never
require them to separate themselves from the real world in order to practice their faith.
With these three principles in mind, Hegel’s folk religion is well on its way to
setting the stage for durable social relationships. Hegel hopes that, by representing
universalizable moral principles, such a religion will demonstrate the interconnectedness
of the group – that is, to demonstrate that the interests of the individual and her community
are mutually constituted. Additionally, Hegel’s folk religion respects the practitioner as an
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autonomous moral agent, as it requires her to try its claims in the court of her own reason
(rather than to defer to the commandments of a deity). Despite the clear influence that Kant
has on his thought, Hegel succeeds here where Kant does not, as he recognizes that religion
deals with matters of the imagination and heart which reason alone may struggle to compel.
However, at this point in his work, Hegel does not provide us with everything necessary to
establish a collaborative religious community. The primary issue is that Hegel continues to
treat religion as a source of indicative beliefs (rather than imperative beliefs), and to
analyze the phenomenon in terms of its literal truth value. In doing so, he does not
sufficiently value the role of the non-rational in the lives of human beings. Hegel holds that
religion’s primary function in human life is to provide a centralized set of principles around
which a community can organize – what Schopenhauer called a community ethos.
However, for Hegel, such a set of principles already objectively exists: it is the mandates
of the universal moral law. Folk religion’s social purpose is simply to represent that law,
and to bring people to consciousness of it, so that they can engage with one another in a
way that aligns with that law.180 Folk religion, therefore, is an educational tool, one which
ought to be evaluated in terms of whether it cultivates an accurate understanding of the
moral law in those who practice it. If folk religious practice does not yield such an
understanding, then Hegel would not consider it to be socially useful. This view therefore
links a religion’s social utility to the literal truth value of its claims – a connection that was
debunked in the first chapter of this project.
Hegel’s early work on religion successfully establishes that the phenomenon is
social in nature, and not merely epistemological. However, his failure to recognize the
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potential social utility in imperative religious beliefs leads him to propose a folk religion
which does not provide everything this project seeks. Hegel eventually moves beyond such
an indicative understanding of religion – but not before he solidifies that position in the
Phenomenology.

4.2.2

The Phenomenology of Spirit
In the Phenomenology, religion (especially historical religion) is certainly not

Hegel’s primary focus, but the concept still plays an important role in his project. As it did
during the Berne period, religion in the Phenomenology works as an intermediary in the
interest of Hegel’s actual concern: human social life. As each self-conscious subject draws
into a greater degree of relation to the universal, she recognizes that the universal is
something which every particular partially constitutes, and in which all things participate.
As Hegel equates the universal with God, he therefore sees God and human social life as
being inextricably linked; God is made manifest through the relation of human beings to
one another. Because of this, we can say that the Absolute itself is socially constituted.
The overarching story of the Phenomenology is that of Spirit’s manifestation in the
world. For Hegel, the terms “Spirit” and “God” are often used interchangeably; however,
we should bear in mind that Hegel is not advocating for any particular religion’s conception
of a deity. The term “God” here refers to the Absolute, which is the logical ground of all
things, or a thinking that contains all possible thought.181 To reduce God to any single
religion’s conception of a deity would be a mistake, as universal Spirit cannot be reduced
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to finite predicates. God or Spirit should instead be understood as a unifying force that
reconciles the universal and each particular; to truly know God is to reach the point of
absolute knowing, where one recognizes the universal and the particular as a unity that
maintains its distinctions. In order for the subject to progress to the level of absolute
knowing, a capacity for relation between the universal and the particular must first be
demonstrated. Historical religious practice is an attempt on the part of the individual
believer to relate to the God that she worships, and to cultivate a fuller understanding of
the universal.
Obviously, a “thinking that contains all possible thought” is an abstract concept,
one which is difficult to wrap one’s head around. Because of this, Hegel states that human
subjects must come to knowledge of the Absolute in stages – beginning with ideas that we
can understand, and building up to an increasingly sophisticated degree of thought.
Religion’s function in this text is to provide us with such understandable ideas, which
represent the Absolute in language that is more familiar to us. Religion employs what Hegel
calls picture-thinking, which is the use of specific, particular images to represent more
abstract truths.182 For example, a religion may describe a deity in terms of a benevolent
father, in order to represent some element of the relation between the Absolute and the
religious subject. This paternal language is, of course, not meant to be understood literally;
all religious language is representational, as an attempt to help the faithful better understand
the mysteries of an infinite being. The point of all this is to represent a universal spirit in
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which believers can perceive enough of their own likeness in order to enter into relation
with that universal.183
Hegel describes three broad categories of religion in this text: natural religion,
religion in the form of art, and revealed religion. All of these reflect some important reality
about the nature of the Absolute; however, all do so incompletely. In natural religion, the
divine is associated with some natural phenomenon, such as light, plants, or animals; these
immediate substances are taken as absolute being, which remains separate from the human
subject.184 “God” in such a religion appears as an entity that stands over and against
humanity as something merely objective to it. This fails to demonstrate the reality that the
Absolute is something which participates in a continuous, active unity with the human
subject (and indeed with all things). Meanwhile, in religion in the form of art, divinity is
no longer recognized in natural objects, but in products of human construction. Such a
religion is thoroughly representational; gods are depicted in various artistic media, yet
those who create that art recognize it to be a mere image built by the power of humans.
Thus, in the religion of art, the human self is treated as absolute being, with humanity
elevated not only as subject but as the author of divinity itself. This eliminates the
distinction between the human and the divine that was present in natural religion, but in
doing so, reduces the divine to a product of the human. Such a religion treats the Absolute
as if it were a mere particularity, without appreciating its necessary simultaneous
universality. Hegel claims that a unity of these two concepts – i.e. Absolute as universal
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and Absolute as particularity – is only successfully represented in the revealed religion,
which he associates with the Christianity of his day.185 Hegel takes the incarnation of
Christ, as both fully human and fully divine, to demonstrate the unity of the Absolute’s
apparently conflicting natures.186 Because it successfully represents the nature of these
opposites, Hegel claims that the revealed religion provides the superior mode of religious
picture-thinking.
Like Kant, the Hegel of the Phenomenology continues to see religion as an
educational tool, one which can help the practical subject to understand that which she may
otherwise struggle to grasp. And like Kant, Hegel here sees historical religious practice as
an intermediary, something which has transient value but should ultimately be transcended.
Hegel writes:
So far as Spirit in religion pictures itself to itself, it is indeed consciousness, and
the reality enclosed within religion is the shape and the guise of its picture-thinking.
But, in this picture-thinking, reality does not receive its perfect due, viz. to be not
merely a guise but an independent free existence; and conversely, because it lacks
perfection within itself it is a specific shape which does not attain to what it ought
to show forth, viz. Spirit that is conscious of itself. 187
Although the revealed religion successfully represents the apparent opposites in the nature
of the divine, it is still just that – a representation. Picture-thinking is a practically useful
185
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activity, but it is necessarily limited, since it never describes things as they actually are. In
order to truly understand the nature of the Absolute, then, one must move beyond mere
representations and into the realm of pure thought. 188 One does this by moving from a
religious mode of thinking to a philosophical one. For Hegel, philosophy and religion share
the same content (i.e. the nature of the Absolute), but those who participate in them cognize
this content differently. Unlike religion, philosophy employs pure thinking, which
expresses Spirit as it is in its essence. Since it trades in thought alone, philosophy does not
make use of limited representational imagery as religion does. Compared to religion,
philosophy is of course a more sophisticated and therefore complex mode of thought, a
quality which makes it more difficult to practice. However, at this point Hegel contends
that moving from religious to philosophical thinking is necessary if one is to attain a
genuine understanding of the Absolute’s nature.
This is the moment in Hegel’s thought where he most clearly evaluates religion in
terms of its ability to create indicative (rather than imperative) beliefs. As he did in his
Berne period, he takes religion to be something that is pedagogically useful, which can
disseminate certain truths about some aspect of reality. However, if we think back to
Hegel’s three criteria for a folk religion, it seems that he has largely abandoned the second
and third in favor of the first. Nowhere in this text does Hegel consider the imagination and
the heart of the human subject. His only mention of the practical is to concede that human
beings have a temporary need to be educated through representational imagery. Instead,
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Hegel judges the Phenomenology’s three broad categories of religion in terms of how
accurately they represent the nature of the Absolute. Natural religion and religion in the
form of art are inferior because they fail altogether to represent some truth about the divine;
the revealed religion is superior in this regard, but still comes up short because the truths it
conveys about the Absolute are representational rather than literal in nature. Hegel here
presents an account that favors the rational at the expense of the practical. Picture-thinking
is not enough; if one does not understand the Absolute as it is in and for itself, then one
simply does not understand the Absolute. In other words, if I do not rise to the level of
philosophical thinking, then I do not truly understand reality. Hegel sees this as religion’s
sole value: its ability to bring the human subject closer to an accurate, literal understanding
of God (as he defines the term). Nowhere in this text does he acknowledge that
representational beliefs about the Absolute can be practically useful for their own sake,
even if the one who holds them never rises above a representational level of understanding.
Rather, he treats religion as a mere step along the way towards absolute knowledge, which
ought to be the subject’s ultimate goal. This view draws a barrier between lived human
experience and the realm of pure thought – creating a distinction of real versus ideal that
echoes Kant’s noumenal/phenomenal divide.
While the Hegel of the Phenomenology recognizes that the Absolute features both
universal and particular elements, and that the Absolute is made manifest in the social
activity of particular human beings, he fails to recognize the social utility of certain beliefs
regarding the Absolute. Commonly-held beliefs, disseminated through religious practice,
can bring a group into meaningful relation with one another, even if those beliefs do not
reflect literal truths about reality. Such beliefs can serve this unifying function because they
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appeal to the practical needs of human life, in a way that the theoretical alone may not.
Instead of stating this fact, however, Hegel here proposes a journey of thought which is
oriented solely towards an Enlightenment-era definition of the rational. Fortunately for us,
however, this is not his final position on the subject. His work in the Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion reflects a shifting understanding of the role of religious belief. This
shift creates new possibilities for relationships within religious communities.

4.2.3

The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
The scope of Hegel’s Lectures on Religion is enormous. The work is both

ontological and epistemological, as Hegel discusses the nature of God (and therefore, the
nature of reality itself) as well as how human beings can gain knowledge of this ultimate
being. He also undertakes the massive task of analyzing all major world faiths, which
despite its limitations (not the least of which is some glaring ignorance about certain
cultures), nonetheless reflects a commitment on Hegel’s part to finding epistemological
value in all particular human experiences. However, when the Lectures are properly
contextualized, it becomes quite clear that the social is still Hegel’s primary interest in this
text.189 Hegel defines God in a way that treats religion as a simultaneously rational and
practical endeavor, and the very existence of God is connected to human social life. This
unique understanding of God (for which Hegel has been called everything from a pantheist
to an atheist190) highlights Hegel’s commitment to finding ways in which individuals can
practice meaningful community relationships. The structure of his account of religion has
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not changed significantly from that of the Phenomenology, but his shifting understanding
of how religious belief works in a social context creates new possibilities for relationships
within the particular religious community. Because of this shift, this text provides us with
the necessary tools to overcome the religious alienation which has plagued us throughout
this project.
Much of Hegel’s religious ontology remains the same from the Phenomenology
forward. Hegel retains his earlier definition of God as Spirit or the Absolute, while making
his understanding of the term more explicit in this text. Contrary to most religious accounts,
he does not define God as an anthropomorphic, alien deity which created the world and
remains separate from it; his God is an abstract, ultimate universal spirit which is made
manifest in the movement of world history. 191 God is therefore not to be found in some
noumenal realm beyond the physical world, but within life itself—although we should be
careful not to reduce God to the physical either. As he did in the Phenomenology, Hegel
continues to think of religion in three broad categories: in this text, those categories have
become the concept of religion, determinate religion, and consummate religion. Unlike in
the Phenomenology, however, Hegel is not here describing three distinct categories of
historical religious practice, but rather the entire scope of religious possibility. The concept
of religion concerns the theoretical aspect of the endeavor, but avoids any discussion of
actual historical faiths; because of this, it remains vague, and separated from any actual
religious experience.192 Determinate religion refers to any particular religious tradition
practiced at a given time and place – Hegel’s view is that such religions often become so
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mired in their own particularities that they lose sight of their theoretical foundations, in
favor of statutory historical traditions.193 In the consummate religion, however, a unity of
the theoretical and the practical is achieved, through proper representation of the Absolute
and the human subject’s relationship to it. 194 The consummate religion is grounded upon
rational, universal truths; however, this religion is not merely a theoretical exercise. It
requires active, consistent participation of the believer within her own particular historical
context. The follower of the consummate religion is required to rationally take up religious
principles and to then apply those principles to her own life. Hegel refers to this as the
“witness of spirit,” i.e. the testimony of the individual believer’s own heart, which confirms
that the claims of the consummate religion are indeed true. 195 Engagement with such a
religion is therefore not merely an intellectual endeavor, but also a way of life. Due to its
theoretical and practical elements, it is within the practice of the consummate religion
where believers can best come to understand the nature of the Absolute.
Given Hegel’s definition of the term, we must keep in mind that relating to the
Absolute does not mean to have a personal relationship with some particular god; it means
to participate in a community, the life of which partially constitutes the divine. Hegel does
not elevate Christianity to the status of consummate religion because he sees some special
value in the person of Jesus Christ. Rather, it is the Christian concept of the holy spirit
which Hegel believes best represents the Absolute’s relation to human beings. 196 While
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Christ as simultaneously human and divine offers an important representation of the
Absolute’s nature, Christ himself is still a particular entity. Affiliating the divine with a
single entity (whether that be the person of Christ, or some objective conception of God
the father who created the world and stands opposed to it) alienates the human subject from
the divine. Hegel understands what Nietzsche would also later point out: when the human
and divine are divided in this way, there is no capacity for meaningful relation between the
two. In light of this, Hegel claims that the death of Christ presents the ideological turning
point of historical religion. Upon Christ’s death, his divine spirit was no longer limited to
his own person, but was disseminated to those who followed him.197 Whereas the spirit of
God was formerly associated with a single individual, that spirit came to be understood as
present in all things, and to be accessible to everyone. Worship in the early Christian church
took on a necessarily communal quality following the death of Christ, reflecting the
growing understanding that the divine spirit was best revealed in the social activity of
human beings. For Hegel, it is the living movement of the religious community, and not
any individual’s faith in a particular god, which makes the Absolute manifest in the lives
of believers.
To put this a different way, Hegel sees the amalgamation of all concrete religious
practices as partially composing the universal. By coming together with others in a
religious context, individuals do not merely worship the divine as something beyond
themselves, but also directly participate in it. God is not an objective deity, but rather the
universal spirit that the sum of all life itself constitutes. Because the divine is made manifest
through the movement of world history (which in itself is necessarily practical), then,
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religion itself cannot be a merely theoretical endeavor– it also has a necessarily practical
element. It is this point which primarily separates Hegel’s account of religion in the
Lectures from that in the Phenomenology. Hegel shifts from an overly rationalistic
understanding of the Absolute, one which privileges indicative beliefs and pure thought, to
an appreciation for the practical elements of the Absolute that reason alone cannot grasp.
We have already seen that, in the Phenomenology, Hegel takes religious picturethinking to be inferior to the pure thought of philosophy. In that text he calls for a move
beyond religion into philosophical thought, claiming that only the latter can provide
knowledge of the Absolute as it exists in and for itself. However, in the Lectures his tune
changes; we see Hegel claiming that it is religion, and not philosophy, which offers a
uniquely useful form of knowledge. Whereas the Phenomenology proposed that religion
should be transformed into philosophy, the Lectures understand religion to already be a
form of philosophy – and not merely to share the same content. 198 Specifically, religion is
a practically-oriented form of philosophy, one which does not rely upon thought alone to
provide knowledge. Philosophy is an abstract, rationalizing process, one which seeks to
remove itself from any practical concerns; while this led the rationally-oriented Hegel to
consider it superior in the Phenomenology, he now seems to take its purely theoretical
nature as a weakness. Hegel no longer considers the elements of historical religion to
obscure the nature of the Absolute, because he believes that it is those historical elements
which actually constitute the Absolute (although always merely in part).
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One weakness that Hegel formerly perceived in religious thought was its
immediacy. Seeking truth in and for itself in the immediate is a risky process, because what
is presented immediately has not yet been analyzed by reason.199 In the Lectures, Hegel
still agrees with his view from the Phenomenology that religion and the intellect cannot be
opposed to one another, and that a focus on immediate religious experience alone would
not be sufficient to provide knowledge of the Absolute.200 However, as the Lectures
progress, we find that there is actually no such thing as pure religious immediacy. We
cannot understand God as an abstract object of cognition, as we can only understand him
through our relation to him.201 A thought receives its content through religious
representation. However, any immediacy in that representation is necessarily already
mediated by the one who thinks, and cognition of God begins in the practice of determinate
religion – not in the realm of pure thought.202 Therefore, Hegel contends that engaging in
any sort of religious thinking is already a version of philosophy, one which imparts
sufficient knowledge of the nature of the Absolute. The immediate knowledge that God
exists, given by the witness of one’s own spirit, becomes an acceptable form of truth
regarding the absolute:
The witness of spirit can be present in manifold and various ways; it is not required
that for all of humanity the truth be brought forth in a philosophical way. […] That
sympathy of which we have spoken earlier, where the spirit or the soul cries out,
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“yes, that is the truth”—that sympathy is so immediate a form of certainty that it
can be as secure for one person as thinking is for another. 203
Whereas Hegel’s earlier work proposed that one ought to move past religious thinking in
pursuit of philosophy, he now does not think such an intellectual development is necessary
for the majority of human subjects. Hegel does not think that a religious community needs
to orient itself philosophically, i.e. to separate itself from the practical in pursuit of pure
knowledge of the divine. Rather, Hegel believes that it is in that practical communal
activity that the nature of the divine is truly revealed. Religious practice is therefore
something that is necessarily social – and a religion is successful insofar as it demonstrates
the necessary relation of the Absolute and those who worship it.
My view is that Hegel’s shifting view on religious immediacy is in light of two
commitments on his part: first, that because the Absolute is made manifest through the
movement of history, which is itself necessarily practical, seeking knowledge of the
Absolute that is purely theoretical would fail to accurately understand an essential part of
its nature; and second, that the practical condition of the human being is such that
participating in pure philosophical thought is not feasible for many individuals. This second
point is of particular importance for our purposes. While a meaningful discussion of the
subject was absent from the seventh chapter of the Phenomenology, Hegel returns in the
Lectures to one of his early concerns from his Berne period: the necessarily practical, nonrational elements of human life. We see in this text that religion is primarily concerned
with the things that (according to Hegel) all of us find most important: matters of morality,
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mortality, and the purpose of life. While these are things that can be considered in pure
thought, they are also practical issues with which all of us must concern ourselves – and
thought alone cannot provide us with solutions to these sorts of problems. Because it deals
in these important matters, religion has an emotional power over those who practice it that
philosophy on its own does not:
All the griefs of this bank and shoal of life vanish away in this aether, whether in
the feeling of devotion or of hope. All of it drops into the past. In religion all cares
pass away, for in it one finds oneself fortunate. All harshness of fate passes into a
dream. […] Such is the universal content of religion among human beings[.] 204
As an abstract activity, philosophical thought seeks to remove itself from these practical
matters; but in doing so, it runs the risk of appearing distant from those things that
individuals find most important. From the above passage, Thomas Lewis notes that most
people tend to encounter religion prior to philosophy (even if they are not religious
themselves), and that religion’s claims do not initially need to be validated by philosophical
thought to be compelling. 205 One can certainly rationalize about religion, but there are
many religious individuals who do not, and feel no need to do so. One is reminded at this
point of Hegel’s claim in Berne, that in order to be socially useful, a religion must engage
not only the reason but also the imagination and the heart of those who practice it. What
Hegel once took to be religion’s weakness – that is, its ability to address the non-rational –
he now recognizes to be one of its strengths.
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To be abundantly clear, Hegel is not advocating for a grossly irrational sort of
religious practice, in which believers throw reason to the wind and accept that which is
glaringly false simply because it makes them feel better about some aspect of their lives.
He has repeatedly made it clear that a religion which stands in contrast to reason will not
be sustainable long-term, especially as society shifts towards Enlightenment ideas of
investigative thought. Recall his early commitment that a religion must be grounded in the
rational; his increasing appreciation for practically-derived knowledge has not led him
away from this position. Hegel is not arguing for a religion of pure faith or feeling—rather,
his point is simply that these things can provide a unique and valuable sort of knowledge,
despite any overly rationalistic views that would claim otherwise. A balance must therefore
be struck: the religious individual should reject those practices that she knows to be
blatantly irrational, while also avoiding using reason as her sole criterion for what is
valuable in religious practice. Reason is an important source of truth, but it is not the only
possible source.
Hegel’s emphasis on the practical in this text reveals a newfound appreciation for
a different sort of religious belief. An individual religious experience is necessarily bound
up with its practical context: the situation in which the believer lives, the particular faith
that she practices, and the imagery that she associates with the divine. Such an experience
is far from universalizable – but despite this, its value is actually to be found in its
particularity, in what it represents to the individual who experiences it. The Hegel of the
Lectures does not think that the particularity of such an experience renders it an inferior
form of knowledge. He rather takes religious belief to be something that is necessary
practical, and something that cannot always be analyzed in terms of a universal standard.
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This revelation on Hegel’s part reflects an appreciation for religious beliefs which are
primarily imperative in nature. It has been suggested, perhaps most famously by Feuerbach,
that Hegel makes the same sort of error that I have attributed to Kant in this project: namely,
that he defends religion by robbing it of any uniquely religious content. 206 While this is a
fair criticism of his position in the Phenomenology, the Lectures’ commitment to subjective
religious experience as a source of authoritative knowledge makes this text far more
amenable to particular religious practices than Kant ever is. The content of religious
thought is not merely a representation; it is mediated knowledge, and therefore ought to be
held in the same regard as pure philosophical thought. The Absolute is the particular, at
least in part; therefore, one cannot set the particular aside without ignoring an important
element of the Absolute’s identity.
By the time of the Lectures, Hegel is no longer treating religion merely as an
educational tool for the dissemination of literal truths about reality. He also sees religious
experience as providing a form of authoritative knowledge regarding the nature of the
Absolute. Hegel recognizes that not only is human life necessarily practical, but that the
Absolute is made manifest in this practical activity. Importantly, this activity is also
necessarily a social one – which brings us back to the subject of the religious community.

4.3

Hegelian Religion as a Collaborative Community
With Hegel’s views on religion thus articulated, we will now bring them into

conversation with the rest of this project. Because Hegel understands the Absolute to be
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made manifest in the movement of human social life, his philosophy of religion (and
arguably, his entire philosophical system) is necessarily bound up with the social. Hegel is
concerned to demonstrate a critical point: that the universal and the particular are not fully
distinct entities, but rather two unique elements of a singular whole. His interest in the
unification of these apparent opposites provides us with what we have sought throughout
this entire project: a way of understanding community that unites the interests of the
individual and the group. Hegel’s philosophy successfully describes a way of doing
religion that meets both of our necessary conditions for the growth of thick trust within a
community. To show how this is the case, we’ll work through both of those conditions.

4.3.1

Hegelian Religion & Moral Autonomy
Because Hegel and Kant share a similar commitment to the moral authority of the

religious subject, Hegel succeeds as Kant did in satisfying our first condition. Hegel’s
earliest work in Berne emphasizes that the practice of folk religion must be something that
is freely chosen by the individual, rather than mandated at the group level. Despite folk
religion’s potential for enormous civic and social benefits, the young Hegel is adamant that
no society should be able to impose faith in any sort of religious doctrine upon its
members.207 This is for at least two reasons: first, it is the individual’s responsibility to try
any religious claims in the court of her own reason before accepting them, as it is one’s
reason which serves as the standard for universal truth. Second, since folk religion concerns
not only the rational but also the emotional side of the individual, it is necessarily a deeply
personal endeavor. Only the individual can know what religious imagery has the ability to
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speak to her own imagination and heart – religious commitment can manifest differently
for different individuals, despite sharing the same rational root. 208 Just as Kant’s
Copernican turn placed the human subject at the center of her perceptual experience, so
Hegel’s folk religion’s emphasis on human freedom places the believer at the center of her
religious practice. 209 This allows her to determine for herself what particular religious
practices are most compelling, and to hold herself accountable to what her reason demands
of her. In this way, such religious practice allows the agent to develop her own capacity for
autonomous moral decision-making.
This commitment to the moral authority of the religious practitioner carries through
the remainder of Hegel’s work on the subject. In both the Phenomenology and the Lectures,
Hegel elevates Christianity to a place of relative honor, naming it the pinnacle of historical
religious practice – but as we have already seen, this is not because he sees any literal
accuracy in its historical claims. Rather, Hegel praises this particular faith because the
person of Christ represents divinity embodied within the human subject. Natural religion
and religion in the form of art both treat the divine as something that is necessarily onesided: it is either completely separate from the human subject, or completely reducible to
it. It is only within a religion like Christianity, one which properly represents the two
opposing sides of the Absolute’s nature, that the human subject can properly understand
her own relation to the divine. The Christian story retains a concept of divinity that religion
in the form of art does not, but it makes that divinity accessible to the human being in a
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way that natural religion never could. Through this form of representation, the individual
becomes aware of a necessary truth: divinity is not something that is merely mundane, or
something that she can never access, but rather a powerful quality that she already
possesses within herself as a rational agent. When planning her own conduct, she need not
rely upon the commands of a deity, or defer to the wisdom of some religious authority
figure; rather, she can refer to her own inherent authority on the subject, and allow her own
reason to guide her decisions.
Hegel’s model of religion therefore avoids a problem raised not only by him, but
also by Kant and Nietzsche: the problem of religious heteronomy. We have considered this
problem at length in Chapters 2 and 3, and have shown that when a religion places moral
authority in the hands of an agent beyond the religious subject, it creates alienation between
the individual and that which she worships. Such religious practice has social
consequences: it not only separates the believer from her God, but also undermines others’
ability to trust her. As Kant’s rational religion did, Hegel’s religion centers the believer as
a source of moral authority, and places responsibility for her conduct solely upon herself.
Such an individual holds herself accountable to her own rationally-derived code of moral
conduct – and because of this, others are justified in trusting her, even in the absence of
coercive religious authority figures. In this way, Hegel’s model for religious practice
satisfies our first condition for thick trust. A collaborative religious community, therefore,
cannot rely upon the commands of a few authority figures, but must allow the individual
to determine for herself what is moral.
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4.3.2

Hegel on the Primacy of the Practical
Much of this chapter has been devoted to demonstrating Hegel’s evolving view on

the role of the practical in religion. With all of this having already been worked out, one
piece of the puzzle remains: we must demonstrate how Hegel’s emphasis on the practical
can work to cultivate relationships of thick trust in a religious community. By placing value
in imperative beliefs (rather than beliefs which are merely indicative in nature), Hegel
recognizes the social utility of a wide variety of religious experiences. This allows him to
widen his definition of what should be considered “rational” in a religious context, and to
preserve religion’s ability to speak to those needs of human life that are not merely
theoretical in nature.
Hegel famously writes that the real is rational, and the rational is real. 210 This view
places him at odds with Kant, who understands reality to be composed not only of
knowable practical conditions but also an unknowable noumenal realm. For Kant, it is the
noumenal which is truly “real” – but because human beings are necessarily practically
situated, this reality is largely unknowable to us (aside from what we can glean through the
activity of our reason). We have already seen that for the mature Hegel, preserving such a
distinction of opposites is intolerable; he believes that the Absolute is not located within
some realm beyond the physical, but is rather composed of all things, which necessarily
includes the here and now. Hegel did not begin his career with this position, however. The
Philosophy of Right was published over a decade after the Phenomenology, and his thought
evolved greatly during the period between these two works. The young Hegel was heavily
influenced by Kant, and imported many of Kant’s views into his own work; we have seen
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several examples of this in his early philosophy of religion. Hegel’s initial commitment to
philosophy as superior to religion reflects an early, largely Kantian view that there is a
distinction between the rational and the real. By the time of his mature work, however,
Hegel has abandoned this distinction.
Treating the real as rational is essential for cultivating durable social relationships.
We saw in the first chapter of this project that what is “rational” in a given context is largely
determined by the practical conditions of that context. What appears ridiculous to someone
outside of a situation may be perfectly sensible to someone within it—in fact, it may be the
only “rational” choice given the circumstances.211 Within a community, if “reason” is
limited to the sphere of individual understanding, then we risk creating a context where the
decisions of those who have distinct experiences are dismissed as irrational. This mutual
dismissal of one another’s experiences blocks the possibility of trust relationships between
individuals. One cannot universalize their own definition of what is “rational” if that
definition dismisses the experience of another. For example, a woman may take herself to
be perfectly rational in carrying pepper spray on a blind date, because experience (whether
her own, or that of other women) has taught her that such a situation can be dangerous; a
man who has never experienced such danger may take her action to be heavy-handed and
unwarranted. Both of these individuals are determining what is “rational” in light of their
own practical experiences – however, in our gentleman’s case, some relevant information
is missing from his own experience, leading him to mistakenly universalize his own
definition of what is rational. If individuals dismiss one another’s reactions to their own
experiences in this way, then how could those individuals ever expect to develop trust in
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one another? Such a situation ultimately breaks down the capacity for relation between
individuals who are influenced by widely different practical contexts, and creates
communities that can only understand each other if they are all alike.
Within a religious context specifically, Hegel acknowledges that subjective
religious experience is authoritative, and states that such experience need not be evaluated
in terms of pure thought. What he means here is that the individual’s experience of the
Absolute is always already mediated by the subject having that experience, and that this
act of mediation alone is sufficient to make that experience an authoritative source of
knowledge. Of course, religious experiences almost never constitute literal truth; because
of this, it is clear that Hegel is not taking religion as a source of indicative belief, but rather
of imperative belief. Imperative beliefs are a mediated, rational response to a set of
particular practical conditions; these beliefs can be useful within those conditions, even if
they cannot be universalized beyond the context in which they were generated. The Hegel
of the Lectures is advocating for a religious community which respects the individual as
the authority on her own practical experiences, and validates the choices that she makes in
light of those experiences as rational.
We have seen that Kant sought to rationalize religion, in order to defend it against
those who considered it an outdated practice. As Kant’s fellow German idealist, Hegel is
certainly not advocating that we toss rationality aside in favor of religion. Rather, his
mature understanding of religious belief as an authoritative source of knowledge reflects a
broadening definition of what we ought to consider rational. For Kant, reason is within the
individual, and ought not to take the particular into account; however, Hegel recognizes
that the human being is necessarily situated in a particular context, and that this context
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plays a massive role in how the individual interprets the world around her. Because of this,
there is no such thing as an objective, universally “rational” position from which the human
subject analyzes the world. We cannot have a religion of pure reason without a historical
context to define what we consider to be rational in the first place.
Within a religious community, our second criterion for thick trust can be met in a
simple way: members of the group should take their own experiences of the divine to be
personally meaningful, but avoid treating those experiences as authoritative for others.
Particularly within a diverse group of individuals, members of the community must accept
a diverse set of experiences and beliefs regarding the Absolute. As long as those beliefs are
not glaringly irrational, they should be accepted as largely authoritative for the one who
holds them, even if they cannot be universalized. This means accepting that historical
practice is an important element of religious commitment, and cannot be transcended in
the way that Kant envisioned.

4.4

Conclusion
Religious practice is typically associated with the formation of beliefs. However,

in order to properly understand the role that religion plays in human life, it is critical to
understand the kinds of beliefs that religion tends to cultivate. When one analyzes
religion in terms of indicative belief alone, one misunderstands its purpose – and in doing
so, misunderstands the powerful role that the practice plays in human social life. Hegel
demonstrates that imperative beliefs can cultivate relationships of thick trust within a
religious context – even if those beliefs do not concern literal matters of truth and
falsehood.
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A collaborative religious community is possible. While much religious practice
that we see today is inherently alienating, this is not necessary; these structures of
alienation can be overcome with careful effort and attention to two conditions. First, the
religious community must avoid any conception of the divine which is necessarily
distinct from the human being. It must be within the power of the individual to enter into
relation with the divine, so that she can discern the divine will for herself – this task
cannot be limited to a few who hold positions of religious authority. Second, the religious
community must be careful in how it defines what is rational. Attempts to defend one’s
religion on purely theoretical grounds are misguided (as are attempts to attack the
practice on the same grounds), for much of religion’s purpose in human life is not
primarily theoretical in nature. A religious community must be flexible, ever-evolving,
and willing to respond to the practical needs of those who participate in it, even if those
needs are beyond the realm of reason alone. Furthermore, such a community should
broaden its definition of what is “rational,” understanding that the rational choice in a
given situation is largely determined by context. If these requirements are met, the
community in question can foster relations of thick trust among its members, creating a
social environment in which the interests of the individual and the group are revealed to
be one and the same. Any particular religious group should be evaluated in terms of
whether it meets these two conditions and successfully accomplishes this function.
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EPILOGUE
This project has sought to articulate the possibility of collaborative religious
community. The final chapter ended on an optimistic note, concluding that such a
community is indeed achievable, given the right set of conditions. However, we began with
a practical observation: people across the globe are abandoning organized religion at an
unprecedented rate. One may therefore ask: why point to the growing social irrelevance of
religion, only to then argue for its potential social utility? And if religion can provide such
a useful foundation for community relationships, why are so many people leaving it
behind?
While this project ends with positive words for religion’s social potential, it should
in no way be taken as a broadly uncritical defense of religion. We have seen in the previous
pages that there are all sorts of ways of doing religion that do not foster meaningful
community relationships. I have criticized these at length on both theoretical and practical
grounds. One should therefore not interpret this project as an attempt to place religion in
rose-colored light. Rather, this project sought a novel vantage point from which to critique
those religious practices that are indisputably harmful. It is certainly not controversial to
say that, especially in our present day, religion has become a uniquely powerful source of
interpersonal tension, social unrest, and even outright violence. The problem for the critic
of religion, however, is that most critiques of the practice are made upon the grounds of its
epistemological shortcomings – those atrocities committed by the faithful are typically
chalked up to products of irrationality, as foolish people doing foolish things. However,
such criticisms are as insufficient as they are dishonest. One can hold beliefs that are
indisputably false, without being motivated to commit the sorts of violent extremism for

which religion has become infamous. Religious extremists do not commit acts of violence
simply because they believe in a deity that does not literally exist; something else must
take place to bring an individual to the point of performing such actions.
In defining religion as a social phenomenon, I have differentiated between two
different kinds of belief, which serve distinct purposes in the lives of those who hold them.
When religious beliefs are taken to be purely indicative in nature, i.e. as attempts to discern
literal truths about reality, then of course those beliefs come up short. The problem with
examining religion in terms of indicative belief, however, is that religious claims are
unverifiable; while they certainly cannot be proven, they likewise cannot be definitively
disproven. This is why the typical critiques of religion are simply not effective in
conversations with those who hold deep-seated religious beliefs. The nature of religion
means that it is all but impossible to reason a diehard believer out of their faith. Criticizing
religion on purely epistemological grounds, then, accomplishes little of practical import.
All this task does is reassure those who already find religion dubitable that they are in fact
the “rational” party, while alienating them from those who find the dubious claims
compelling.
However, I have argued that since religion is primarily a social practice (rather than
a purely epistemological one), we should understand its primary function to be the
formation of imperative beliefs that foster durable social relationships. And criticizing it
on these grounds, i.e. whether the religion in question does in fact foster such relationships,
can be a more productive task. I have sought to not only define religion as a social
phenomenon, but to demonstrate its possibility as a healthy social phenomenon, so that we
can be justified in criticizing those historical practices which fail to achieve this standard.
161

As Kant famously establishes, necessity implies possibility; if we are to critique religions
that do not function as collaborative communities, we ought to demonstrate that such a
community is actually possible within a religious context. If this were not the case, then
religion writ large would simply have outlived any former social utility, and perhaps ought
to be cast into the dustbin of history. However, we have seen that such a community is
indeed possible. With this established, we can then examine particular religious practices
from a new perspective – i.e. whether those practices foster communal connections among
religious individuals. And in almost all of religion’s most well-documented failures, we
can see an alienation of the individual from the group that drives the believer away from
her faith community. Consider the sorts of religious violence that have become all too
common: individuals often experience alienation from religion over issues such as LGBTQ
rights, the morality of abortion, and the nature of such “sins” as addiction and suicide. We
should set aside the question of whether these religious moral claims are objectively true
(since, as we have already seen, these conversations are hardly productive in the first
place); what matters here is the social aspect of these disagreements. Dogmatic religious
ideologies set forth moral rules as objective truths to which the human being is held
accountable. On these issues, religious tradition is treated as being of greater import than
the individuals who participate in that tradition. 212 In these situations, neither of our
conditions for the growth of thick trust are met. The believer’s moral autonomy is not
preserved; she is rather subjected to an objective moral code, and told that she must follow
that code out of fear of punishment. Such a religion can only produce relations of thin trust,
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since it is based upon relations of force. Additionally, the practical context of the believer’s
situation is not considered; determining that a certain action is morally wrong in all
instances, regardless of context, betrays a limited definition of rationality and a lack of
appreciation for the practical situation of the human being. Because of this, in these
circumstances, the potential for religious community is undermined, as the believer
experiences herself as alienated from others within the faith. This is a failure of religion to
fulfill its social function – and it can be demonstrated without ever having to wade into the
issue of indicative belief.
One may still ask: what’s the value of preserving religion, when we could simply
stop being religious and avoid altogether the sorts of harms that it tends to perpetuate?
Perhaps religion can give some individuals community, but if it also yields such harms,
then isn’t there a safer way to foster community relationships? This project is certainly not
a prescription for faith; if one does not find meaningful community relationships within a
religious context, even a healthy one, then one is justified in removing oneself from that
community. However, while one’s own religious experiences are valid, one must also
contend with the reality that for billions of people across history, religion has been an
immensely meaningful institution, one which has been instrumental in the organization of
their personal and social lives. This is still the case for certain communities even in our
increasingly secular age. Given the prevalence of religion across history, it is highly
unlikely that the practice is something that humanity as a whole will eventually dispense
with altogether. Demanding so would be presumptive. Rather than stipulating that people
renounce those practical forms of life that have been fundamental in constructing their own
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values and worldviews, we should rather point to a healthier way of organizing those forms
of life, one which functions with the well-being of those who participate in them in mind.
It is important to note that what a collaborative religious community looks like in
practice will vary depending upon the practical situation of those who participate in it. This
project does not seek to (for example) say that one particular historical faith ought to be
disseminated worldwide, due to some built-in superior ability of that faith to foster thick
trust. While Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche all believed that certain historical religions did a
better job than others of fulfilling religion’s social function, they also recognized that no
particular religion is universalizable. Rather, one’s religious orientation (or lack thereof)
must develop in response to the given conditions of one’s own life. For those who find
religion to be a meaningful source of community, what I am proposing is something akin
to Hegelian folk religion: an individually-organized orientation towards one’s particular
social context.
In this way, I have argued for a way of doing religion that broadens the definition
of what we tend to consider “rational.” Religious beliefs should not be subjected to
scientific standards of scrutiny, or dismissed merely on the grounds that they are not
empirically verifiable. Rather, what is “rational” should be understood as a reasoned
response to a given set of conditions, even if the same response would be irrational outside
of those conditions. A potential objection to this project may go as follows: if religion need
not be rational (in the Enlightenment sense of the term), then we run the risk of signing off
on all manner of religious extremism. After all, if we are not holding religious claims to a
standard of universal truth, then what’s stopping a religious group from promoting any
absurd ideologies that they like? My response to this is to once again suggest that we refer
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back to Hegel’s criteria for a folk religion. Two points are relevant here: first, Hegel claims
that despite its practical orientation, a folk religion must still be grounded in reason. A folk
religion cannot issue out of an ideology that is blatantly irrational. However (and this raises
our second point), this is not because religion functions primarily in service of reason, but
rather because the blatantly irrational does not function in service of human life.
Communities are grounded upon relations of thick trust, which means that members of the
group must have reasonable confidence in their ability to predict the behavior of others. If
a religion encourages those who follow it to conduct themselves irrationally, then this
erodes the possibility of trust, because one cannot reasonably predict behavior that is
irrational. This in turn undermines the possibility of durable community relationships. I am
not therefore suggesting that we throw the rational to the wind; rather, I am suggesting that
we refrain from evaluating the “rationality” of religion merely in terms of whether its
claims are definitively true. There is a difference, after all, between the demonstrably
irrational and that which is beyond the scope of what human beings have historically
defined as “rational.”
In conclusion, religion is certainly not the only institution in which human beings
can find a community. Perhaps my most fundamental disagreement with Hegel is that I do
not believe that a wide-scale turn towards religion can fix mankind’s problems. However,
the practice has historically been a source of value and meaning for an untold number of
individuals, and due to its prevalence, it is not something that we should expect to vanish
altogether anytime soon. Instead of demanding that we should dispense with religion, or
simply dismissing it as something that is fundamentally irrational and therefore beyond the
scope of philosophical critique, we should instead see it as a human activity like any other,
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which can succeed or fail at accomplishing a given purpose. Those of us who are committed
to understanding human life ought to undertake an effort towards a good-faith
understanding of religion – and instead of dismissing it, to define the ways in which it can
be better.
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